8c3b62745a9ea5b2a52ec10f3219eea92cee9b1f
11
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 dtourolle
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ef1154af94 |
Resolve every base directory in one place, and on Windows
Five sites each read XDG_*_HOME and fell back to $HOME/.local/… on their own, which is fine on Linux and wrong everywhere else: Windows sets neither variable, so every one of them degraded to a path relative to the working directory — for a Start Menu launch, C:\Windows\System32. The models lookup walked XDG_DATA_DIRS the same way. dr_plat::dirs now holds the rule per platform: XDG on Unix, the known folders on Windows — %APPDATA% for config, which roams, and %LOCALAPPDATA% for data and state, which do not — and the executable's own directory as the system data dir, which is where the installer puts the models. The Android overrides stay where they were; only the fallback behind them moved. Both rule sets are unit-tested on either host, and the Windows one was confirmed by running the application under Wine: its log landed in AppData\Local\darkroom\state and nothing was written anywhere else. |
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 dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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6a97fdf6f9 |
Put the adjustment groups in the rail where a finger is driving
Reported from the tablet: the tool rail is very useful there, and the same interface under a mouse and keyboard is not. That is `ui-navigation.md` D-N2's central assumption failing in use, and the interesting part is which half of it failed. D-N2 was right that platform is the wrong axis and width is the wrong axis: a tablet in landscape wants what a desktop wants, and a desktop window dragged narrow wants what a small screen wants. `apply_layout_class` still decides the layout class from the window and nothing here changes that. What D-N2 got wrong is the sentence "touch changes hit regions, not layout" — it identified input as the real difference between the targets and then assumed that difference could never reach the layout. Two controls answer one question — which group of adjustments am I looking at — and neither is better in general. A horizontal strip above the column is one gesture to a target the eye has already found, and it pans when the operation set is rich, so a group can sit off the end with nothing saying so: a pointer user tolerates that, a finger user never discovers it. The same list down the rail is every entry visible at once, each finger-sized, on the edge of the screen the hand is already holding, and it costs no width because the rail is already there. So `ToolRail` grows a second section, and `GroupStrip` stands down when it does. The two are never both on screen, which is why they can share `adjust-tab-picked`: Rust is not told which was pressed and has no reason to want to. Mode and group stay independent axes as N1 requires — one entry lit in each section, and choosing a group while a tool is held still filters without putting the tool down. They stay drawn differently, which N1 also required. The tools fill with `active-dim` and invert their ink; the groups take a bar down the leading edge — the strip's underline turned ninety degrees — so a lit entry says which kind of state it is without the reader having to remember which section it was in. The rule between the sections is the second signal. The rail scrolls now. Its own note argued against a Flickable because "this list is four entries written in this file"; with the groups in it the list comes from the operation set, which is exactly the "something the user's data decides" that note excluded this control from. The axis is input, and it is a preference because the automatic answer is a guess that cannot be made reliable. Neither platform can be asked what the user is holding: an Android tablet in a keyboard case is being driven like a desktop, and a touchscreen laptop is whichever its owner says. `dr_plat::is_touch_first` reports the usual case per platform, and `GroupNavigation` lets it be overridden. Settings names what Automatic resolves to on this device rather than leaving it to be found by pressing. D-N6 records the reversal beside the decision it reverses, including the half that still stands and the question it opens: whether Local is a mode at all, or a scope that would collapse the two sections into one list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dtourolle
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509c3a3e96 |
Merge: a log that survives the process, so the tablet can be debugged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> # Conflicts: # apps/darkroom-android/Cargo.toml # apps/darkroom-desktop/Cargo.toml # platform/dr-plat/src/lib.rs |
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dtourolle
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465f5a7ffa |
Keep the log after the session that produced it
Everything this application knew about a failure went to stderr on the desktop and to logcat on Android, and both are gone the moment the terminal closes or the ring buffer wraps. That is fine when the person debugging is sitting at the machine. It is useless for the case NFR-OPS-1 actually describes, and the one Android makes normal: somebody reproduces a bug on a tablet, and then sends us a file. A large amount of Android behaviour has never run on a device — image intents read over JNI, an ExportProvider, a class loaded through the activity's class loader, memory-pressure eviction, lost-root recovery — and the single most likely failure of the lot, the activity's loader not resolving our classes from android_main's thread, produces one line that scrolls past. That line is now in a file, with the thread that emitted it named beside it. dr_plat::state answers "where does this platform keep state for this app": $XDG_STATE_HOME/darkroom on Linux, and on Android whatever the entry point declares. Separate from configuration and from the catalog for the reason XDG separates them — state is the thing nobody backs up and the user may delete without consequence. dr_plat::diagnostics is the sink. Two files of 4 MiB, so the worst case is a number rather than a discovery on a full phone; one line per write with no BufWriter anywhere, because on Android processes are killed rather than ended and a buffered log loses exactly the line it was kept for; and redaction applied at the sink rather than at the call sites, since a rule every author has to remember is not a rule. It tees the platform's own logger rather than replacing it, so logcat is unchanged — losing that while debugging would have made this a downgrade. Android logs to external_data_path, not internal. Both are app-private and both survive backgrounding; what separates them is that /data/data/<pkg>/files needs run-as against a debuggable build to read and /sdcard/Android/data/<pkg>/files is a plain adb pull from any build. A log nobody can retrieve is not a diagnostic. The consequence is that anyone holding the tablet can read it, which is why the redaction is where it is, and why configuration stays on internal_data_path. What is redacted is what NFR-SEC-2 and NFR-OPS-1 name: credentials and tokens, found by the keyword that nearly always sits next to them, plus the two forms that carry one with no keyword at all — an Authorization scheme and a URL's userinfo. What is deliberately not redacted is filesystem paths and the names of the user's photographs. They are in neither requirement's list, and "failed to decode <redacted>" is not a diagnostic; the preview-and-consent step NFR-OPS-1 asks for governs those better than scrubbing would, because it lets the user look. The over-redaction failure is tested as carefully as the under-redaction one. A scrubber that eats "using basic sRGB as the fallback" makes a log useless without ever being caught. |
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dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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35954dfa1d |
Write a panic down where it can still be read, with nothing in it that names the user
NFR-OPS-2 is two sentences — local crash capture always, upload only on explicit opt-in — and what existed was one `log::error!` in the Android entry point and nothing at all on desktop. So a panic on desktop went to stderr and died with the terminal, and a panic on Android went to a logcat ring buffer that is gone long before anyone reports anything. What the user saw either way was a job that stopped or a control that went dead, with nothing to send. That matters more here than it would in most applications, because NFR-ARCH-4 says no worker error may panic the process and the code is written that way: errors are typed and attached to the image or job they belong to. A panic is therefore by construction a bug — an invariant this codebase believed and got wrong — and it was the one class of failure with no trace. `dr_plat::crash` writes a record to the XDG state directory: version, time, os, arch, thread, panic location, message, backtrace. In dr-plat rather than in either entry point because "where does this platform let an application keep state" is a platform question, and Android's answer is neither XDG nor `temp_dir` — `set_state_dir` takes it from `internal_data_path`, the same place `dr_sync::account::set_data_dir` gets its answer. The hook resolves the directory when it fires rather than when it is installed, which is what lets it go in before everything else and cover the startup it would otherwise miss. **The content rule is the substance of this, not the plumbing.** NFR-SEC-2 forbids credentials in logs and plain files; the same reasoning applies with more force to what this application is actually about, because a user's library is private and so is its shape. `/home/anna/Photos/2019 Divorce/` says something about a person, and a crash record is exactly the file someone attaches to a bug report while trying to be helpful. So `redact` runs over the message *and* the backtrace, and is deliberately blunt: anything containing a slash goes, `content://` and `primary:DCIM/...` included, since SAF names a library just as precisely as a path does; anything beside a word like `password` goes; a long opaque run with letters and digits in it goes, which is the shape of an app password nobody labelled. The one exception is a `.rs` path, which keeps its basename — a backtrace with no filenames is close to useless and `library.rs:1270` says nothing about anybody. Over-redaction costs legibility. Under-redaction costs a user something they cannot take back. Those are not comparable, so the boundary is not the place to be clever. NFR-SEC-5 — face data never in a crash report, under any configuration — is met structurally rather than by filtering: this module reads no catalog, opens no image, touches no account. A record is assembled from the panic hook's own arguments and `std::env::consts`, and there is no code path from here to an embedding. The message length cap is the backstop for a payload some other module formatted something large into. stderr is the one surface that still sees the message unredacted, deliberately: the previous hook is chained rather than replaced, so a developer watching a terminal does not lose the panic because the application started writing files. It is ephemeral, local, and never attached to a report. **No upload path, and not half of one** — no endpoint, no queue, no "send this later" flag. Opt-in upload needs a server to receive it and a consent flow stating what leaves the device (NFR-SEC-4, and the preview-and-consent step NFR-OPS-1 requires of the diagnostics bundle). Neither exists, and a transport built ahead of its consent is the shape of thing that later gets switched on by default. Leaves NFR-OPS-1 cheaper by three things it will want unchanged: `state_dir` (the log belongs at `state_dir()/log` beside `crash/`, so the diagnostics bundle has one directory to collect), `redact` (NFR-OPS-1's "automatic redaction of credentials and tokens" is this function), and `prune` (a size-capped rotation is this, counting bytes instead of files). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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e4875498ca |
Ask the platform what colour the screen actually is
FR-DSP-8's acquisition half. `dr_plat::display` surveys the session's
displays and reduces each one's profile to an output space the pipeline
can encode into, stating the mechanism per display server as
FR-PLAT-LIN-2 requires:
- X11 reads the `_ICC_PROFILE` / `_ICC_PROFILE_<n>` root-window
properties, enumerating and numbering the outputs through RandR,
which also yields the rectangles a window move is measured against.
- Wayland binds `wp_color_manager_v1` and asks each `wl_output` for
its image description, accepting either an ICC profile on a file
descriptor or primaries stated as chromaticities.
- Where neither answers, sRGB is assumed and the reason travels with
it as data rather than into a log, so the About page can say which
path the session is on.
A display profile is a measurement of one panel and is none of the four
spaces the pipeline knows. Rather than grow an ICC engine, the profile
is reduced to D50-adapted colorants and matched against the four; a
match that is merely nearest is marked as such and shown as such.
Verified on this machine: mutter 50 advertises the colour-management
global and reports eDP-1 as sRGB, and the same session forced onto X11
enumerates the output through RandR and correctly finds no atom.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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b1bf68022d |
Do not offer an import where one cannot be done
The Import button went into the library header unconditionally, so an Android user got a page that opens, finds nothing, and cannot be pressed — worse than no page at all, because it reads as broken rather than as absent. `dr_plat::imports_supported()` answers the question the interface actually has, which is not "did we find a volume". An empty list on Linux means plug one in; false here means it cannot be done on this device however hard the user tries. It is false on Android for two reasons that both have to be fixed before it changes: there is no mount table to read and no path to type, and nothing implements WritableStorage except LocalStorage. The button is hidden rather than disabled. The buttons beside it come and go with the selection — unavailable now, available in a moment — where this one never will be here, and a permanently disabled control teaches the reader that the row lies. What this gates is the interface, not the engine. dr-ingest takes storage traits and never a path, and cross-compiles to aarch64-linux-android today; it should need no changes when a SAF implementation lands. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dtourolle
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735683b849 | wip: ingest | ||
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dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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37d8744db8 |
Let storage write as well as read
Storage enumerates and reads, which is all a scan ever needed. An import writes, and there was nothing to write through. WritableStorage is separate from Storage rather than folded into it, because the two are not granted together: a card mounted read-only, or a share the user has view rights on, should fail to typecheck as a destination rather than fail with EROFS halfway through a copy. Ingest takes a &dyn Storage source and a &dyn WritableStorage destination, which is exactly the asymmetry of copying off a card. Shaped for SAF throughout, for the same reason the read side is: a document id is not composable, so every call takes a parent reference plus one name and hands back the reference the provider itself produced. create_dir is idempotent because importing a second card on the same day must land in the folder the first made, and the naive SAF call would produce "2026-08-22 (1)". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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bb71f141e7 |
Let a folder on this machine be scanned into the catalog
`dr_catalog::scan` has known since it was written what a changed directory means — when to prune, when to list, and the one question that decides whether a deletion sweep is safe. It was fully tested and nothing called it, because walking a real directory "belongs to the platform layer" and the platform layer was eleven lines re-exporting `secrets`. So every photograph in DarkRoom arrived over WebDAV, and a user without a Nextcloud account saw nothing at all. This is the missing half: a `Storage` trait, a filesystem implementation of it, and the driver that pours one into the other. The trait is shaped by the platform it does *not* yet support. Android's SAF gives no filesystem path, which is why `SourceRef` exists; less obviously, it gives no way to *compose* one either — a document id is opaque, and the only way to learn a child's id is the children query that returned it. So a listing hands back the reference to each entry rather than a name for the caller to join onto a parent, and there is deliberately no "path + name" helper anywhere above `LocalStorage`. That single restriction is what makes SAF a second implementation rather than a second set of call sites. A reference is otherwise an opaque `(RootId, key)` pair the catalog stores verbatim and rebuilds later, which a persisted tree grant supports exactly as a relative path does. A `Path` now appears in one place: `LocalStorage::grant`, where the folder the user picked is handed in. Everything above it addresses a `RootId`. `dr_catalog::walk` is the seam. It probes a directory, asks `scan` what that means, lists only when told to, and reconciles what it found against the rows it holds. Two things it does are worth saying out loud, because both are ways to lose a library: Absence only counts where absence was observed. A listed folder proves its missing images are gone; a pruned one proves nothing about its contents, and a scan that was cancelled or that failed part-way proves nothing about folders it never reached. So the file sweep runs per listed folder, the folder sweep runs once at the end and only after a complete scan, and a root that cannot be reached at all marks its images offline and deletes nothing — FR-CAT-9's line between proven-absent and merely-unreachable, which is the difference between unplugging a drive and losing everything on it. A trashed image is absent from its folder on purpose. It is exempt from both sweeps, and detached from a folder about to be deleted rather than cascaded away with it, or a soft delete would come undone the first time the folder it came from was rescanned. Two things the tests taught, both changes to what was there before: Modification times are now milliseconds, not seconds. Change detection asks whether a timestamp moved, so the unit's granularity is the width of the window in which a change is invisible — and a second is long enough to copy a card and start a scan. The test that caught it looked like a test bug; it was not. SAF reports milliseconds natively, so this is also the unit that needs no conversion on the platform with the coarser clock. And an in-place rewrite of an existing file is invisible to directory-level pruning, because writing to a file moves neither its directory's mtime nor its entry count. That is a real limit, now documented and held by a test rather than left to be discovered. It bites less than it reads: an export, a restore, `mv`, and every editor that saves safely write beside the file and rename over it, which does move both. Narrowing the format filter no longer deletes what it stops matching, which fell out of the same principle: unticking JPEG says stop looking for new ones, not discard the hundred already rated. The files are sitting right there. `DirState` and `DirEntry` move to `dr-types`. They are the sentence the platform says to the catalog and both crates need the same one; `scan` re-exports them so nothing that used them has changed. Not done: the UI. The launch screen's "Open library" flow is account-shaped from the first field to the thumbnail worker, and giving it a local branch is its own piece of work rather than a button. `cargo run -p dr-catalog --example scan_local -- ~/Pictures` scans a real folder and reports what it cost; run it twice to see the second run list nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dtourolle
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09e3043f4c |
Add secure credential storage, sessions, and a launch screen
Login now persists properly rather than through the JSON file the test
harness was using.
dr-plat SecretStore trait plus a Secret Service backend.
Verified against the live GNOME Keyring: store,
retrieve, delete, confirm-gone all round-trip.
Session/SessionStore splits credentials from settings — the app
password goes to the keyring (FR-NC-2), while
server, login, chosen root and format selection are
ordinary config. A test asserts the credential never
appears in the config file.
LaunchModel the launch-screen state machine, testable without a
display server: sign in, approve in browser, choose
folder, tick formats, sign out.
launch.slint the screen itself, in its own file.
Absence of a secrets daemon is an explicit degraded mode, not a silent
fallback to plaintext — the screen says sign-in will not persist rather
than letting the user find out next launch. Android's Keystore backend
fails loudly for the same reason: a no-op store would look like it
worked and then lose the credential.
Two bugs caught by tests rather than by running it:
- fail() after busy() signed the user out, because busy() had already
discarded the session. A failed *scan* would have logged you out.
Busy now carries the session.
- normalise_server upgrades http:// to https:// rather than accepting
it. NFR-SEC-3 requires TLS, and silently sending a credential in the
clear is not a decision to make on the user's behalf.
launch.slint is not yet wired into app.slint. Calling slint_build::compile
twice replaces the generated module rather than adding to it, which broke
the other in-flight work on dr-ui; I reverted that immediately. Wiring it
needs an import inside app.slint, which is that work's file to change.
419 tests passing across ten crates.
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