Three routes now deliver truth data -- a sidecar, a worker push, and a fetched
manifest -- and once stored they were indistinguishable. The truth file records
nothing about how it arrived, so a locally computed sidecar and a loose-tier
manifest from a third-party server looked identical to every reader, despite
making claims of very different strength about the same item.
TruthProvenance records source, server, match tier, applied offset and caveat.
GET /Items/{itemId}/Provenance serves it, and JR-036's loose-tier caveat now
has somewhere to come from.
Two decisions carried in the code rather than assumed:
Provenance is stored BESIDE the truth file, never inside it. Injecting fields
would mean the bytes served back are not the bytes the producer wrote, which is
the property JR-004 turns on. UT-026 pins it by asserting the stored truth JSON
contains no provenance keys.
The applied offset is recorded because it is otherwise unrecoverable. Once
JR-030 shifts every window the timings look native, and nothing else would say
they had been shifted -- which matters when diagnosing an overlay that is
consistently a few seconds out.
A sidecar's provenance is derived rather than stored: it is local, and its
timestamp is the file's own. Precedence resolves through the same rule as
GetTruthAsync, because resolving it twice by different rules is how the two
would drift.
Fourth mutation check: stopping Delete from removing provenance fails UT-027
alone -- a stale record would otherwise outlive its claim and describe data the
next fetch had already replaced.
TRACES: UT-024, UT-025, UT-026, UT-027, UT-028 | JR-010
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Satisfies JRay-public-server UR-007. Servers are tried in configured order and
the first result clearing the configured tier wins; first-match rather than
best-match because querying every server for every item multiplies egress and
leaks the library to more parties, and the ordering already encodes which
source the admin prefers.
Every server is untrusted, including the pre-configured community one, so a
fetched manifest is re-validated against the same rules the server applies on
upload: envelope version refused if unknown, identifiers format-checked,
windows bounds-checked against the *local* file's runtime, belief bounded to
[0, 1], control and bidi characters refused in names. Responses are capped
while streaming rather than after buffering, since a hostile server can declare
any Content-Length it likes. HTTPS is required away from loopback. A failing
server is skipped with exponential backoff so one dead server cannot stall a
sweep.
The audio-tier offset is applied once, at store time, so stored truth is always
in the local file's own timebase and no read path needs offset awareness.
Windows are shifted, never reshaped — merging adjacent ones would answer "was a
face visible" rather than "was the actor present" (SR-002).
Also records why there is no `exact` tier, which was missing and led me to
re-add one. The file-hash tier is withdrawn on legal grounds: a TMDB id
discloses "some copy of this film", but an OpenSubtitles hash discloses "this
exact release", which turns a catalogue lookup into a release-identification
service and a server's database into a mapping from file fingerprints to the
instances holding them. The reason now lives on MatchTier and in SPEC.md §JR-036,
`TitleQuery` has no VideoHash property so there is nothing to send, and a test
asserts the enum has no Exact member — the spec had still listed `exact` as a
configurable tier, which is what made the removal look like an oversight.
42 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TRACES: JR-025, JR-027, JR-028, JR-029, JR-030, JR-031, JR-036, JR-037 | PR-005, PR-006
dtourolleandClaude Opus 5