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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 dtourolle
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509c3a3e96 |
Merge: a log that survives the process, so the tablet can be debugged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> # Conflicts: # apps/darkroom-android/Cargo.toml # apps/darkroom-desktop/Cargo.toml # platform/dr-plat/src/lib.rs |
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dtourolle
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465f5a7ffa |
Keep the log after the session that produced it
Everything this application knew about a failure went to stderr on the desktop and to logcat on Android, and both are gone the moment the terminal closes or the ring buffer wraps. That is fine when the person debugging is sitting at the machine. It is useless for the case NFR-OPS-1 actually describes, and the one Android makes normal: somebody reproduces a bug on a tablet, and then sends us a file. A large amount of Android behaviour has never run on a device — image intents read over JNI, an ExportProvider, a class loaded through the activity's class loader, memory-pressure eviction, lost-root recovery — and the single most likely failure of the lot, the activity's loader not resolving our classes from android_main's thread, produces one line that scrolls past. That line is now in a file, with the thread that emitted it named beside it. dr_plat::state answers "where does this platform keep state for this app": $XDG_STATE_HOME/darkroom on Linux, and on Android whatever the entry point declares. Separate from configuration and from the catalog for the reason XDG separates them — state is the thing nobody backs up and the user may delete without consequence. dr_plat::diagnostics is the sink. Two files of 4 MiB, so the worst case is a number rather than a discovery on a full phone; one line per write with no BufWriter anywhere, because on Android processes are killed rather than ended and a buffered log loses exactly the line it was kept for; and redaction applied at the sink rather than at the call sites, since a rule every author has to remember is not a rule. It tees the platform's own logger rather than replacing it, so logcat is unchanged — losing that while debugging would have made this a downgrade. Android logs to external_data_path, not internal. Both are app-private and both survive backgrounding; what separates them is that /data/data/<pkg>/files needs run-as against a debuggable build to read and /sdcard/Android/data/<pkg>/files is a plain adb pull from any build. A log nobody can retrieve is not a diagnostic. The consequence is that anyone holding the tablet can read it, which is why the redaction is where it is, and why configuration stays on internal_data_path. What is redacted is what NFR-SEC-2 and NFR-OPS-1 name: credentials and tokens, found by the keyword that nearly always sits next to them, plus the two forms that carry one with no keyword at all — an Authorization scheme and a URL's userinfo. What is deliberately not redacted is filesystem paths and the names of the user's photographs. They are in neither requirement's list, and "failed to decode <redacted>" is not a diagnostic; the preview-and-consent step NFR-OPS-1 asks for governs those better than scrubbing would, because it lets the user look. The over-redaction failure is tested as carefully as the under-redaction one. A scrubber that eats "using basic sRGB as the fallback" makes a log useless without ever being caught. |
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 dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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35954dfa1d |
Write a panic down where it can still be read, with nothing in it that names the user
NFR-OPS-2 is two sentences — local crash capture always, upload only on explicit opt-in — and what existed was one `log::error!` in the Android entry point and nothing at all on desktop. So a panic on desktop went to stderr and died with the terminal, and a panic on Android went to a logcat ring buffer that is gone long before anyone reports anything. What the user saw either way was a job that stopped or a control that went dead, with nothing to send. That matters more here than it would in most applications, because NFR-ARCH-4 says no worker error may panic the process and the code is written that way: errors are typed and attached to the image or job they belong to. A panic is therefore by construction a bug — an invariant this codebase believed and got wrong — and it was the one class of failure with no trace. `dr_plat::crash` writes a record to the XDG state directory: version, time, os, arch, thread, panic location, message, backtrace. In dr-plat rather than in either entry point because "where does this platform let an application keep state" is a platform question, and Android's answer is neither XDG nor `temp_dir` — `set_state_dir` takes it from `internal_data_path`, the same place `dr_sync::account::set_data_dir` gets its answer. The hook resolves the directory when it fires rather than when it is installed, which is what lets it go in before everything else and cover the startup it would otherwise miss. **The content rule is the substance of this, not the plumbing.** NFR-SEC-2 forbids credentials in logs and plain files; the same reasoning applies with more force to what this application is actually about, because a user's library is private and so is its shape. `/home/anna/Photos/2019 Divorce/` says something about a person, and a crash record is exactly the file someone attaches to a bug report while trying to be helpful. So `redact` runs over the message *and* the backtrace, and is deliberately blunt: anything containing a slash goes, `content://` and `primary:DCIM/...` included, since SAF names a library just as precisely as a path does; anything beside a word like `password` goes; a long opaque run with letters and digits in it goes, which is the shape of an app password nobody labelled. The one exception is a `.rs` path, which keeps its basename — a backtrace with no filenames is close to useless and `library.rs:1270` says nothing about anybody. Over-redaction costs legibility. Under-redaction costs a user something they cannot take back. Those are not comparable, so the boundary is not the place to be clever. NFR-SEC-5 — face data never in a crash report, under any configuration — is met structurally rather than by filtering: this module reads no catalog, opens no image, touches no account. A record is assembled from the panic hook's own arguments and `std::env::consts`, and there is no code path from here to an embedding. The message length cap is the backstop for a payload some other module formatted something large into. stderr is the one surface that still sees the message unredacted, deliberately: the previous hook is chained rather than replaced, so a developer watching a terminal does not lose the panic because the application started writing files. It is ephemeral, local, and never attached to a report. **No upload path, and not half of one** — no endpoint, no queue, no "send this later" flag. Opt-in upload needs a server to receive it and a consent flow stating what leaves the device (NFR-SEC-4, and the preview-and-consent step NFR-OPS-1 requires of the diagnostics bundle). Neither exists, and a transport built ahead of its consent is the shape of thing that later gets switched on by default. Leaves NFR-OPS-1 cheaper by three things it will want unchanged: `state_dir` (the log belongs at `state_dir()/log` beside `crash/`, so the diagnostics bundle has one directory to collect), `redact` (NFR-OPS-1's "automatic redaction of credentials and tokens" is this function), and `prune` (a size-capped rotation is this, counting bytes instead of files). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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09dddde594 |
Take the photograph another app hands over, and hand an export back
FR-PLAT-AND-6 asks for two things this app did neither of: be a receiver for image view and share intents, and share exported results out through a FileProvider. The manifest declared one activity with one MAIN/LAUNCHER filter, so nothing on the device ever offered DarkRoom for a photograph, and there was no route out at all — Android has refused file:// URIs between apps since API 24, and a content:// URI needs a provider to be behind it. Inbound. Three filters now: VIEW for a gallery or a file manager, SEND and SEND_MULTIPLE for the share sheet, all on image/*. `android_main` reads the launch Intent before it gives `app` away to Slint, and what comes back is passed to `dr_ui::run` exactly as argv is on the desktop — `startup_action` already treats a non-empty list as "the user asked for these specifically", which is what a share is. The URIs are copied into the cache before the viewer opens, and that cost is real: a shared raw file is written once, in full, on the startup path. A content:// URI is a handle into another app's provider, not a path, and the decoders take paths; the alternative is teaching the whole read path about URIs, which is FR-PLAT-AND-1's SAF connector and is not built. Outbound. ExportProvider serves one directory — getFilesDir(), which is the same path `internal_data_path` gives the Rust side — and refuses everything else by canonicalising the request and checking it is inside that root, so `../` and a planted symlink fail the same test. Not AndroidX's FileProvider, because AndroidX is a Maven artefact and this build has no resolver; what it does is a hundred lines and they are here. The share half has no caller. The provider, the URI grant and the chooser are all in place, but the control that would invoke them belongs in `ui/dr-ui`, and wiring it needs an `AndroidApp` the interface can reach. It is documented as unwired and deliberately not tagged as covering the requirement. `launchMode="singleTask"` comes with the filters and is not decoration: another app can now launch this activity while it is running, and the default mode answers that by creating a second NativeActivity in the same process — a second android_main, a second Slint backend, a second wgpu device. The cost of the fix is stated in the manifest: a share arriving while DarkRoom is already open brings it forward without opening the image, because onNewIntent has no route through android-activity's event stream. The Java is Java because Android constructs it: a ContentProvider is instantiated by the system from its manifest entry, and getIntent() exists only on an activity object. Both directions live there rather than in JNI so that what crosses the boundary is two method signatures instead of forty, each of which is a string checked at run time and nowhere else. What a test can hold: the declarations. Nothing about an Intent or a ContentProvider is reachable from `cargo test`, but an intent filter that is deleted takes the app out of every "open with" menu silently, and an authority that stops matching its class raises a SecurityException inside somebody else's app. The tests in lib.rs read the manifest and ExportProvider.java through `include_str!` and hold both to that, on the host, which is the only place in the workspace that looks at either file from Rust. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dtourolle
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f12aece07e |
Make storage pluggable, and prove it with a folder backend
`RemoteBackend` existed from the first release and bought nothing it was
designed for. Seven files in `dr-ui` constructed a `NextcloudBackend`
directly, an account *was* a server URL beside a DAV user id, the local
cache directory was named after a hostname, and the launch screen knew
that signing in meant a browser handshake. The trait was real; the seam
was documentation.
A trait over operations is only a quarter of it. Pluggable storage needs
four things, and this adds the other three:
- **Capabilities** — already there, and the reason the engine can drive
two backends at the speed each actually runs at.
- **Configuration** — `dr_sync::Account`: where a library lives, in
whatever form its connector addresses, with no server in it. Loads
every existing config unchanged (`backend` defaults to `nextcloud`,
`endpoint` is stored under its historical `server` key), and
`Account::namespace()` reproduces the old catalog directory byte for
byte, because changing it would abandon a catalog, its thumbnail
shards, and the sidecars holding unsynced offline work.
- **Registration** — `BackendProvider` and `BackendRegistry`.
`ui/dr-ui/src/remote.rs` is now the only file above `dr-sync` that
names a connector.
`Connection` (an account plus an optional `Secret`) replaces the
credentials-and-user-id pair that was threaded through fifteen
signatures in an order that could be swapped. `Secret`'s inner string is
reachable only through `expose()` and its `Debug` prints `Secret(***)`,
so the indirect leak — a `{:?}` on anything holding one — no longer
compiles into a leak.
Nextcloud is unchanged and keeps every peculiarity: propagating ETags,
chunked upload v2, `oc:fileid`, the `oc:permissions` probe on a refused
PUT, the 423 retry classification, Login Flow v2. Those are what the
capability model exists to serve, not something to hide.
`dr-sync-folder` is the second connector: a local disk, a network mount,
an external drive, or a folder a Nextcloud client already syncs. No
account, no credential — the route that works where no secrets daemon
does. It declares `LocalEtags` rather than claiming propagation a POSIX
directory cannot provide, which costs nothing because 50k `stat` calls
are not 50k PROPFINDs. Identity is a path hash, not an inode: an inode
survives a rename but differs between devices and is reused after a
delete, so two machines would disagree about which photograph a
thumbnail belonged to. Re-deriving a thumbnail is a cost; showing the
wrong one is a bug.
docs/storage.md is the contract — the traits, the four steps to add a
backend, and what each connector declares. ARCH §8.0 and §8.4a, and
FR-NC-13, say why.
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dtourolleandClaude Opus 5
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cf8f5b632f |
Show the develop frame itself, instead of a photocopy of it
The oldest open item in the project (ARCH §6.1, spike S1, AC-8). Every frame
in develop was read off the GPU into a `SharedPixelBuffer` and handed back to
Slint to upload again: ~7 ms at 4K against a 0.28 ms compute pass, 96% of the
frame spent carrying pixels to the CPU and back so they could be drawn where
they already were.
Slint 1.17 will adopt a `wgpu::Texture` directly, and the whole of what that
needs is arrangement rather than code.
**One device, made before the window.** A texture belongs to the device that
allocated it, so the compute passes and the compositor cannot each open their
own. `GpuContext::new_shared` opens one and hands back the instance and
adapter alongside it; `dr_ui::shared_gpu` gives all four to
`BackendSelector::require_wgpu_29(WGPUConfiguration::Manual { .. })`. That
call has to come before the first window, because creating one selects a
backend for you — which is why the GPU is now opened at the top of `run`
rather than two hundred lines down beside the other controllers.
dr-gpu still names no UI type. It hands out raw wgpu and does not ask who is
compositing (ARCH §6.5a).
**Vulkan only on the shared path**, where headless keeps its GL fallback.
wgpu's GL backend reaches its display through EGL at instance creation, and
before a window exists there is no display handle to give it — so a GL
instance cannot later produce the window surface Slint needs from it. A
machine with no Vulkan gets no shared device and browses without develop,
which is the same degradation as no adapter at all.
**`renderer-femtovg` becomes `renderer-femtovg-wgpu`.** The old one is FemtoVG
over OpenGL and cannot be handed a wgpu texture at all. It is not kept
alongside as a fallback: FemtoVG-over-GL has no branch for an imported
texture, falls through to "render this image into a buffer", gets nothing, and
draws nothing — a blank canvas with no error, which is worse than the failure
it would be papering over. The consequence is stated plainly in the manifest:
the desktop app now needs a working wgpu adapter to open a window.
**Two output textures, not one, and this is the part that is not obvious.**
Slint repaints when the image property *changes*, and it decides that with
`PartialEq` — which for two images over the same `wgpu::Texture` says
"unchanged". A pass that reused a single target would have rendered every
slider move correctly on the GPU and shown none of them: right, and invisible.
`AdjustPass` alternates between two targets, so consecutive frames are
genuinely different values. It also settles the read-while-write question that
one queue was already answering.
`RENDER_ATTACHMENT` is added to both render targets. Neither pass uses it;
Slint rejects an imported texture without it, on the reasoning that a
compositor handed a texture may need to draw into it.
**`AdjustPass::read_output` is deleted rather than gated.** It and
`export_pixels` were the same transfer under two names, and the comments
explaining why they were separate are the point of the whole criterion:
reading pixels back to *display* them is the defect, reading them back to
*encode a file* is the only way a file is made. The display twin is now gone
outright, which is stronger than a feature flag — it cannot be turned back on.
`export_pixels` is untouched and still ungated. The `readback` feature comes
off dr-ui, darkroom-desktop and darkroom-android; it stays in dr-gpu, where it
still gates `RenderTarget::read_pixels` and the segmentation field readback.
`examples/develop` moves to `export_pixels`, which is honest — it writes a
PPM — and so no longer needs the feature.
Four tests, each named for what it protects and each of which fails without a
screen if the property it guards breaks:
- the adjust target satisfies every condition Slint's import checks, asserted
in the crate that owns the descriptor, because a descriptor that drifts
fails at runtime on a real display and nothing else would notice;
- consecutive renders are different textures, and the third is the first
again, so the alternation is a rotation and not an allocation per frame;
- the develop canvas has no CPU pixel buffer and does have a wgpu texture —
AC-8 itself, in the terms Slint uses;
- consecutive frames compare unequal as `slint::Image`, which is the property
the repaint actually depends on.
The zoom test's readback moves into the test module. It has to: there is no
library function that copies a displayed frame to the CPU any more, and that
is the point — the round-trip now exists in the test binary and nowhere a
shipping build can reach.
**What is not proven.** No GUI was run. What is verified is that the texture
satisfies the import contract, that the import succeeds, that the canvas is a
texture rather than a buffer, and that consecutive frames are distinguishable.
What is unverified is everything that needs a display: that Slint's FemtoVG
wgpu renderer adopts the Manual configuration on a real surface, that the
picture appears the right way up and the right colour, and the frame timing
that motivated the whole exercise. Android is untouched by testing — the
android backend routes a WGPU29 request to Skia, whose wgpu surface does
handle imported textures, but that is read from the source, not observed.
56 dr-gpu tests and 255 dr-ui tests pass, clippy clean under `-D warnings`,
fmt clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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dtourolle
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4d78041d1d | Many imorovments | ||
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dtourolle
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2a7a319d6c |
Depend on slint directly in the Android app
android_main takes an AndroidApp and calls slint::android::init, both of which come from slint itself rather than from dr-ui. The backend feature still arrives through dr-ui's target-specific dependency. anyhow was unused. Assisted-by: LLM |
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dtourolle
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5dc1279429 |
Add the Android app shell; cap cross-build parallelism
Cap both halves of the container build: CARGO_BUILD_JOBS limits how many rustc processes cargo starts, while --cpus limits what the container gets regardless of what nested build scripts spawn — cc, cmake, and ring's asm build all parallelise on their own account and do not consult cargo. Without both, a full cross-compile takes every thread on the host and makes the machine unusable for the length of a background build. Assisted-by: LLM |