Files
DarkRoom/ui/dr-ui
dtourolleandClaude Opus 5 2fb3eb5d2d
Build and test / Desktop (Linux) (push) Successful in 2h7m52s
Build and test / Layer separation (push) Successful in 57s
🐳 Android image / Build and push (push) Successful in 12s
Build and test / android-image (push) Successful in 13s
Traceability / Requirement traces (push) Successful in 57s
Build and test / Android (aarch64) (push) Successful in 20m58s
Upload a shard that was sealed after the server saw it
The tablet showed 442 of a person's 648 faces and could never catch up. Its
shard ledger said why: it had adopted the laptop's shard 0 at 2,711,552 bytes,
and that shard is 20,402,176 bytes on disk.

The upload skipped it. A sealed shard the server already had under that name was
taken to be "byte-identical by construction", so its mere presence was proof
enough and the size was never consulted. That premise is false, and this library
is the counter-example: an *open* shard is uploaded on every pass as it fills —
that is how a growing shard reaches the other devices — so the server ordinarily
holds a partial copy of a shard that is later completed and sealed. Sealing then
froze that partial copy in place for ever.

Nothing downstream could recover from it. The tablet's `has_adopted` check is
keyed on name *and* size and would have re-downloaded a changed shard gladly; it
was never offered one, because the sending side had stopped looking.

So the comparison is on size, sealed or not. The client id is in the name, so
nobody else can have written the file and size is a sound test. A sealed shard
whose size already matches is still skipped on the first comparison, which is
all the original cheapness was worth.

The thumbnail upload had the identical test and the identical hole, and is fixed
with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 08:32:01 +02:00
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