Removes `cut.video_hash` and the `exact` match tier on legal grounds. The
OpenSubtitles hash was the strongest technical signal available — it identifies
a specific file, so it cannot produce a false positive — and that is exactly
the problem.
Every tier must be a claim about a *cut*, never about a copy. A TMDB id
discloses "some copy of this film", which is what a library catalogue
discloses. A file hash discloses "this exact release": it made a read endpoint
into a release-level oracle, and made an instance's database a mapping from
file fingerprints to the instances holding them. That is a far more specific
disclosure than PR-005 permits, and a dataset no volunteer operator should be
asked to hold. The audio signature is the replacement: derived from content, it
identifies the cut rather than the copy, so two encodes of the same edit agree.
The field is deleted rather than kept as a vestigial null, on the same
reasoning §2 applied to `anneal_sec` — a key naming a signal the format no
longer has is actively misleading — so an upload carrying one is now an
unknown-field 400, with a test asserting it.
**Every content_id changes**, including for manifests that never carried a
hash, because the canonical `cut` object lost a key. The golden vector is
regenerated and re-verified against an independent Python implementation; the
plugin and extraction repos must adopt the new value or federation
deduplication silently breaks. Free now, pre-release; not free later.
Adds docs/legal-posture.md, the operator-facing half of what §5a asks for:
what an instance holds exhaustively, what it structurally cannot do, and how
that sits against the intermediary-liability regimes that plausibly apply.
208 tests. Coverage 25/32.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TRACES: UR-011 | SR-004, PR-005
Implements §9a. The replication surface is four reads and no writes: a change
feed, fetch by content_id, a batch have, and a human-facing peer directory —
plus a capabilities endpoint carrying the accepted envelope versions, which
lets a client discover a schema mismatch in one request instead of a 400 per
manifest across a library sweep.
Pull, never push: a pulling server chooses what it ingests and when. Push would
let any peer inject work into the validation queue — the same abuse surface as
anonymous upload, at higher volume.
Nothing inherits a peer's judgement. A pulled manifest runs the full §6 stage 1
and 2 validation and this server's own cast check, and the fetched body must
hash to the content_id that was asked for — the check that stops an
intermediary or a misbehaving peer substituting content under a trusted id.
A peer's retraction flags for review rather than delisting, because
auto-delisting would hand every peer a remote delete primitive; only the opt-in
per-peer abuse channel delists, because a takedown propagating at the speed of
manual review is the wrong failure mode for that one case.
A test caught a real bug in the first cut: the feed cursor was a ULID, and
ULIDs are only monotonic *between* milliseconds — two generated in the same
millisecond carry independent random components and can sort opposite to write
order. A peer resuming from `seq > cursor` would then silently skip an entry:
replication losing manifests with no error anywhere. The cursor is now an
AUTOINCREMENT integer, and the test asserts strict monotonicity rather than
merely sortedness.
Peer administration is deliberately not an API. §9a requires that a peering
exist only because an operator typed a URL, so nothing a remote server returns
can establish or widen one; there_is_no_endpoint_that_creates_a_peering asserts
that absence rather than trusting it.
212 tests. Coverage 25/32 (78%).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TRACES: UR-008 | PR-006
dtourolleandClaude Opus 5