# JellyTau Codebase Audit

**Date:** 2026-08-16 · **Version:** v0.6.0 · **Commit:** `be907b49` (master)

A review of the Rust/Svelte/Android codebase against its own requirements matrix
and against current Android and Tauri v2 platform practice. Every finding was
verified by running the project's own tooling or reading the code it points at —
nothing here is inferred from documentation alone.

**Scale:** 55,835 LOC Rust · 50,490 LOC TS/Svelte · 530 requirements · 824 traces

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| High | 5 |
| Medium | 9 |
| Low | 6 |
| Tests passing | 1,719 |
| Untraced requirements | 86 |
| Traceability coverage | 86% (285/330) |

> **Revisions, 2026-08-16.** Three rankings changed after device testing and
> platform research, all documented in place:
> - **B1 High → Low.** The predicted impact was refuted on a physical Android 16
>   device. The residual risk turned out to be a different, narrower one.
> - **B7 Low → Medium, re-framed.** The original reading of predictive back was
>   backwards: at targetSdk 36 it is already enabled, not merely un-opted-into.
> - **B8 added (Medium).** Android 16 Local Network Protections versus a
>   LAN-hosted Jellyfin server.
> - **D3 Medium → Low.** The "820 unwraps" figure was a measurement error; the
>   real number is 19, and none are in command handlers.
> - **B1's stated mechanism was wrong** even though its conclusion held. FGS
>   notifications are *not* exempt from `POST_NOTIFICATIONS`; media-session
>   notifications are. See B1 — the distinction changes what the fix should be.
>
> Original ranking was 6 High / 8 Medium / 5 Low.

**Verified by running:** `bun run check` · `bun run test` · `cargo test` ·
`cargo clippy --all-targets` · `bun run check:boundary` · `bun run traces:json`

**Device-verified (2026-08-16):** B1 and B2 were checked against a physical HONOR
ROD2-W09 running Android 16 (SDK 36) with the shipped app installed. B2 was
confirmed; B1 was refuted and downgraded.

**Not covered:** the e2e suite (`test:e2e` is not wired into CI and was not run),
Windows and Arch packaging paths, and the docs-site build. B3, C1 and C2 still
need a device/desktop playback pass.

---

## A. Requirements versus code

The traceability matrix is the project's own claim about what is built. Of 530
defined requirement IDs, 86 carry no `TRACES:` tag anywhere in the tree. Most of
those gaps are documentation debt rather than missing features — which is
precisely the problem, because it makes the matrix unreliable as evidence.

### A1 · High · Twelve requirements are marked "Done" but have zero traces

`UR-006` (lockscreen/BLE control), `UR-037` (video library presentation),
`IR-006` (Android MediaSession), `IR-008` (audio focus), `IR-022` (person/cast
API), `IR-024` (home-screen API) and six Jellyfin API requirements (`JA-006`,
`JA-009`, `JA-013`, `JA-014`, `JA-015`, `JA-018`) all claim completion with
nothing pointing at an implementation.

These features demonstrably work — lockscreen control, Next Up, favourites are
all shipped. The code is there; the tags are not. That means the matrix currently
over-reports on exactly the requirements a reviewer would most want to verify,
and a regression in any of them would leave no trace to follow.

**Fix:** Tag the existing implementations. Highest value per keystroke in the
whole audit: six of the twelve are single Jellyfin API call sites.

### A2 · Medium · Requirement statuses contradict each other across layers

`UR-020` (subtitle selection) and `UR-021` (audio track selection) are marked
*Done*, while the integration requirements they decompose into — `IR-018` and
`IR-019`, both libmpv-specific — are still *Planned*. Similarly `IR-005` (MPRIS)
sits at *Planned* under a *Done* `UR-006`.

The likely truth is that these user requirements were satisfied through a
different path than the one originally specified (HTML5 `<video>` and ExoPlayer
rather than libmpv), and the IRs were never re-scoped. Left as-is, the matrix
reads as though shipped features depend on unbuilt integrations.

**Fix:** Re-scope or retire the stale IRs so each Done UR rests on Done IRs.

### A3 · Medium · The traceability gate is set far below actual coverage

`traceability-check.yml` fails only below 50%. Real coverage is well above that,
so the gate cannot catch a coverage regression until roughly half the matrix has
rotted. A gate that can only fire after a catastrophe is not protecting anything.

**Measured coverage: 86% (285/330)** — UR 71/75, IR 19/32, DR 166/187, JA 29/36.
IR is by far the weakest dimension, which corroborates A1.

**Fix applied:** `MIN_THRESHOLD` ratcheted 50 → 82, with the ratchet policy
written into the workflow (only goes up; never lowered to make a red build pass).
The same figure is mirrored as `MIN_COVERAGE_PERCENT` in
`scripts/extract-traces.ts` so local `traces:coverage` gates on the same bar, and
a test parses the workflow YAML and fails if the two drift apart.

### A4 · Low · Two traced IDs do not exist in the requirements document

`DR-189` and `UT-188` are referenced by `TRACES:` comments but are defined
nowhere in `docs/requirements.md`. The extraction tool accepts them silently, so
typos and renames pass unnoticed.

**Fix:** Add a dangling-ID check to the extractor and fail CI on it — cheap, and
it keeps the matrix honest in both directions.

### A5 · Not a gap · The remaining untraced requirements are legitimately unbuilt

`UR-016`, `UR-022` and `UR-070` are Planned or Proposed, and `UR-031`
(crossfade) is explicitly blocked by `DR-034`. Their absence from the trace graph
is correct and needs no action — noted so it does not get swept into the fix list.

---

## B. Android platform practice

The app targets SDK 36 with a minSdk of 24. Several manifest and WebView settings
still reflect an earlier target level.

### B1 · Low · `POST_NOTIFICATIONS` is declared but never requested at runtime

*Downgraded from High. The original ranking was refuted by device testing — the
evidence is below, and it is the reason this finding is now near-trivial.*

The permission appears in the manifest, but there is no `requestPermissions` call
anywhere in the Kotlin, Rust or TypeScript sources, and
`JellyTauPlaybackService.startForeground()` runs with no `checkSelfPermission`
guard. On Android 13+ notification permission defaults to denied.

This was ranked High on the theory that it would suppress the media notification
and with it the lockscreen transport controls (`UR-006`). Testing on an HONOR
ROD2-W09 running **Android 16 (SDK 36)**, with the shipped app installed and
playing, shows otherwise. The permission is genuinely denied:

```
POST_NOTIFICATIONS: granted=false, flags=[USER_SENSITIVE_WHEN_GRANTED|USER_SENSITIVE_WHEN_DENIED]
appops POST_NOTIFICATION: ignore
```

and the notification is nonetheless live and complete:

```
ServiceRecord{... com.dtourolle.jellytau/.player.JellyTauPlaybackService}
  isForeground=true  foregroundId=1  types=0x00000002
  foregroundNoti=Notification(flags=NO_CLEAR|FOREGROUND_SERVICE
                              category=transport actions=3 vis=PUBLIC)
```

**`UR-006` is not at risk.** But the *reason* is not the one this audit first
gave, and the correction is load-bearing rather than pedantic.

The first explanation here was "foreground-service notifications are exempt." That
is wrong. Android's own wording is that the permission covers "non-exempt
(**including Foreground Services (FGS)**) notifications", and that users who deny
it see FGS notices "in the Task Manager but [not] in the notification drawer" — an
FGS notification is explicitly *not* exempt. What is exempt is **media-session**
notifications. The platform predicate is `Notification.isMediaNotification()`,
requiring `MediaStyle`/`DecoratedMediaCustomViewStyle` **and** a non-null
`EXTRA_MEDIA_SESSION`; it is byte-identical across API 33–36, and
`NotificationManagerService` has no FGS clause in either enforcement site.

Why the difference matters: under the FGS theory, anything the service posts is
safe, and the code needs no care. Under the correct one, the exemption is earned
per-notification by the token — so losing the token loses not just the shade entry
but the lockscreen controls entirely, since SystemUI's media carousel
(`MediaDataProcessor.onNotificationAdded`) gates on the *same* predicate. A
token-less notification never even reaches the notification listener.

**The real risk here is not the permission — it is how narrowly the exemption is
earned.** AOSP's `Notification.isMediaNotification()` grants it only when the
style is `MediaStyle`/`DecoratedMediaCustomViewStyle` **and**
`Notification.EXTRA_MEDIA_SESSION` holds a non-null *platform* session token. If
either is missing while the permission is denied, the notification is **silently
suppressed** — no exception, no log.

JellyTau earns it at two sites, both of which hang it on a null-safe call:

```kotlin
androidx.media.app.NotificationCompat.MediaStyle()
    .setMediaSession(mediaSessionCompat?.sessionToken)   // :273 and :466
```

Ordering currently saves it — `mediaSessionCompat` is assigned in `onCreate`
(:195) and `createBasicNotification()` is only reached from `onStartCommand`
(:251) — and the device test confirms it works. But it is one reordering away
from breaking invisibly, and only for users who denied the permission, which is
a population most developers never test as.

**Fix:** Keep the permission declared — download-service FGS notifications are
*not* covered by the media exemption, and this app has a downloads feature that
may want them. Comment both `setMediaSession` sites to record what earns the
exemption, and log loudly if the token is ever null at build time, converting a
silent failure into a diagnosable one.

**Location:** `src-tauri/android/src/main/java/com/dtourolle/jellytau/player/JellyTauPlaybackService.kt:251`, `:273`, `:466`

### B2 · High · Cloud backup is on by default, and it will break credential restore

The manifest sets neither `android:allowBackup="false"` nor a
`dataExtractionRules`/`fullBackupContent` file, so Android's default applies: the
app's data directory is backed up to the user's Google account. That ships the
SQLite catalogue — library metadata and watch history — off the device.

The credential path makes it worse rather than better. `SecureStorage.kt`
encrypts with AES/GCM under an Android Keystore key, and Keystore keys are never
backed up. A user restoring onto a new phone therefore gets the ciphertext
without the key: undecryptable credentials and a silent authentication failure,
with no code path that recognises the situation.

**Fix applied.** `allowBackup="false"`. Extraction rules that merely excluded the
DB and credential prefs would have left nothing worth backing up: the SQLite
catalogue is a rebuildable mirror of the server and watch state lives server-side,
so there is no user-authored data to preserve.

**A gap this audit missed:** on API 31+, `allowBackup="false"` disables *cloud*
backup but **not device-to-device transfer**, which reproduces the identical
failure — the prefs travel, the Keystore key does not. A
`data_extraction_rules.xml` excluding all five domains from both `<cloud-backup>`
and `<device-transfer>` was added to close it.

**A real bug found while fixing this:** the Rust encrypted-file fallback in
`credentials.rs` propagated a decrypt failure as `CredentialError::Encryption`,
which `storage_get_access_token` turned into a hard `Err` — so an undecryptable
blob was an error state, not a logout. It now logs and returns an empty map, so
the caller sees `NotFound` → `Ok(None)` → login screen, and the next sign-in
self-heals the file. `SecureStorage.getCredential` on the Kotlin side already
returned null, but could not distinguish "nothing stored" from "unreadable" and
left the dead blob in prefs forever; it now separates the cases and discards it.
Three tests written and watched fail first, per the red→green rule.

### B3 · High · `MIXED_CONTENT_ALWAYS_ALLOW` undoes the network security config

`network_security_config.xml` is careful and well-argued: cleartext blocked
everywhere, exempted only for `127.0.0.1` so the local media server can serve
downloads. Its own comment warns "this must not become a blanket cleartext
opt-in."

But `MainActivity.kt` sets `mixedContentMode = MIXED_CONTENT_ALWAYS_ALLOW`, which
permits the WebView to load http subresources into an https page from any origin.
Alongside it, `allowFileAccess = true` and `allowContentAccess = true` are both
broader than anything the app needs, since Tauri serves the UI from its own scheme
and media comes from the token-guarded loopback server. These read as leftovers
from before the media server existed.

**Fix:** Drop to `MIXED_CONTENT_COMPATIBILITY_MODE` and set both file and content
access to false, then verify offline video still plays.

**Location:** `src-tauri/android/src/main/java/com/dtourolle/jellytau/MainActivity.kt:504-507`

### B4 · Medium · Android TV is half-declared

The manifest advertises `LEANBACK_LAUNCHER` and a non-required leanback feature,
but omits `<uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.touchscreen"
android:required="false"/>` and an `android:banner`. That combination fails Play's
TV validation, and on a real TV the app would launch into a UI with no D-pad focus
model behind it.

**Fix:** Either commit to TV — add the feature declaration, a banner, and a focus
pass — or remove the leanback category until you do.

### B5 · Medium · `jvmTarget` is pinned to 1.8 under compileSdk 36

The Kotlin target has not moved with the SDK. AGP 8 warns on it, and it locks the
Kotlin sources out of APIs and desugaring behaviour that everything else in the
toolchain assumes.

**Fix:** Move `jvmTarget` and the Java source/target compatibility to 17.

### B6 · Low · Media3 is several minor versions behind

`androidx.media3` is pinned at 1.5.0 across exoplayer, hls, session and common.
Given how much of this app's hard-won behaviour lives in ExoPlayer edge cases —
truncated progressive streams, background audio handoff, HLS resume — staying
current on its bug-fix releases has unusually high value here.

**Fix:** Schedule a Media3 bump with a device pass over the playback regression list.

### B7 · Medium · Predictive back is already on, not merely un-opted-into

*Upgraded from Low, and re-framed — the original framing was backwards.*

The audit first read the absent `enableOnBackInvokedCallback` as the app
*forgoing* the Android 13+ back-gesture preview. That is not what the flag means
at this target level. Predictive back is enabled by default for apps targeting
recent SDKs, and Android 16's own behaviour-change list carries "Migration or
opt-out required for predictive back" — with the opt-out being removed. Targeting
36, JellyTau is already getting predictive back; it simply hasn't been checked
against it.

That matters more than a missing opt-in would, because the app does not use
ordinary Android back. It runs a WebView with its own history model —
`src/lib/utils/navigation.ts` tracks a depth counter, applies a popstate delta,
and falls back to a path when `history.back()` would trap the user, with
`scrollRestore.ts` keying off the same popstate events. That is exactly the kind
of custom back handling predictive back is most likely to disagree with.

**Fix:** This is a device test, not a code change — exercise the back gesture
(including the drag-and-release preview and the cancel) from a library page, a
detail page, the player, and the settings screen, and watch for the depth counter
desynchronising. Only change code if it misbehaves.

Separately and unrelatedly: `JellyTauPlaybackService` is `exported="true"` with a
`MediaSessionService` intent filter — conventional for Media3, but it means any
app on the device can attempt to bind and drive playback. Confirm the session's
`onConnect` callback rejects unknown packages.

### B8 · Medium (forward-looking) · Android 16 Local Network Protections vs a LAN Jellyfin server

*New finding, surfaced while researching B1.*

Android 16's behaviour-change list includes **Local Network Permission**. JellyTau's
entire purpose is reaching a Jellyfin server that, for most users, sits on the
local network — so a permission gate on local-network access is a direct threat to
the app's core function, not a peripheral concern.

Stated carefully, because the timing matters: in Android 16 this is **opt-in for
testing**, not enforced by default, with enforcement signalled for a future
release. Nothing is broken today, and the device test will not surface it. But
this is the rare platform change that could stop the app working at all, and it
is much cheaper to handle before it is mandatory.

**Fix:** Investigate what the permission will require, then test the app against
it with the opt-in flag enabled on the Android 16 device already to hand. Track it
as a release-blocking item for whichever Android version enforces it.

---

## C. Tauri v2 configuration

The capability model here is genuinely well done — see section E. The gaps are in
the two settings that govern what a compromised web layer could reach.

### C1 · High · `"csp": null` contradicts the project's own security convention

`CLAUDE.md` lists "keep the CSP restrictive in `tauri.conf.json`" as a standing
rule; the config disables CSP entirely. With it off, any script that reaches the
web layer inherits the full IPC surface.

The realistic exposure today is low, and worth stating plainly rather than
inflating: the frontend has a single `{@html}` — an app-owned icon in
`GenericGenreBrowser.svelte`, not server data — and no `innerHTML`, `eval` or
`new Function` outside tests. So this is a missing defence rather than an open
hole. But it is the defence that stops the next careless interpolation of a
Jellyfin-supplied string from becoming a full compromise.

**Fix:** Set a CSP permitting `'self'`, `asset.localhost`, `http://127.0.0.1:*`
for media, and the configured Jellyfin origin for images. Expect one or two
iterations against HLS playback.

### C2 · Medium · The asset protocol scope is wider than what it serves

`assetProtocol.scope` is `$APPDATA/**`, which covers the whole app data directory
— the SQLite database and the credential store included — while the protocol only
needs to reach cached thumbnails and downloaded media.

Since `DR-137` introduced the token-guarded loopback media server, the asset
protocol's remaining job may be thumbnails alone, which would make the narrowing
nearly free.

**Fix applied:** scoped to `$APPDATA/thumbnails/**`. Confirmed on device that
`jellytau.db` (8 MB catalogue) and `shared_prefs` sit in the `$APPDATA` root and
are now outside the grant.

**But device testing found the finding was aimed at the wrong thing.** The asset
protocol is not narrowly used — it is **entirely unused at runtime**:

- `getCachedImageUrl` in `imageCache.ts` has **no production callers**. Its only
  references are its own test file. `convertFileSrc`'s sole production mention
  sits inside that uncalled function, so it never executes.
- The real path is `MediaCard` → `CachedImage` → `commands.imageGetUrl()`, which
  returns **base64 from Rust**. Every image in the app is a `data:` URI delivered
  over IPC.
- Confirmed on device: zero `asset.localhost` requests across a full session of
  browsing home, the library list and a poster grid; the thumbnail cache stayed
  at 12 files and never grew, because nothing calls `thumbnailSave` either.

Two consequences worth acting on, neither yet done:

1. **The `protocol-asset` Cargo feature and the whole `assetProtocol` config
   block can likely be removed**, which retires the attack surface rather than
   shrinking it. `imageCache.ts` is dead code and can go with it.
2. **`img-src` in the new CSP can be much tighter.** It currently grants
   `http: https:` on the reasoning that thumbnails are fetched direct-from-server
   on a cache miss — but they are not; they arrive as data URIs. With no
   webview-side server image loads anywhere in `src/`, `img-src 'self' data:
   blob:` should suffice. That is a real tightening the CSP work left on the
   table because it reasoned from the dead code path.

Both need their own device pass, since a wrong `img-src` blanks every image.

### C3 · Low · Shipped desktop bundles have no update path

The bundle targets deb, rpm and nsis, but `tauri-plugin-updater` is not among the
dependencies. Every desktop user upgrades by manually fetching a new package,
which in practice means a long tail of installs pinned to whatever version they
first downloaded.

**Fix:** Add the updater plugin with a signed release manifest, or document the
manual upgrade path in the README so the omission is at least deliberate.

---

## D. CI and code health

Local discipline in this project is strong and well documented. CI enforces only
part of it, which means the discipline holds exactly as long as every contributor
remembers it.

### D1 · High · CI runs neither `cargo clippy` nor `cargo fmt --check`

`CLAUDE.md` requires both before committing. Neither appears anywhere in
`.gitea/workflows/`. The build-and-test job runs the boundary check, the frontend
tests, the Rust tests and an Android `cargo check` — a good set, with the two lint
gates missing.

Clippy currently reports 51 warnings across the lib and its tests, including
unused imports and a redundant import that a gate would have stopped at the door.

**Fix:** Add both to the test job. Start with `-D warnings` on new code only if
clearing the existing 51 is too large a first step.

### D2 · Medium · A flaky test will intermittently redden CI

`offlineCatalog.test.ts` — "pushes include=true while the server is reachable"
(`UT-068`) — timed out at the 5 s limit during a full-suite run, then passed twice
in isolation taking 1.13 s and 0.61 s.

**Root cause (corrected):** this audit originally attributed it to a real
wall-clock timer. It isn't. The cost is the **first dynamic
`import("./offlineCatalog")`**, which pays to transform the service and its whole
dependency graph (~1072 ms cold) inside a test body, charged against vitest's 5 s
default. Later re-imports after `vi.resetModules()` cost ~30 ms. Under full-suite
contention the cold transform alone crosses the limit.

**Fix applied:** warm the import once at collection time with a top-level
`await import(...)`, so no test is timing the compiler. Slowest test 1072 ms →
129 ms; file total 1170 ms → 238 ms. Timeout deliberately left at the default.
A latent cross-test leak was also fixed alongside it — the store shim's
subscribers were never cleared, so every module instance discarded by
`resetModules()` kept pushing its own visibility value.

**Location:** `src/lib/services/offlineCatalog.test.ts:58`

### D3 · Low · ~~820~~ **19** production `unwrap()`/`expect()` calls

*Downgraded from Medium. This audit substantially overstated the problem, and the
correction is worth recording because the measurement error is instructive.*

The original 820 figure came from grepping for `unwrap()`/`expect()` and filtering
lines containing "test". That does not exclude test *modules* — it only excludes
lines with "test" in them. Scripting the actual `#[cfg(test)]` boundaries gives
**19 real production sites**, not 820. `player/mod.rs`'s 154 hits, for instance,
are *all* past its `#[cfg(test)]` at line 2183, as are the bulk of
`repository/offline.rs`, `storage/mod.rs` and `commands/download/mod.rs`.

**More importantly: zero bare unwraps exist in any `#[tauri::command]` handler.**
The specific risk this finding was built around — a panic inside a command killing
the task and stranding shared player state — is already absent.

The same correction applies to the lock half: all 33 raw `.lock().unwrap()` hits
were in test modules (three weren't even code, but prose in `utils/lock.rs`'s doc
comment). Production was already fully on `lock_safe()`/`read_safe()`/
`write_safe()`. Converting them was consistency work, not a bug fix.

**What is genuinely worth doing** is a three-site cluster, all the same pattern —
`Runtime::new().unwrap()` in threads owning playback-critical state:

| | Site | Consequence of a panic |
|---|------|------------------------|
| 1 | `session_poller/mod.rs:102` | Poller thread dies silently; it drives remote-mode state *and* offline→online recovery, so the app strands offline with nothing surfaced |
| 2 | `player/mpv_backend.rs:424` | Position reporting stops mid-playback; the scrubber freezes while audio keeps going |
| 3 | `player/android/mod.rs:761` | Same pattern across a JNI boundary; progress reporting dies and no resume points are written |

**Fix:** One shared helper returning `Option<Runtime>` and logging on failure
retires all three. The remaining 16 are startup `expect()`s and two provably
infallible calls.

### D4 · Low · Five files carry a disproportionate share of the complexity

`player/mod.rs` (4,726 lines), `repository/offline.rs` (4,696),
`repository/online.rs` (3,702), `commands/player/mod.rs` (3,299) and
`commands/download/mod.rs` (3,226), plus `VideoPlayer.svelte` (2,778) on the
frontend.

These are the same files the changelog keeps returning to for deadlocks and
playback regressions. Not a defect in itself, and not worth a speculative
refactor — but the next time one of them needs substantial work, splitting it is
likely cheaper than continuing to grow it.

---

## E. Verified sound

Things this audit specifically went looking for and found in good order —
including one that looked alarming from the warning output and turned out to be
fine.

| Area | Finding |
|------|---------|
| **The 9 "MutexGuard across await" warnings are test-only** | All nine sit in `#[tokio::test]` functions holding a serialization lock, not in the production async paths that `CLAUDE.md`'s deadlock gotcha warns about. |
| **The local media server is exemplary** | Loopback-only bind, a 32-hex-char per-session token, lexical `..` folding rather than `canonicalize`, and a test asserting reads stay inside the data directory. |
| **Tauri capabilities are minimal** | Three permissions total — `core:default`, `opener:default`, `core:path:default`. No blanket grants, no `withGlobalTauri`. |
| **SQL is parameterised** | Two `format!`-built statements in the whole Rust tree, neither interpolating caller-controlled input into a query. |
| **R8 keep rules are correct and explained** | JNI-loaded player and security classes, the JavascriptInterface bridges and Media3 are all kept, each with a comment naming the crash it prevents. |
| **Type and boundary gates are green** | `svelte-check`: 0 errors, 0 warnings. `check:boundary` passes with three reviewed allowlist entries. 698 Rust tests and 1,021 frontend tests pass. |

---

## F. Suggested order

Sequenced so the cheap gates land before the work they would have caught. B2
leads because it is the finding a user is most likely to actually feel.

*(B1 originally led this list. It was demoted to row 10 after device testing —
see B1. This is a good advertisement for testing a finding before scheduling
work against it.)*

| # | Finding | What it buys | Effort |
|---|---------|--------------|--------|
| 1 | B2 | Catalogue and credentials stop leaving the device; restore stops failing silently | S — **confirmed on device**: `ALLOW_BACKUP` set, Google transport active |
| 3 | D1 | Lint discipline becomes enforced rather than remembered | S |
| 4 | B3 | The network security config actually holds | S — needs an offline-playback check |
| 5 | A1 | The matrix stops over-reporting on twelve shipped requirements | M — mostly mechanical |
| 6 | D2 | CI stops flaking | S |
| 7 | C1 · C2 | The web layer stops being one interpolation away from full IPC | M — iterate against HLS |
| 8 | A2 · A3 · A4 | The matrix becomes self-consistent and defended by a real gate | M |
| 9 | B4 · B5 · B6 · B7 | Platform hygiene brought level with the SDK target | M |
| 10 | B1 · D3 · C3 · D4 | Long-tail robustness; opportunistic rather than scheduled | L |
