139bfbb made the channel refuse a sentinel offered while one was still
pending — correct, and the reason is a data race: overwriting wrote
eof_value_ while the consumer could be moving the previous one out of it,
which ThreadSanitizer reports as a torn refcount and a heap-use-after-free.
That part stands.
What was wrong was the accounting. The refusal recorded a drop, and PoolNode
reported it through the overflow event callback, on the theory that two
control tokens on one channel means the stream ended twice and is a caller
protocol error.
It is not. A source that has reached the end of its input keeps being polled
and keeps returning EOF — that is the normal steady state, not an error — so
the token is re-offered on every firing. Refusing a re-offer loses nothing:
the pending token carries the same meaning and is already on its way.
Found by running it. scene-actor-extraction on a 14 s clip reported
[main] ERROR: frames were dropped (channel overflow):
frame_source: 2
scene_annotate: 1
[main] The output would describe footage that was never analysed.
Refusing to report success.
and exited 2, on a run where nothing had been dropped and every frame was
analysed. frame_source emits EOF once and then returns it forever
(frame_source_node.hpp:76), so the count grows with however many times the
source is polled after the end. The pipeline's own loss detector — which
exists because a dropped frame silently corrupts the output — was being
tripped by a clean run, which is the one thing a loss detector must not do.
So SlotBusy now records nothing and reports nothing. The cost, stated
plainly: a genuinely distinct second token would also be refused silently,
and the channel cannot tell a re-offer from a distinct token. Re-offering is
the case that actually occurs; the delivery guarantee that matters — the
first token arrives — holds either way.
The test asserting the old behaviour is inverted rather than deleted, and now
also checks that the token which was accepted is the one delivered. 148/148.