6802328e97245a623c5cae6be9566bad3fd37791
18
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
80c2b1fb2f |
fix: try_push must distinguish delivered from discarded
try_push returned bool, and returned *true* for a closed channel — so "the
value arrived" and "the value was thrown away because nobody is listening"
were the same answer.
Every caller was nonetheless correct, because both cases mean "stop trying,
do not park and retry". But nothing above the channel could tell the two
apart: a node counting successful pushes counted discards among them, and the
only record of the loss was the channel's own drop counter, visible solely to
whoever read the diagnostics table.
Now a three-way PushResult { Taken, Full, Closed }, matching the shape
SentinelResult already uses. Behaviour is unchanged at every call site —
each treats Closed the same as Taken, and only Full parks — but the
distinction is now available to anyone who needs it, and a scoped enum means
a future caller cannot silently reintroduce the conflation with `if (push)`.
deliver_one benefits immediately: it no longer reaches its teardown path for
a closed channel, only for one that is still full, so the last-ditch throwing
push it does there to record the loss now records an overflow rather than a
drop the channel had already counted.
|
||
|
|
97670d8ba3 |
fix: stop() must not return while a firing is still running
stop() set the flag, disabled the inputs and returned, leaving an executing fire_once touching input_channels_, stats_ and pending_ while the caller went on to destroy them. The comment was explicit about it: callers wanting the guarantee should call scheduler_->drain() first. But ~PoolNode calls stop(), and a destructor cannot ask its caller to have done that. A node with a private pool survived by accident, because Node::stop() calls pool->stop() and that joins the worker. A node sharing a pool — which make_pool_node exists to create — had nothing joining it, so its own destructor raced the firing. stop() now waits on the submit gate, which is claimed for the whole of a firing and released as its last act. A queued but unstarted firing also holds it and will run, observe stop_flag_ and release, so the pool must still be running when stop() is called; that is already the documented order and what Node/ObjectNode do. Two ways it declines to wait. It is bounded at five seconds, because a node function that never returns must not convert teardown into a hang — it warns and continues. And it returns immediately when called from the firing thread itself, since an error handler that stops its own node would otherwise wait for a firing that is waiting for it. Verified in both directions: with the wait removed, stop() returns while the node function is still sleeping and the flag it sets on the way out is still false. 143/143. |
||
|
|
abbb2d4770 |
fix: submitting to a stopped pool must be refused, not fatal
ThreadPool::stop() ends with queues_.clear(), and submit() went straight to
queues_[target] with no check. A submission arriving after stop indexed an
empty vector and segfaulted.
This is not a contrived teardown ordering. A node's space callback fires from
whichever thread drained the channel, and that thread belongs to the
*consumer*; the callback it runs belongs to the *producer*. Stop the producer
first — which a sources-first shutdown does by design — and the consumer keeps
draining its backlog, firing the producer's space callback into a pool that
has already been torn down:
ThreadPool::submit
<- source node's space_callback
<- Channel<int>::try_pop_now (relay draining its input)
<- relay fire_once
The static-network shutdown case in the next commit crashed about 12 runs in
20 on this. It survived until now because halt() stops in reverse topological
order — consumers first — so the producer whose callback might fire is always
still alive. shutdown() stops sources first and does not have that protection.
Reading stopped_ without a lock would not fix it: the window between the read
and the indexing is exactly where clear() runs. submit() takes a shared lock
and stop() an exclusive one, so submissions still proceed in parallel with
each other while being serialised against teardown. stop() sets the flag under
the lock, releases it to join — a worker's task may itself call submit, and
holding the lock across the join would deadlock against that — then retakes it
to destroy the queues.
Refusals are counted rather than silent. A teardown race is expected, but a
node repeatedly trying to run after its pool is gone is worth being able to
see. try_submit also checks stop_flag_ first, so a stopped node cannot claim
the submit gate and leave it held.
Not a smart-pointer problem, for anyone reading the crash: nothing here is
owned by a raw pointer. It is std::vector::operator[] on a vector that was
emptied by another thread.
Verified in both directions: with the guard removed the new scheduler cases
segfault; with it they pass.
|
||
|
|
139bfbb794 |
fix: the sentinel slot holds one token and refuses a second
push_sentinel wrote eof_value_ unconditionally. Offering a second token
before the first was taken did two wrong things at once.
It lost the first silently, and a lost EOF is not a lost frame — it is the
token every downstream node is waiting for in order to shut down, so losing
it wedges the pipeline.
And it wrote the storage while the consumer could be moving the previous
value out of it. I expected that to be a stale read; ThreadSanitizer shows
it is worse. On the shared_ptr storage that non-trivial types use, the
racing write tears the refcount, and the stress case added here reports
heap-use-after-free in extract() alongside the data race.
try_push_sentinel now refuses when the slot is occupied, which turns the
slot into a correct SPSC handshake: the producer is the only writer of
eof_value_ and the only one that sets has_eof_, the consumer is the only one
that clears it, so observing it false is what licenses the write. Refusal is
recorded as a drop, and PoolNode reports it through the overflow event
callback, because a refused control token going unnoticed is the failure
this commit exists to stop.
Refusing rather than queueing is deliberate. Two control tokens on one
channel means the stream ended twice, which is a caller protocol error and
not backpressure; parking and retrying would spin against a slot only the
consumer can free, and there is no sensible second value to deliver after
the end of a stream. The non-consuming try_push_sentinel exists so a refused
token is still the caller's to report — the consuming push_sentinel cannot
offer that, since the value has already been moved into its parameter.
Single-shot EOF is what every current caller does, so this is latent for
them today. It stops being latent the moment a pipeline is reused for a
second input, which is what the persistent-pipeline work in
|
||
|
|
8d319eeb88 |
fix: an empty channel is not a closed one
pop_one reported an empty channel the same way it reported a closed one, by throwing ChannelClosedError, and fire_once treats that as "upstream is finished" and calls self_stop(). self_stop disables the node's own inputs *and* outputs, so a benign empty read does not merely skip a frame — it kills the node and, through the disabled channels, whatever depended on it. A node genuinely does get woken with empty inputs: a space callback fires when its output drains, which has nothing to do with input arrival. fire_once already guards against it by checking readiness before popping. That guard is the live protection and it works; this commit makes the thing it is guarding non-lethal. So the pop_one path changed here is unreachable today, and I would rather say that than imply a fixed hang. Its value is that the readiness check is now a performance detail rather than the only thing standing between a routine wake and a dead pipeline. Three separate comment blocks in fire_once exist to warn about exactly this hazard; they were added because it had already been hit during development, and the conflation they warn about is what this removes. Verified in three directions. With the guard and the distinction: passes. With the guard removed but the distinction present: still passes, which is the point — the new ChannelEmptyError path catches what the guard used to. With both removed, reproducing the original code: the node self-stops on the firing that has nothing to read, the next value throws "channel closed" out of its own output channel, and the relay handles one item instead of two. |
||
|
|
15e993f6ca |
fix: two firings of the same node must not overlap
fire_once released the submit gate and then kept working:
release_and_recheck(); // gate is now free
if (stop_flag_) return;
if (pending_) { ... } // still reading node state
on_input_ready();
The moment the gate is free another worker may enter fire_once for the same
node, so this invocation's reads of pending_ raced with the next one's writes
to pending_done_. ThreadSanitizer caught exactly that, between a firing
submitted by release_and_recheck and one submitted by try_submit.
The race is the visible half. The real damage is to the one-slot park, which
is sound only because "at most one fire_once runs per node at a time" — the
comment on pending_ says so explicitly. With two firings live, one can park a
value into the slot the other is about to overwrite, and the overwritten value
is gone with no drop recorded anywhere. That is silent data loss under
backpressure, from a node that reports itself healthy.
finish_firing() replaces release_and_recheck() at every exit: it evaluates the
follow-up decision — parked and waiting on output space, or drained and
waiting on input — while the claim is still held, and releases the gate as the
last thing the firing does. Nothing touches node state afterwards.
This also collapses three near-identical resubmit tails into one, which is
worth something on its own: the divergence between them is what
|
||
|
|
a5c016833d |
fix: install channel callbacks before any node runs
ThreadSanitizer reported ten data races on a plain multi-node network, all
the same one:
Read in Channel::try_push -> push_callback_() (worker thread)
Write in Channel::set_push_callback -> push_callback_ = ... (main thread)
A node's push and space callbacks are std::function members living on
channels it shares with its neighbours. register_callbacks() wrote them from
inside start(), and a network starts its nodes one at a time — so by the
time node N is being started, nodes 1..N-1 are already running and pushing
into N's input channel, reading the very std::function that start() is
assigning. Concurrent read and write of a std::function is a data race on
its vtable pointer and buffer, not a benign one.
This is the cause of the symptom
|
||
|
|
f53af260a2 |
fix: make the submit gate a single atomic
|
||
|
|
5628447ea8 |
fix: never self-move the parked output tuple
push_outputs ended with
else pending_ = std::move(result);
and the retry path calls it as push_outputs(std::move(*pending_), …), so on
that path `result` is the parked tuple itself. The assignment was a
self-move-assignment. std::tuple's is elementwise, and libstdc++'s
std::vector does not guard against self-move: _M_move_assign swaps its data
into a temporary, which is then destroyed. The vector ends up empty.
So the first park was clean — the argument there is a local temporary — and
the second erased the payload. The value was still delivered, still in
order, still counted, just empty. Downstream cannot distinguish that from a
frame on which the node genuinely found nothing, which is why it would never
surface as an error: in scene-actor-extraction it reads as "no faces in this
frame" and the run completes with a quietly wrong answer.
Scope, stated precisely because I first got it wrong: this needs a node with
*two or more* outputs. With one output the only thing that resubmits a
parked node is that output's own space callback, which by definition fires
when there is room, so the retry always succeeds and never reassigns. With
two, output A draining resubmits the node while output B is still full — the
retry skips A (already delivered, tracked in pending_done_) and fails on B,
and that is the reassignment that eats B's payload.
Every node in the scene-actor-extraction pipeline currently has exactly one
output, and the fanout is a separate class that does not use pending_, so
this is latent there rather than active. It is reachable by any multi-output
node under backpressure, which the library supports and documents.
Verified in both directions: on
|
||
|
|
6a4f45f111 |
fix: a filter or router must not drop on a full output
RouterNode and FilterNode were the last nodes on a data path still using the
throwing push() and swallowing the result:
try { out_ch_->push(val); } catch (const ChannelOverflowError&) {}
|
||
|
|
c73edffe5c |
chore: delete the unreachable duplicate of the parked-retry block
PoolNode::fire_once carried the pending_ retry block twice, verbatim. The first copy returns on every path through it — parked, drained, or not pending at all — so the second was dead code from the moment it appeared. PoolObjectNode, which is otherwise a line-for-line twin of PoolNode, has it once. No behaviour change; the deleted 25 lines were unreachable. Worth doing before the fixes queued behind it, each of which has to be applied once per copy of this function. The duplication is a symptom: PoolNode and PoolObjectNode are ~400 lines of near-identical code maintained by parallel edit, and a block getting pasted twice into one of them is exactly the failure that arrangement invites. Factoring the shared body out is a larger change and wants its own review. |
||
|
|
a8cfe7300a |
fix: a lossless fanout, a node that starts awake, and the instrumentation that found them
Three changes from one debugging session on the intermittent wedge, kept together because the instrumentation is what made the other two findable. **Fanout was never made lossless.** |
||
|
|
9c5ce5f34a |
fix: never drop a wake — a node must not sleep with one outstanding
|
||
|
|
28e06675f5 |
fix: park nodes on a full output instead of blocking the worker
push_blocking parked a scheduler worker inside the push. Nodes own a private single-thread pool, so the parked thread was the only one that could drain that node's own input — hold-and-wait, and under sustained backpressure four nodes of a five-node chain slept in nanosleep at once. channel.hpp already warned about this for sentinels; it applies just as much to data pushes. The scheduler was purely input-driven: on_input_ready() wakes a node when input arrives, with no counterpart for "my output has room". Lacking that signal, blocking the thread was the only way to handle a full output. This adds the missing half. - Channel::try_push + has_space + set_space_callback; the callback fires from both pop() and try_pop_now(). - PoolNode/PoolObjectNode keep a one-slot pending_ buffer with per-element done flags, so a retry cannot duplicate an already-accepted element. One slot suffices because queued_ admits at most one fire_once per node. - The re-check after clearing queued_ closes the lost-wakeup race where a space callback fires while the flag is still up and is swallowed. Two bugs surfaced once nodes actually parked, both fixed here: - pop_one reports an *empty* channel as ChannelClosedError, which is also the node's "upstream finished, self-stop" signal. A node woken by output space with empty inputs therefore killed itself. fire_once now releases the worker when its inputs are not ready rather than falling through. - The drained-park path resubmitted unconditionally instead of via on_input_ready(), firing nodes with nothing to read. compute_priority is now output-aware: mean output fill is deducted from mean input fill, mapped as 0.5·(1 + in - out). Input fill alone asks only "how much work is waiting for me"; a node whose outputs are already full cannot deliver, so running it just parks it again and wastes the slot while the node that would drain that channel waits behind it. The scheduler now favours whoever is furthest downstream of a bottleneck. Also adds a network-level error listener. A node's exception was discarded at the node boundary and survived only as a Closed event, which reports that a node stopped but not why — that missing detail is what made the above slow to diagnose. INode::set_network_error_callback plus StaticNetwork::set_error_handler forward it to the application. Tests: 121/121. test_backpressure_deadlock drives a five-node chain with capacity-2 channels against a slow sink and fails on the old code. The four test_pool_node overflow tests now assert parking rather than the removed drop-and-report behaviour. Known-incomplete: a rare hang remains, roughly 1 run in 20 against a 300s timeout, down from every run failing. Committed because the fix is a large strict improvement and the residual case needs its own reproduction. |
||
|
|
6595e6e925 |
fix: node outputs block instead of dropping on a full channel
Every node output used the throwing push(), so a consumer falling behind cost values rather than time. push_blocking() already existed on Channel and OutputPort — "wait for the consumer to drain instead of dropping; the producer just runs slower" — but nothing called it. A dropped frame does not degrade a downstream result, it silently changes one, and the consumer has no way to tell it happened. For any pipeline whose output is a claim about its input, that is corruption rather than degradation. Safe because sentinels are already handled out-of-band, above this path: only data blocks, so the EOF token that unwinds the network can always overtake a stalled data path. That is exactly the hold-and-wait deadlock the push_sentinel comment warns about, and the reason it is not reachable here. Measured on a downstream consumer (face pipeline, 77s clip at 5 fps, expected 385 sampled frames): before 65 frames written, 320 dropped at one node, 29s after 385 frames written, 0 dropped, 17s Faster, not slower — a dropped frame has already cost its decode, and the overflow exception cost more. Two consecutive runs now produce byte-identical output, which they did not before: what got dropped depended on timing, so the same command could yield different results. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
|
19f5a2b0ae |
Deliver EOF sentinels out-of-band to prevent teardown deadlock
Channel::push() drops values on overflow (the intended backpressure policy for data), and PoolNode swallows the resulting ChannelOverflowError. For a control sentinel like EOF this is fatal: a single dropped EOF under backpressure wedges every downstream pop() forever, so the pipeline never tears down. Deliver sentinels out-of-band instead. Channel::push_sentinel() stores the token in a dedicated slot that does not consume ring capacity, so it can never overflow and — crucially — never blocks the caller. That non-blocking property is essential: each KPN node has a single worker thread, so a *blocking* push would park that thread and stop it draining its own input, cascading into a hold-and-wait deadlock under backpressure. The consumer's pop()/try_pop_now() drain the ring first, then deliver the sentinel, so it always arrives after every value pushed before it. approx_size() (which node readiness checks call) counts a pending sentinel as consumable work, so a channel carrying only a sentinel still schedules its consumer's next fire — without this the token would sit undelivered and the pipeline would still deadlock at teardown. PoolNode/PoolObjectNode route values carrying an eof flag (direct .eof or nested .source.eof) through push_sentinel via a SFINAE-safe is_sentinel_value trait; all other values keep the existing lossy throwing push. The trait compiles to false for types without an eof convention, so this is a no-op for pipelines that don't use one. Verified end-to-end: scene_analyze now reaches EOF, flushes its output, and exits cleanly instead of hanging. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
|
6f384dc4b5 |
Added callbacks for node errors and fifo overflow
Add new doc system which should/might deploy to pages. |
||
|
|
f6bcaa15b0 |
Performance improvements, better readme and complete python bindings
🧪 Test / test (push) Failing after 28m30s
|