fix(android): stop backing up credentials no key can ever open

The app's data dir was eligible for Google cloud backup: the manifest set
neither allowBackup nor any extraction rules, so the SQLite catalogue
(library metadata, watch history) and the jellytau_secure_prefs
credential blob were shipped to the user's Google account. Restoring that
is worse than not having it — SecureStorage encrypts under an Android
Keystore key, and Keystore keys are never backed up, so a restored
install gets ciphertext with nothing to open it and fails auth silently
while looking signed in.

Backup and device-to-device transfer are both turned off. allowBackup
="false" covers API 24-30 outright and kills cloud backup on 31+; it does
NOT stop D2D there, so @xml/data_extraction_rules excludes every domain
from both channels. Nothing is lost: the catalogue is a rebuildable
mirror of the Jellyfin server, and watch state lives on the server.

The credential-load path degrades instead of erroring, because a device
can still arrive at undecryptable ciphertext (an older install's backup,
a Keystore key invalidated by a lockscreen change). Both backends now
distinguish "nothing stored" from "stored but unreadable" and answer the
second as the first: CredentialStore::load_credentials_file logs and
returns an empty map rather than CredentialError::Encryption — which
storage_get_access_token was turning into a hard Err and
storage_get_active_session into a warning — and SecureStorage.getCredential
discards the dead blob so it cannot fail every subsequent read. The
result is a login screen rather than a broken session, and the next
successful sign-in rewrites the store.

Also removes the half-declared Android TV support: the manifest offered
LEANBACK_LAUNCHER and the leanback uses-feature with no D-pad focus
model, no TV layouts, and neither of the two declarations Play's TV
validation also requires (touchscreen required="false", android:banner).
That fails review while advertising the app to TV launchers. All four go
back together when a focus pass is actually done.

And raises jvmTarget from 1.8 to 17 under compileSdk 36, with matching
compileOptions — AGP 8.11 already requires a JDK 17 toolchain, so 1.8 was
only capping emitted bytecode. Nothing else in the build assumed 1.8.

TRACES: UR-012 | IR-014

src-tauri/android/app/build.gradle.kts

@@ -107,8 +107,17 @@ android {
             )
         }
     }
+    // Java 17 bytecode. AGP 8.11 already requires a JDK 17 toolchain to run
+    // (the builder image ships openjdk-17), so "1.8" was only capping the
+    // bytecode we emit, not the JDK in use. Kotlin's jvmTarget and javac's
+    // source/targetCompatibility must agree or AGP 8 fails the build, so all
+    // three move together.
+    compileOptions {
+        sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
+        targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
+    }
     kotlinOptions {
-        jvmTarget = "1.8"
+        jvmTarget = "17"
     }
     buildFeatures {
         buildConfig = true

src-tauri/android/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml

@@ -27,16 +27,50 @@
     <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK" />
     <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS" />
 
-    <!-- AndroidTV support -->
+    <!--
-    <uses-feature android:name="android.software.leanback" android:required="false" />
+      Android TV is deliberately NOT declared here.
 
+      A LEANBACK_LAUNCHER category and an android.software.leanback uses-feature
+      used to sit in this manifest, but nothing behind them: no D-pad focus
+      model, no TV-sized layouts, and neither of the two declarations Play's TV
+      validation also requires (android.hardware.touchscreen required="false"
+      and an android:banner). That combination is the worst of both - it offers
+      the app to TV launchers while failing TV review and shipping a UI that
+      cannot be driven without a touchscreen.
+
+      Re-declare all four together (leanback feature, LEANBACK_LAUNCHER,
+      touchscreen required="false", banner) once a focus pass has actually been
+      done, not before.
+    -->
+
+    <!--
+      android:allowBackup / android:dataExtractionRules below:
+      no cloud backup, no device-to-device transfer (UR-012).
+
+      Credentials are encrypted under an Android Keystore key, and Keystore keys
+      are NEVER backed up. A restored install would therefore get the
+      jellytau_secure_prefs ciphertext with no key to open it - the app would
+      look signed in and silently fail every request, which is worse than a
+      login screen. Everything else in the data dir (the SQLite catalogue:
+      library metadata, watch history, download bookkeeping) is a rebuildable
+      mirror of the Jellyfin server, so backing it up buys nothing and exports
+      the user's library and viewing history to their Google account.
+
+      allowBackup covers API 24-30 completely, and kills *cloud* backup on API
+      31+. It does NOT stop device-to-device transfer there, so
+      @xml/data_extraction_rules (API 31+) excludes both channels explicitly. No
+      android:fullBackupContent is needed: over the API 23-30 range where it
+      would govern, allowBackup="false" has already turned backup off entirely.
+    -->
     <application
         android:icon="@mipmap/ic_launcher"
         android:label="${appLabel}"
         android:theme="@style/Theme.jellytau"
         android:hardwareAccelerated="true"
         android:networkSecurityConfig="@xml/network_security_config"
-        android:usesCleartextTraffic="${usesCleartextTraffic}">
+        android:usesCleartextTraffic="${usesCleartextTraffic}"
+        android:allowBackup="false"
+        android:dataExtractionRules="@xml/data_extraction_rules">
         <activity
             android:configChanges="orientation|keyboardHidden|keyboard|screenSize|locale|smallestScreenSize|screenLayout|uiMode|density"
             android:launchMode="singleTask"
@@ -48,8 +82,7 @@
             <intent-filter>
                 <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
                 <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
-                <!-- AndroidTV support -->
+                <!-- No LEANBACK_LAUNCHER: see the Android TV note above. -->
-                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LEANBACK_LAUNCHER" />
             </intent-filter>
         </activity>
 

src-tauri/android/src/main/java/com/dtourolle/jellytau/security/SecureStorage.kt

@@ -100,9 +100,27 @@ class SecureStorage private constructor(context: Context) {
         }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * Read a credential.
+     *
+     * Returns null for both "nothing stored" and "stored but undecryptable", but
+     * treats them as distinct events. The second happens after a backup restore
+     * or a device-to-device transfer: SharedPreferences travel, the Android
+     * Keystore key that encrypted them never does, so the ciphertext can never
+     * be read again on this install. That blob is discarded here rather than
+     * left to fail on every subsequent read, which turns a permanently broken
+     * credential into a clean logged-out state. (The app also declares
+     * allowBackup="false" plus data-extraction rules so this should no longer
+     * arise - this is the belt to that manifest's braces.)
+     */
     fun getCredential(key: String): String? {
-        try {
+        val encoded = prefs.getString(key, null)
-            val encoded = prefs.getString(key, null) ?: return null
+        if (encoded == null) {
+            Log.d(TAG, "No credential stored for: $key")
+            return null
+        }
+
+        return try {
             val combined = Base64.decode(encoded, Base64.DEFAULT)
 
             // Extract IV (first 12 bytes for GCM)
@@ -114,10 +132,16 @@ class SecureStorage private constructor(context: Context) {
             cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, getSecretKey(), spec)
 
             val decrypted = cipher.doFinal(encrypted)
-            return String(decrypted, Charsets.UTF_8)
+            String(decrypted, Charsets.UTF_8)
         } catch (e: Exception) {
-            Log.e(TAG, "Failed to get credential: $key", e)
+            Log.w(
-            return null
+                TAG,
+                "Credential '$key' is present but cannot be decrypted; discarding it and " +
+                    "reporting no credential. Signing in again will store a fresh one.",
+                e
+            )
+            prefs.edit().remove(key).apply()
+            null
         }
     }
 

src-tauri/android/src/main/res/xml/data_extraction_rules.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!--
+  Backup / transfer policy for JellyTau (API 31+; see android:allowBackup in
+  AndroidManifest.xml for API 24-30).
+
+  Nothing is eligible for extraction, from either channel:
+
+  * cloud-backup   - already off via android:allowBackup="false".
+  * device-transfer - NOT covered by allowBackup on Android 12+, which is why
+    this file exists. A D2D transfer would otherwise copy the same data the
+    cloud backup used to.
+
+  Why nothing is extractable:
+
+  * Credentials are unrecoverable off-device. jellytau_secure_prefs holds
+    AES-GCM ciphertext encrypted under an Android Keystore key, and Keystore
+    keys are never backed up or transferred. Restoring the prefs without the
+    key produces ciphertext nothing can read - a silent auth failure that looks
+    like a broken app rather than a logged-out one.
+  * Everything else is a rebuildable cache. The SQLite catalogue is a mirror of
+    the Jellyfin server (library metadata, watch history, offline downloads);
+    signing in again reproduces it, and watch state lives on the server anyway.
+    Backing it up would export a user's library and viewing history to their
+    Google account for no gain.
+
+  Exclude rules are listed per domain rather than relying on "root" alone,
+  because database/, shared_prefs/, files/ and external storage are addressed
+  as their own domains by the extraction engine.
+-->
+<data-extraction-rules>
+    <cloud-backup>
+        <exclude domain="root" />
+        <exclude domain="file" />
+        <exclude domain="database" />
+        <exclude domain="sharedpref" />
+        <exclude domain="external" />
+    </cloud-backup>
+    <device-transfer>
+        <exclude domain="root" />
+        <exclude domain="file" />
+        <exclude domain="database" />
+        <exclude domain="sharedpref" />
+        <exclude domain="external" />
+    </device-transfer>
+</data-extraction-rules>

src-tauri/src/credentials.rs

@@ -471,6 +471,19 @@ impl CredentialStore {
         hasher.finalize().into()
     }
 
+    /// Load and decrypt the credential map.
+    ///
+    /// A file that is present but **undecryptable** is deliberately reported as
+    /// an *empty* credential set rather than as an error. The key never leaves
+    /// the device it was derived on (Android Keystore keys are never backed up,
+    /// and the file fallback's key is derived from machine identifiers), so a
+    /// restored/transferred install gets ciphertext with no key and every read
+    /// would fail *permanently*. Surfacing that as an error made session restore
+    /// throw instead of falling back to the login screen: an unrecoverable app
+    /// rather than a clean logged-out one. The next successful login re-encrypts
+    /// the file with the current key, so the state self-heals.
+    ///
+    /// TRACES: UR-012 | IR-014
     fn load_credentials_file(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value, CredentialError> {
         if !self.credentials_path.exists() {
             return Ok(serde_json::json!({}));
@@ -483,8 +496,31 @@ impl CredentialStore {
             return Ok(serde_json::json!({}));
         }
 
-        let decrypted = self.decrypt(&encrypted_data)?;
+        let decrypted = match self.decrypt(&encrypted_data) {
-        serde_json::from_str(&decrypted).map_err(|e| CredentialError::Encryption(e.to_string()))
+            Ok(decrypted) => decrypted,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(
+                    "Credentials file at {:?} exists but cannot be decrypted ({}); \
+                     treating as no stored credentials. This is expected after a \
+                     backup restore or device transfer - the encryption key does \
+                     not travel with the data. Signing in again will rewrite it.",
+                    self.credentials_path, e
+                );
+                return Ok(serde_json::json!({}));
+            }
+        };
+
+        match serde_json::from_str(&decrypted) {
+            Ok(value) => Ok(value),
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(
+                    "Credentials file at {:?} decrypted to invalid JSON ({}); \
+                     treating as no stored credentials.",
+                    self.credentials_path, e
+                );
+                Ok(serde_json::json!({}))
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     fn save_credentials_file(&self, data: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<(), CredentialError> {
@@ -856,6 +892,73 @@ pub use android_keystore::{
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    /// Build a store pinned to the encrypted-file backend with an explicit key,
+    /// so a test can simulate "same file, different machine key" (which is what
+    /// a restored backup looks like).
+    fn file_backed_store(credentials_path: PathBuf, encryption_key: [u8; 32]) -> CredentialStore {
+        CredentialStore {
+            using_keyring: false,
+            credentials_path,
+            encryption_key,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A credentials file we cannot decrypt must read as *no credentials stored*,
+    /// not as a hard error. This is the restored-backup case: the ciphertext comes
+    /// back but the key that encrypted it (Android Keystore / the machine-derived
+    /// key) does not, so every read fails forever.
+    ///
+    /// TRACES: UR-012 | IR-014
+    #[test]
+    fn undecryptable_credentials_file_reads_as_not_found() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join(CREDENTIALS_FILENAME);
+
+        let original = file_backed_store(path.clone(), [1u8; 32]);
+        original.save_to_file("user-1", "token-abc").unwrap();
+
+        // Restored onto a device whose derived key differs: same bytes, no key.
+        let restored = file_backed_store(path.clone(), [2u8; 32]);
+        match restored.get_token("user-1") {
+            Err(CredentialError::NotFound) => {}
+            other => panic!("expected NotFound for undecryptable ciphertext, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Garbage in the file (truncation, partial restore) is the same story.
+    ///
+    /// TRACES: UR-012 | IR-014
+    #[test]
+    fn corrupt_credentials_file_reads_as_not_found() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join(CREDENTIALS_FILENAME);
+        fs::write(&path, "not base64 at all !!!").unwrap();
+
+        let store = file_backed_store(path, [3u8; 32]);
+        match store.get_token("user-1") {
+            Err(CredentialError::NotFound) => {}
+            other => panic!("expected NotFound for corrupt file, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// …and the logged-out state must be recoverable: signing in again has to be
+    /// able to write over the unreadable file rather than failing on load.
+    ///
+    /// TRACES: UR-012 | IR-014
+    #[test]
+    fn login_after_undecryptable_file_rewrites_it() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let path = dir.path().join(CREDENTIALS_FILENAME);
+
+        let original = file_backed_store(path.clone(), [1u8; 32]);
+        original.save_to_file("user-1", "token-abc").unwrap();
+
+        let restored = file_backed_store(path.clone(), [2u8; 32]);
+        restored.save_to_file("user-1", "token-fresh").unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(restored.get_from_file("user-1").unwrap(), "token-fresh");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_encryption_roundtrip() {
         let store = CredentialStore::new();