From 662cb3cd85c33a50151537f303143a2d1ca0eee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Duncan Tourolle <duncan@tourolle.paris>
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 19:30:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] docs(requirements): add new IDs, retire the v0.6.0 audit,
 record module size
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Adds the requirement rows other work in flight needs so `traces:validate`
stays green: DR-204 (frontend logging facade), DR-205 (ESLint + Prettier
gate), DR-206 (pinned Rust toolchain), DR-207 (pre-commit hook), DR-208
(documentation link integrity), DR-209 (server-side library folder
exclusion) and UR-076, plus §4 test rows UT-201, UT-202 and UT-203.

Deletes docs/codebase-audit.md. It was a 2026-08-16 snapshot of v0.6.0 at
commit be907b49 with no status markers, three releases stale, describing
code that had since changed — a document that half-describes the codebase
is worse than none. Everything in it still genuinely open already lived in
§5's table; the §5 preamble now records what was dropped as closed and
why, so nothing is silently re-raised or silently lost.

Also rewrites §5 row 11 with today's figures and the actual cost: the six
oversized modules are the same ones CLAUDE.md's Gotchas section keeps
having to warn about, which is the price being paid. Recorded, not
scheduled.

Fixes a dead link to the removed src/lib/services/playbackControl.ts,
which now points at src/lib/utils/playbackUnits.ts.
---
 docs/codebase-audit.md | 532 -----------------------------------------
 docs/requirements.md   |  51 +++-
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 544 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 docs/codebase-audit.md

diff --git a/docs/codebase-audit.md b/docs/codebase-audit.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1485591e..00000000
--- a/docs/codebase-audit.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,532 +0,0 @@
-# JellyTau Codebase Audit
-
-**Date:** 2026-08-16 · **Version:** v0.6.0 · **Commit:** `be907b49` (master)
-
-A review of the Rust/Svelte/Android codebase against its own requirements matrix
-and against current Android and Tauri v2 platform practice. Every finding was
-verified by running the project's own tooling or reading the code it points at —
-nothing here is inferred from documentation alone.
-
-**Scale:** 55,835 LOC Rust · 50,490 LOC TS/Svelte · 530 requirements · 824 traces
-
-| Severity | Count |
-|----------|-------|
-| High | 5 |
-| Medium | 9 |
-| Low | 6 |
-| Tests passing | 1,719 |
-| Untraced requirements | 86 |
-| Traceability coverage | 86% (285/330) |
-
-> **Revisions, 2026-08-16.** Three rankings changed after device testing and
-> platform research, all documented in place:
-> - **B1 High → Low.** The predicted impact was refuted on a physical Android 16
->   device. The residual risk turned out to be a different, narrower one.
-> - **B7 Low → Medium, re-framed.** The original reading of predictive back was
->   backwards: at targetSdk 36 it is already enabled, not merely un-opted-into.
-> - **B8 added (Medium).** Android 16 Local Network Protections versus a
->   LAN-hosted Jellyfin server.
-> - **D3 Medium → Low.** The "820 unwraps" figure was a measurement error; the
->   real number is 19, and none are in command handlers.
-> - **B1's stated mechanism was wrong** even though its conclusion held. FGS
->   notifications are *not* exempt from `POST_NOTIFICATIONS`; media-session
->   notifications are. See B1 — the distinction changes what the fix should be.
->
-> Original ranking was 6 High / 8 Medium / 5 Low.
-
-**Verified by running:** `bun run check` · `bun run test` · `cargo test` ·
-`cargo clippy --all-targets` · `bun run check:boundary` · `bun run traces:json`
-
-**Device-verified (2026-08-16):** B1 and B2 were checked against a physical HONOR
-ROD2-W09 running Android 16 (SDK 36) with the shipped app installed. B2 was
-confirmed; B1 was refuted and downgraded.
-
-**Not covered:** the e2e suite (`test:e2e` is not wired into CI and was not run),
-Windows and Arch packaging paths, and the docs-site build. B3, C1 and C2 still
-need a device/desktop playback pass.
-
----
-
-## A. Requirements versus code
-
-The traceability matrix is the project's own claim about what is built. Of 530
-defined requirement IDs, 86 carry no `TRACES:` tag anywhere in the tree. Most of
-those gaps are documentation debt rather than missing features — which is
-precisely the problem, because it makes the matrix unreliable as evidence.
-
-### A1 · High · Twelve requirements are marked "Done" but have zero traces
-
-`UR-006` (lockscreen/BLE control), `UR-037` (video library presentation),
-`IR-006` (Android MediaSession), `IR-008` (audio focus), `IR-022` (person/cast
-API), `IR-024` (home-screen API) and six Jellyfin API requirements (`JA-006`,
-`JA-009`, `JA-013`, `JA-014`, `JA-015`, `JA-018`) all claim completion with
-nothing pointing at an implementation.
-
-These features demonstrably work — lockscreen control, Next Up, favourites are
-all shipped. The code is there; the tags are not. That means the matrix currently
-over-reports on exactly the requirements a reviewer would most want to verify,
-and a regression in any of them would leave no trace to follow.
-
-**Fix:** Tag the existing implementations. Highest value per keystroke in the
-whole audit: six of the twelve are single Jellyfin API call sites.
-
-### A2 · Medium · Requirement statuses contradict each other across layers
-
-`UR-020` (subtitle selection) and `UR-021` (audio track selection) are marked
-*Done*, while the integration requirements they decompose into — `IR-018` and
-`IR-019`, both libmpv-specific — are still *Planned*. Similarly `IR-005` (MPRIS)
-sits at *Planned* under a *Done* `UR-006`.
-
-The likely truth is that these user requirements were satisfied through a
-different path than the one originally specified (HTML5 `<video>` and ExoPlayer
-rather than libmpv), and the IRs were never re-scoped. Left as-is, the matrix
-reads as though shipped features depend on unbuilt integrations.
-
-**Fix:** Re-scope or retire the stale IRs so each Done UR rests on Done IRs.
-
-### A3 · Medium · The traceability gate is set far below actual coverage
-
-`traceability-check.yml` fails only below 50%. Real coverage is well above that,
-so the gate cannot catch a coverage regression until roughly half the matrix has
-rotted. A gate that can only fire after a catastrophe is not protecting anything.
-
-**Measured coverage: 86% (285/330)** — UR 71/75, IR 19/32, DR 166/187, JA 29/36.
-IR is by far the weakest dimension, which corroborates A1.
-
-**Fix applied:** `MIN_THRESHOLD` ratcheted 50 → 82, with the ratchet policy
-written into the workflow (only goes up; never lowered to make a red build pass).
-The same figure is mirrored as `MIN_COVERAGE_PERCENT` in
-`scripts/extract-traces.ts` so local `traces:coverage` gates on the same bar, and
-a test parses the workflow YAML and fails if the two drift apart.
-
-### A4 · Low · Two traced IDs do not exist in the requirements document
-
-`DR-189` and `UT-188` are referenced by `TRACES:` comments but are defined
-nowhere in `docs/requirements.md`. The extraction tool accepts them silently, so
-typos and renames pass unnoticed.
-
-**Fix:** Add a dangling-ID check to the extractor and fail CI on it — cheap, and
-it keeps the matrix honest in both directions.
-
-### A5 · Not a gap · The remaining untraced requirements are legitimately unbuilt
-
-`UR-016`, `UR-022` and `UR-070` are Planned or Proposed, and `UR-031`
-(crossfade) is explicitly blocked by `DR-034`. Their absence from the trace graph
-is correct and needs no action — noted so it does not get swept into the fix list.
-
----
-
-## B. Android platform practice
-
-The app targets SDK 36 with a minSdk of 24. Several manifest and WebView settings
-still reflect an earlier target level.
-
-### B1 · Low · `POST_NOTIFICATIONS` is declared but never requested at runtime
-
-*Downgraded from High. The original ranking was refuted by device testing — the
-evidence is below, and it is the reason this finding is now near-trivial.*
-
-The permission appears in the manifest, but there is no `requestPermissions` call
-anywhere in the Kotlin, Rust or TypeScript sources, and
-`JellyTauPlaybackService.startForeground()` runs with no `checkSelfPermission`
-guard. On Android 13+ notification permission defaults to denied.
-
-This was ranked High on the theory that it would suppress the media notification
-and with it the lockscreen transport controls (`UR-006`). Testing on an HONOR
-ROD2-W09 running **Android 16 (SDK 36)**, with the shipped app installed and
-playing, shows otherwise. The permission is genuinely denied:
-
-```
-POST_NOTIFICATIONS: granted=false, flags=[USER_SENSITIVE_WHEN_GRANTED|USER_SENSITIVE_WHEN_DENIED]
-appops POST_NOTIFICATION: ignore
-```
-
-and the notification is nonetheless live and complete:
-
-```
-ServiceRecord{... com.dtourolle.jellytau/.player.JellyTauPlaybackService}
-  isForeground=true  foregroundId=1  types=0x00000002
-  foregroundNoti=Notification(flags=NO_CLEAR|FOREGROUND_SERVICE
-                              category=transport actions=3 vis=PUBLIC)
-```
-
-**`UR-006` is not at risk.** But the *reason* is not the one this audit first
-gave, and the correction is load-bearing rather than pedantic.
-
-The first explanation here was "foreground-service notifications are exempt." That
-is wrong. Android's own wording is that the permission covers "non-exempt
-(**including Foreground Services (FGS)**) notifications", and that users who deny
-it see FGS notices "in the Task Manager but [not] in the notification drawer" — an
-FGS notification is explicitly *not* exempt. What is exempt is **media-session**
-notifications. The platform predicate is `Notification.isMediaNotification()`,
-requiring `MediaStyle`/`DecoratedMediaCustomViewStyle` **and** a non-null
-`EXTRA_MEDIA_SESSION`; it is byte-identical across API 33–36, and
-`NotificationManagerService` has no FGS clause in either enforcement site.
-
-Why the difference matters: under the FGS theory, anything the service posts is
-safe, and the code needs no care. Under the correct one, the exemption is earned
-per-notification by the token — so losing the token loses not just the shade entry
-but the lockscreen controls entirely, since SystemUI's media carousel
-(`MediaDataProcessor.onNotificationAdded`) gates on the *same* predicate. A
-token-less notification never even reaches the notification listener.
-
-**The real risk here is not the permission — it is how narrowly the exemption is
-earned.** AOSP's `Notification.isMediaNotification()` grants it only when the
-style is `MediaStyle`/`DecoratedMediaCustomViewStyle` **and**
-`Notification.EXTRA_MEDIA_SESSION` holds a non-null *platform* session token. If
-either is missing while the permission is denied, the notification is **silently
-suppressed** — no exception, no log.
-
-JellyTau earns it at two sites, both of which hang it on a null-safe call:
-
-```kotlin
-androidx.media.app.NotificationCompat.MediaStyle()
-    .setMediaSession(mediaSessionCompat?.sessionToken)   // :273 and :466
-```
-
-Ordering currently saves it — `mediaSessionCompat` is assigned in `onCreate`
-(:195) and `createBasicNotification()` is only reached from `onStartCommand`
-(:251) — and the device test confirms it works. But it is one reordering away
-from breaking invisibly, and only for users who denied the permission, which is
-a population most developers never test as.
-
-**Fix:** Keep the permission declared — download-service FGS notifications are
-*not* covered by the media exemption, and this app has a downloads feature that
-may want them. Comment both `setMediaSession` sites to record what earns the
-exemption, and log loudly if the token is ever null at build time, converting a
-silent failure into a diagnosable one.
-
-**Location:** `src-tauri/android/src/main/java/com/dtourolle/jellytau/player/JellyTauPlaybackService.kt:251`, `:273`, `:466`
-
-### B2 · High · Cloud backup is on by default, and it will break credential restore
-
-The manifest sets neither `android:allowBackup="false"` nor a
-`dataExtractionRules`/`fullBackupContent` file, so Android's default applies: the
-app's data directory is backed up to the user's Google account. That ships the
-SQLite catalogue — library metadata and watch history — off the device.
-
-The credential path makes it worse rather than better. `SecureStorage.kt`
-encrypts with AES/GCM under an Android Keystore key, and Keystore keys are never
-backed up. A user restoring onto a new phone therefore gets the ciphertext
-without the key: undecryptable credentials and a silent authentication failure,
-with no code path that recognises the situation.
-
-**Fix applied.** `allowBackup="false"`. Extraction rules that merely excluded the
-DB and credential prefs would have left nothing worth backing up: the SQLite
-catalogue is a rebuildable mirror of the server and watch state lives server-side,
-so there is no user-authored data to preserve.
-
-**A gap this audit missed:** on API 31+, `allowBackup="false"` disables *cloud*
-backup but **not device-to-device transfer**, which reproduces the identical
-failure — the prefs travel, the Keystore key does not. A
-`data_extraction_rules.xml` excluding all five domains from both `<cloud-backup>`
-and `<device-transfer>` was added to close it.
-
-**A real bug found while fixing this:** the Rust encrypted-file fallback in
-`credentials.rs` propagated a decrypt failure as `CredentialError::Encryption`,
-which `storage_get_access_token` turned into a hard `Err` — so an undecryptable
-blob was an error state, not a logout. It now logs and returns an empty map, so
-the caller sees `NotFound` → `Ok(None)` → login screen, and the next sign-in
-self-heals the file. `SecureStorage.getCredential` on the Kotlin side already
-returned null, but could not distinguish "nothing stored" from "unreadable" and
-left the dead blob in prefs forever; it now separates the cases and discards it.
-Three tests written and watched fail first, per the red→green rule.
-
-### B3 · High · `MIXED_CONTENT_ALWAYS_ALLOW` undoes the network security config
-
-`network_security_config.xml` is careful and well-argued: cleartext blocked
-everywhere, exempted only for `127.0.0.1` so the local media server can serve
-downloads. Its own comment warns "this must not become a blanket cleartext
-opt-in."
-
-But `MainActivity.kt` sets `mixedContentMode = MIXED_CONTENT_ALWAYS_ALLOW`, which
-permits the WebView to load http subresources into an https page from any origin.
-Alongside it, `allowFileAccess = true` and `allowContentAccess = true` are both
-broader than anything the app needs, since Tauri serves the UI from its own scheme
-and media comes from the token-guarded loopback server. These read as leftovers
-from before the media server existed.
-
-**Fix:** Drop to `MIXED_CONTENT_COMPATIBILITY_MODE` and set both file and content
-access to false, then verify offline video still plays.
-
-**Location:** `src-tauri/android/src/main/java/com/dtourolle/jellytau/MainActivity.kt:504-507`
-
-### B4 · Medium · Android TV is half-declared
-
-The manifest advertises `LEANBACK_LAUNCHER` and a non-required leanback feature,
-but omits `<uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.touchscreen"
-android:required="false"/>` and an `android:banner`. That combination fails Play's
-TV validation, and on a real TV the app would launch into a UI with no D-pad focus
-model behind it.
-
-**Fix:** Either commit to TV — add the feature declaration, a banner, and a focus
-pass — or remove the leanback category until you do.
-
-### B5 · Medium · `jvmTarget` is pinned to 1.8 under compileSdk 36
-
-The Kotlin target has not moved with the SDK. AGP 8 warns on it, and it locks the
-Kotlin sources out of APIs and desugaring behaviour that everything else in the
-toolchain assumes.
-
-**Fix:** Move `jvmTarget` and the Java source/target compatibility to 17.
-
-### B6 · Low · Media3 is several minor versions behind
-
-`androidx.media3` is pinned at 1.5.0 across exoplayer, hls, session and common.
-Given how much of this app's hard-won behaviour lives in ExoPlayer edge cases —
-truncated progressive streams, background audio handoff, HLS resume — staying
-current on its bug-fix releases has unusually high value here.
-
-**Fix:** Schedule a Media3 bump with a device pass over the playback regression list.
-
-### B7 · Medium · Predictive back is already on, not merely un-opted-into
-
-*Upgraded from Low, and re-framed — the original framing was backwards.*
-
-The audit first read the absent `enableOnBackInvokedCallback` as the app
-*forgoing* the Android 13+ back-gesture preview. That is not what the flag means
-at this target level. Predictive back is enabled by default for apps targeting
-recent SDKs, and Android 16's own behaviour-change list carries "Migration or
-opt-out required for predictive back" — with the opt-out being removed. Targeting
-36, JellyTau is already getting predictive back; it simply hasn't been checked
-against it.
-
-That matters more than a missing opt-in would, because the app does not use
-ordinary Android back. It runs a WebView with its own history model —
-`src/lib/utils/navigation.ts` tracks a depth counter, applies a popstate delta,
-and falls back to a path when `history.back()` would trap the user, with
-`scrollRestore.ts` keying off the same popstate events. That is exactly the kind
-of custom back handling predictive back is most likely to disagree with.
-
-**Fix:** This is a device test, not a code change — exercise the back gesture
-(including the drag-and-release preview and the cancel) from a library page, a
-detail page, the player, and the settings screen, and watch for the depth counter
-desynchronising. Only change code if it misbehaves.
-
-Separately and unrelatedly: `JellyTauPlaybackService` is `exported="true"` with a
-`MediaSessionService` intent filter — conventional for Media3, but it means any
-app on the device can attempt to bind and drive playback. Confirm the session's
-`onConnect` callback rejects unknown packages.
-
-### B8 · Medium (forward-looking) · Android 16 Local Network Protections vs a LAN Jellyfin server
-
-*New finding, surfaced while researching B1.*
-
-Android 16's behaviour-change list includes **Local Network Permission**. JellyTau's
-entire purpose is reaching a Jellyfin server that, for most users, sits on the
-local network — so a permission gate on local-network access is a direct threat to
-the app's core function, not a peripheral concern.
-
-Stated carefully, because the timing matters: in Android 16 this is **opt-in for
-testing**, not enforced by default, with enforcement signalled for a future
-release. Nothing is broken today, and the device test will not surface it. But
-this is the rare platform change that could stop the app working at all, and it
-is much cheaper to handle before it is mandatory.
-
-**Fix:** Investigate what the permission will require, then test the app against
-it with the opt-in flag enabled on the Android 16 device already to hand. Track it
-as a release-blocking item for whichever Android version enforces it.
-
----
-
-## C. Tauri v2 configuration
-
-The capability model here is genuinely well done — see section E. The gaps are in
-the two settings that govern what a compromised web layer could reach.
-
-### C1 · High · `"csp": null` contradicts the project's own security convention
-
-`CLAUDE.md` lists "keep the CSP restrictive in `tauri.conf.json`" as a standing
-rule; the config disables CSP entirely. With it off, any script that reaches the
-web layer inherits the full IPC surface.
-
-The realistic exposure today is low, and worth stating plainly rather than
-inflating: the frontend has a single `{@html}` — an app-owned icon in
-`GenericGenreBrowser.svelte`, not server data — and no `innerHTML`, `eval` or
-`new Function` outside tests. So this is a missing defence rather than an open
-hole. But it is the defence that stops the next careless interpolation of a
-Jellyfin-supplied string from becoming a full compromise.
-
-**Fix:** Set a CSP permitting `'self'`, `asset.localhost`, `http://127.0.0.1:*`
-for media, and the configured Jellyfin origin for images. Expect one or two
-iterations against HLS playback.
-
-### C2 · Medium · The asset protocol scope is wider than what it serves
-
-`assetProtocol.scope` is `$APPDATA/**`, which covers the whole app data directory
-— the SQLite database and the credential store included — while the protocol only
-needs to reach cached thumbnails and downloaded media.
-
-Since `DR-137` introduced the token-guarded loopback media server, the asset
-protocol's remaining job may be thumbnails alone, which would make the narrowing
-nearly free.
-
-**Fix applied:** scoped to `$APPDATA/thumbnails/**`. Confirmed on device that
-`jellytau.db` (8 MB catalogue) and `shared_prefs` sit in the `$APPDATA` root and
-are now outside the grant.
-
-**But device testing found the finding was aimed at the wrong thing.** The asset
-protocol is not narrowly used — it is **entirely unused at runtime**:
-
-- `getCachedImageUrl` in `imageCache.ts` has **no production callers**. Its only
-  references are its own test file. `convertFileSrc`'s sole production mention
-  sits inside that uncalled function, so it never executes.
-- The real path is `MediaCard` → `CachedImage` → `commands.imageGetUrl()`, which
-  returns **base64 from Rust**. Every image in the app is a `data:` URI delivered
-  over IPC.
-- Confirmed on device: zero `asset.localhost` requests across a full session of
-  browsing home, the library list and a poster grid; the thumbnail cache stayed
-  at 12 files and never grew, because nothing calls `thumbnailSave` either.
-
-Two consequences worth acting on, neither yet done:
-
-1. **The `protocol-asset` Cargo feature and the whole `assetProtocol` config
-   block can likely be removed**, which retires the attack surface rather than
-   shrinking it. `imageCache.ts` is dead code and can go with it.
-2. **`img-src` in the new CSP can be much tighter.** It currently grants
-   `http: https:` on the reasoning that thumbnails are fetched direct-from-server
-   on a cache miss — but they are not; they arrive as data URIs. With no
-   webview-side server image loads anywhere in `src/`, `img-src 'self' data:
-   blob:` should suffice. That is a real tightening the CSP work left on the
-   table because it reasoned from the dead code path.
-
-Both need their own device pass, since a wrong `img-src` blanks every image.
-
-### C3 · Low · Shipped desktop bundles have no update path
-
-The bundle targets deb, rpm and nsis, but `tauri-plugin-updater` is not among the
-dependencies. Every desktop user upgrades by manually fetching a new package,
-which in practice means a long tail of installs pinned to whatever version they
-first downloaded.
-
-**Fix:** Add the updater plugin with a signed release manifest, or document the
-manual upgrade path in the README so the omission is at least deliberate.
-
----
-
-## D. CI and code health
-
-Local discipline in this project is strong and well documented. CI enforces only
-part of it, which means the discipline holds exactly as long as every contributor
-remembers it.
-
-### D1 · High · CI runs neither `cargo clippy` nor `cargo fmt --check`
-
-`CLAUDE.md` requires both before committing. Neither appears anywhere in
-`.gitea/workflows/`. The build-and-test job runs the boundary check, the frontend
-tests, the Rust tests and an Android `cargo check` — a good set, with the two lint
-gates missing.
-
-Clippy currently reports 51 warnings across the lib and its tests, including
-unused imports and a redundant import that a gate would have stopped at the door.
-
-**Fix:** Add both to the test job. Start with `-D warnings` on new code only if
-clearing the existing 51 is too large a first step.
-
-### D2 · Medium · A flaky test will intermittently redden CI
-
-`offlineCatalog.test.ts` — "pushes include=true while the server is reachable"
-(`UT-068`) — timed out at the 5 s limit during a full-suite run, then passed twice
-in isolation taking 1.13 s and 0.61 s.
-
-**Root cause (corrected):** this audit originally attributed it to a real
-wall-clock timer. It isn't. The cost is the **first dynamic
-`import("./offlineCatalog")`**, which pays to transform the service and its whole
-dependency graph (~1072 ms cold) inside a test body, charged against vitest's 5 s
-default. Later re-imports after `vi.resetModules()` cost ~30 ms. Under full-suite
-contention the cold transform alone crosses the limit.
-
-**Fix applied:** warm the import once at collection time with a top-level
-`await import(...)`, so no test is timing the compiler. Slowest test 1072 ms →
-129 ms; file total 1170 ms → 238 ms. Timeout deliberately left at the default.
-A latent cross-test leak was also fixed alongside it — the store shim's
-subscribers were never cleared, so every module instance discarded by
-`resetModules()` kept pushing its own visibility value.
-
-**Location:** `src/lib/services/offlineCatalog.test.ts:58`
-
-### D3 · Low · ~~820~~ **19** production `unwrap()`/`expect()` calls
-
-*Downgraded from Medium. This audit substantially overstated the problem, and the
-correction is worth recording because the measurement error is instructive.*
-
-The original 820 figure came from grepping for `unwrap()`/`expect()` and filtering
-lines containing "test". That does not exclude test *modules* — it only excludes
-lines with "test" in them. Scripting the actual `#[cfg(test)]` boundaries gives
-**19 real production sites**, not 820. `player/mod.rs`'s 154 hits, for instance,
-are *all* past its `#[cfg(test)]` at line 2183, as are the bulk of
-`repository/offline.rs`, `storage/mod.rs` and `commands/download/mod.rs`.
-
-**More importantly: zero bare unwraps exist in any `#[tauri::command]` handler.**
-The specific risk this finding was built around — a panic inside a command killing
-the task and stranding shared player state — is already absent.
-
-The same correction applies to the lock half: all 33 raw `.lock().unwrap()` hits
-were in test modules (three weren't even code, but prose in `utils/lock.rs`'s doc
-comment). Production was already fully on `lock_safe()`/`read_safe()`/
-`write_safe()`. Converting them was consistency work, not a bug fix.
-
-**What is genuinely worth doing** is a three-site cluster, all the same pattern —
-`Runtime::new().unwrap()` in threads owning playback-critical state:
-
-| | Site | Consequence of a panic |
-|---|------|------------------------|
-| 1 | `session_poller/mod.rs:102` | Poller thread dies silently; it drives remote-mode state *and* offline→online recovery, so the app strands offline with nothing surfaced |
-| 2 | `player/mpv_backend.rs:424` | Position reporting stops mid-playback; the scrubber freezes while audio keeps going |
-| 3 | `player/android/mod.rs:761` | Same pattern across a JNI boundary; progress reporting dies and no resume points are written |
-
-**Fix:** One shared helper returning `Option<Runtime>` and logging on failure
-retires all three. The remaining 16 are startup `expect()`s and two provably
-infallible calls.
-
-### D4 · Low · Five files carry a disproportionate share of the complexity
-
-`player/mod.rs` (4,726 lines), `repository/offline.rs` (4,696),
-`repository/online.rs` (3,702), `commands/player/mod.rs` (3,299) and
-`commands/download/mod.rs` (3,226), plus `VideoPlayer.svelte` (2,778) on the
-frontend.
-
-These are the same files the changelog keeps returning to for deadlocks and
-playback regressions. Not a defect in itself, and not worth a speculative
-refactor — but the next time one of them needs substantial work, splitting it is
-likely cheaper than continuing to grow it.
-
----
-
-## E. Verified sound
-
-Things this audit specifically went looking for and found in good order —
-including one that looked alarming from the warning output and turned out to be
-fine.
-
-| Area | Finding |
-|------|---------|
-| **The 9 "MutexGuard across await" warnings are test-only** | All nine sit in `#[tokio::test]` functions holding a serialization lock, not in the production async paths that `CLAUDE.md`'s deadlock gotcha warns about. |
-| **The local media server is exemplary** | Loopback-only bind, a 32-hex-char per-session token, lexical `..` folding rather than `canonicalize`, and a test asserting reads stay inside the data directory. |
-| **Tauri capabilities are minimal** | Three permissions total — `core:default`, `opener:default`, `core:path:default`. No blanket grants, no `withGlobalTauri`. |
-| **SQL is parameterised** | Two `format!`-built statements in the whole Rust tree, neither interpolating caller-controlled input into a query. |
-| **R8 keep rules are correct and explained** | JNI-loaded player and security classes, the JavascriptInterface bridges and Media3 are all kept, each with a comment naming the crash it prevents. |
-| **Type and boundary gates are green** | `svelte-check`: 0 errors, 0 warnings. `check:boundary` passes with three reviewed allowlist entries. 698 Rust tests and 1,021 frontend tests pass. |
-
----
-
-## F. Suggested order
-
-Sequenced so the cheap gates land before the work they would have caught. B2
-leads because it is the finding a user is most likely to actually feel.
-
-*(B1 originally led this list. It was demoted to row 10 after device testing —
-see B1. This is a good advertisement for testing a finding before scheduling
-work against it.)*
-
-| # | Finding | What it buys | Effort |
-|---|---------|--------------|--------|
-| 1 | B2 | Catalogue and credentials stop leaving the device; restore stops failing silently | S — **confirmed on device**: `ALLOW_BACKUP` set, Google transport active |
-| 3 | D1 | Lint discipline becomes enforced rather than remembered | S |
-| 4 | B3 | The network security config actually holds | S — needs an offline-playback check |
-| 5 | A1 | The matrix stops over-reporting on twelve shipped requirements | M — mostly mechanical |
-| 6 | D2 | CI stops flaking | S |
-| 7 | C1 · C2 | The web layer stops being one interpolation away from full IPC | M — iterate against HLS |
-| 8 | A2 · A3 · A4 | The matrix becomes self-consistent and defended by a real gate | M |
-| 9 | B4 · B5 · B6 · B7 | Platform hygiene brought level with the SDK target | M |
-| 10 | B1 · D3 · C3 · D4 | Long-tail robustness; opportunistic rather than scheduled | L |
diff --git a/docs/requirements.md b/docs/requirements.md
index 9cee1835..973532a8 100644
--- a/docs/requirements.md
+++ b/docs/requirements.md
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ For a narrative overview of the system design, see
 | UR-073 | Watched state is something the viewer can **set**, not only something playback records. Any episode, season, series or movie can be marked watched — or unwatched again — from where it is shown, without sitting through it or erasing its history wholesale. Marking a season or series covers the episodes inside it, and works with the server unreachable | Medium | Done |
 | UR-072 | Each page opens where a page should open. Moving to a new screen starts at the top of it, and going Back returns the viewer to the place they left — their position in a long library grid or home screen, not the top of it. A page never inherits the scroll position of the page before it | Medium | Done |
 | UR-075 | Artwork is shown at the shape it was made in. Where a screen presents a set of things side by side — the libraries on the library page and on home — they are laid out as a mosaic: rows of a common height in which each tile is as wide as its own picture, rather than a grid that crops every cover to one box. Favourites are reachable per category from that same mosaic, beside the library they belong to, not only as one undifferentiated list | Medium | Done |
+| UR-076 | Music browsing shows only what the listener considers music. A Jellyfin server commonly keeps podcasts, audiobooks, sound effects or sample packs in their own folders inside a music library; those folders can be **excluded by choice**, once, and every music surface — library grids, artist and album listings, genre rows, search and the home screen — then agrees on what is in scope. The choice is by folder, not by a name the app happens to recognise, so a folder called anything at all can be excluded and an item is never dropped because its title matched a word | Medium | Proposed |
 | UR-074 | Video streaming can be held to a **bandwidth budget the viewer sets**, rather than spent at whatever rate the server would otherwise send. A ceiling chosen once — from the source's own bitrate down to a rung that still plays on a poor connection — governs every video the app opens, live TV included, and survives a restart, so a metered connection is not quietly drained by the next thing played. A single video can be moved to a different ceiling from the player, resuming where it was, without disturbing that default | Medium | Done |
 
 ---
@@ -392,6 +393,12 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
 | DR-137 | Local media is served to the player over a loopback HTTP server, not the asset protocol. Tauri's `asset` protocol answers a request carrying no `Range` header by reading the whole file into memory, and only advertises `Accept-Ranges: bytes` from *inside* its range branch — so the first request never learns ranges exist and a multi-gigabyte body is attempted instead. Chromium abandoned it with `PIPELINE_ERROR_READ` after ~31s, which reached the user as "downloaded video does not play offline". Real HTTP on `127.0.0.1` is chosen over a custom URI scheme deliberately: range support becomes a property of the transport rather than depending on whether a platform's webview forwards `Range` to a custom scheme. No response ever exceeds a 4 MiB chunk and bodies stream from the file handle, so memory is bounded regardless of file size. Because **loopback is shared between apps on Android**, the server binds `127.0.0.1` only and every URL carries a random per-session token; paths are additionally confined to the app data directory, so a leaked URL cannot read outside it. This is stage 1 of making the server the single media origin — remote passthrough and download-while-watching are deliberately out of scope here | Playback | UR-071 | Done |
 | DR-138 | Loopback is exempted from Android's cleartext ban, and nothing else is. Release builds set `usesCleartextTraffic="false"`, so the webview's request to the local media server (DR-137) was rejected by network security policy before any I/O — `<video>` failed in the same millisecond as `loadstart`, with `NETWORK_NO_SOURCE` and no server-side log at all, which is why it looked identical to a missing file. A `network-security-config` resource permits cleartext for `127.0.0.1` only and keeps `base-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="false"`, so a remote server must still be HTTPS; this is deliberately not a blanket opt-in. The manifest attribute is ignored once the config is present, so the config is the single authority. `sync-android-sources.sh` also had to learn to copy `res/xml`, which it skipped — the manifest references the resource, so a missed copy fails the resource link rather than degrading quietly | Security | UR-071 | Done |
 | DR-093 | Traceability coverage gate derives its requirement denominators from `requirements.md` at run time rather than hardcoded literals: `countDefinedRequirements` counts an ID only where it leads a markdown table row (ignoring the "Traces To" column and prose) and deduplicates IDs listed both in the definition tables and in the §3 traceability matrix; `computeCoverage` reports the *intersection* of traced and defined IDs so an ID traced in code but absent from `requirements.md` is surfaced as `orphaned` instead of inflating the ratio past 100%. UT/IT test identifiers are excluded as a separate taxonomy. CI and `bun run traces:coverage` share this computation and fail on both a sub-threshold and an impossible >100% result | Tooling | - | Done |
+| DR-204 | A leveled logging facade for the frontend, replacing raw `console.*` calls. One module owns the log sinks, so a level (error/warn/info/debug) decides at run time what is emitted rather than every call site deciding permanently at authoring time: a release build stays quiet, a developer chasing a playback bug turns the player's debug output on without editing and rebuilding, and nothing that reaches the console is written by a `console.log` nobody can find again. Scoped loggers carry the subsystem in the message, so a filtered console is usable while a player, a download worker and a store are all talking | Tooling | - | Proposed |
+| DR-205 | ESLint + Prettier run as a gate over the frontend, so lint and formatting are decided once by configuration rather than per reviewer. Formatting is not a matter of opinion at review time, and the classes of bug a linter sees (unused bindings, floating promises, accidental globals) should never reach a human reviewer at all. Wired as an npm script so the same command runs locally and in CI, matching how `check:boundary` and the traceability gate already work | Tooling | - | Proposed |
+| DR-206 | The Rust toolchain is pinned in-repo (`rust-toolchain.toml`) and the pin is what both a developer's machine and CI use. Without it, `cargo fmt --check` and `cargo clippy` are run by whatever version each host happens to have, so a formatting or lint result differs between a laptop and the builder image and CI fails on a diff that was clean locally — the failure mode is a red build nobody can reproduce. The builder image carries the pinned toolchain, so pinning is a *declaration*, not a CI-time install (see the no-toolchain-installs rule) | Tooling | - | Proposed |
+| DR-207 | A pre-commit hook runs the "Before Committing" gates — frontend checks and tests, `cargo fmt`, clippy, the boundary tripwire and the traceability checks — so the gates are enforced at the commit rather than discovered in CI. The gates already exist and are already documented; what is missing is that nothing runs them, which makes compliance a matter of memory. The hook is the mechanism that makes the documented list actually binding | Tooling | - | Proposed |
+| DR-208 | Documentation link integrity is checked mechanically (`scripts/check-doc-links.sh`): every relative markdown link in every tracked `.md` must resolve to a file that exists on disk. This is a real defect class, not hygiene — the generated traceability matrix shipped ~2,800 dead file links because it was written to `docs/` while its hrefs were repo-root-relative, and nothing noticed for months because no check existed and nobody clicks 2,800 links. The check validates *paths*, deliberately not anchors or external URLs: anchor resolution needs a markdown renderer's slug rules and network checks make the gate flaky, so both are out of scope and stated as such in the script | Tooling | - | Done |
+| DR-209 | Library folders are excluded from music browsing **server-side, by folder id**, replacing a hardcoded frontend filter that dropped anything whose name contained "Podcasts". The name filter was wrong in three separate ways: it encoded a domain classification in the presentation layer, it matched on a title rather than on what an item *is* (so an album legitimately called "Podcasts" vanished while a podcast folder named anything else did not), and it applied only where someone had remembered to call it, so the same library was in scope on one screen and out of scope on the next. Excluded folder ids are stored as user configuration and applied by the repository layer to every music query — libraries, artists, albums, genres, search and the home rows — so scope is decided in one place and is the same everywhere | Repository | UR-076 | Proposed |
 | DR-198 | The webview runs under a real Content-Security-Policy, and the asset protocol is scoped to the one directory it still serves. `csp` was `null`, which disables CSP entirely: any script that reached the web layer — through a future `{@html}`, a dependency, or a devtools paste — would have inherited the whole IPC surface, and with it the user's session. `script-src 'self'` (Tauri injects a nonce for SvelteKit's inline bootstrap script at build time, so no `'unsafe-inline'` is needed) plus `object-src`/`frame-src 'none'` and `base-uri 'self'` is the part that is genuinely restrictive. `img-src`/`media-src`/`connect-src` cannot be: the Jellyfin origin is typed in by the user at run time and is commonly plain `http` on a LAN, so they allow `http:`/`https:` — a wide grant for *data*, but one that still bars `file:`, `filesystem:` and scripting schemes, and leaves `script-src` untouched. `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because Svelte compiles `style="…"` attributes (including `app.html`'s `display: contents` wrapper) into markup; this is safe only while no `<style>` element survives into `index.html`, since a nonce there would make Tauri's injection outrank — and therefore void — `'unsafe-inline'`. `worker-src blob:` and `media-src blob:` are hls.js: it demuxes in a worker built from a blob and attaches MSE through `URL.createObjectURL`. `asset:` and `http://asset.localhost` are the same protocol under the two naming schemes `convertFileSrc` emits (custom scheme on Linux/macOS, `http` host on Windows/Android); `ipc:`/`http://ipc.localhost` is the invoke transport, which would otherwise be blocked by `connect-src`. A run-time CSP naming the server origin exactly was rejected: Tauri computes the header from immutable config when it serves the HTML, so it would mean rebuilding config and reloading the webview on every server change, for a policy the user can already point anywhere. The asset-protocol scope narrows from `$APPDATA/**` to `$APPDATA/thumbnails/**` — since DR-137 moved downloaded media to the loopback server, `imageCache` is the only `convertFileSrc` caller left, so the database and the encrypted-token fallback file no longer sit inside the grant | Security | UR-012, UR-071 | Done |
 
 ---
@@ -476,6 +483,7 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
 | UR-073 | - | DR-158 |
 | UR-074 | - | DR-162, DR-177, DR-181 |
 | UR-075 | - | DR-174, DR-175 |
+| UR-076 | - | DR-209 |
 
 ---
 
@@ -678,6 +686,9 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
 | UT-197 | Skipping forward near the end clamps to the duration rather than running past it into an EOF-driven advance | DR-201 | Done |
 | UT-198 | An unknown duration still scrubs and still refuses to go negative | DR-201 | Done |
 | UT-199 | The screen-wake decision: video playing holds the display, pausing releases it, audio playing never holds it, a webview element going inactive releases even without a pause report, either renderer alone is enough to hold, and teardown drops both | DR-202 | Done |
+| UT-201 | The logging facade gates by level: a message below the active level is not emitted at all, one at or above it reaches the sink, changing the level at run time changes what passes without touching the call sites, and a scoped logger tags its output with the subsystem | DR-204 | Proposed |
+| UT-202 | Generated traceability-matrix file links resolve from `docs/`: an emitted href, resolved against the directory `traceability.md` is written to, points at a file that exists on disk; the visible link text stays repo-root-relative; the `#Lnn` anchor survives; and a bare repo-root href — the regression that made every link 404 as `docs/<path>` — is rejected | DR-093 | Done |
+| UT-203 | Library folder exclusion filters by id, not by name: an excluded folder's items are absent from a music query, an item whose *title* merely contains an excluded folder's name is kept, and clearing the exclusion restores the items | DR-209 | Proposed |
 | UT-200 | The stream a player could only restart is refused its retry: the handoff transcode answers yes to `player_retry_restarts_stream` while music, video and a downloaded episode answer no, and the Kotlin decision starts permissive, flips on a non-resumable load, and is restored by the next ordinary one | DR-203 | Done |
 
 ### Integration Tests
@@ -704,12 +715,28 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
 
 ## 5. Technical Debt
 
-### Open items from the codebase audit (2026-08-16)
+### Open items carried over from the v0.6.0 codebase audit
 
-Findings from [codebase-audit.md](codebase-audit.md) that were **not** addressed
-in v0.8.0, plus items the device-verification pass turned up. Ordered by what
-would hurt most if left. The audit doc carries the full reasoning and evidence
-for each.
+The 2026-08-16 audit (v0.6.0, commit `be907b49`) was a point-in-time snapshot
+with no status markers, and by v0.8.2 most of it had been either fixed or
+overtaken. It was **retired** rather than left to rot into a document that
+half-describes the code: what survived it is the table below, which is now the
+record. Each row is self-contained — the audit is not needed to act on it.
+
+What was dropped as demonstrably closed, so it is not re-raised: the CSP and
+asset-protocol scope findings (now DR-198), cloud backup and credential restore,
+the WebView mixed-content override (DR-199), `POST_NOTIFICATIONS` and the
+media-session exemption (DR-200), the `jvmTarget` 1.8 pin (now 17), the
+half-declared Android TV leanback category (removed), the untraced-but-Done
+requirements and the contradictory UR/IR statuses (re-scoped in §2.1), the 50%
+traceability gate (ratcheted, and gated on a live denominator by DR-093), the
+flaky `offlineCatalog` test, the clippy warning backlog (cleared, and `cargo
+fmt --check` plus clippy now run in CI), and the "820 production `unwrap()`s"
+figure — a measurement error that counted test modules, corrected in the audit
+itself to ~19 and standing at 27 today, none of them in a command handler. The
+three `Runtime::new().unwrap()` sites that genuinely matter survive as row 5.
+
+Ordered by what would hurt most if left.
 
 > **Closed 2026-08-17:** the R8-minified release APK was validated on device.
 > That was the last item gating confidence in the v0.8.0 release itself; R8
@@ -719,17 +746,17 @@ for each.
 
 | # | Item | Why it matters | Size |
 |---|------|----------------|------|
-| 1 | **Android 16 Local Network Protections** (audit B8) | The rare platform change that could stop the app working at all: JellyTau's core function is reaching a Jellyfin server that, for most users, is on the LAN. Opt-in for testing in Android 16, enforcement signalled for a later release — so nothing is broken today and no device test will surface it. Far cheaper to handle before it is mandatory. An Android 16 device is already to hand to test the opt-in flag against | M |
+| 1 | **Android 16 Local Network Protections** | The rare platform change that could stop the app working at all: JellyTau's core function is reaching a Jellyfin server that, for most users, is on the LAN. Opt-in for testing in Android 16, enforcement signalled for a later release — so nothing is broken today and no device test will surface it. Far cheaper to handle before it is mandatory. An Android 16 device is already to hand to test the opt-in flag against | M |
 | 2 | **The traceability matrix cannot see Kotlin** | `scripts/extract-traces.ts` walks only `src`, `src-tauri/src` and `scripts`, so every `TRACES:` comment in `src-tauri/android/**` is invisible — pre-existing ones included. A whole platform is unmeasured, which is plausibly why the Android IRs sat untagged for so long, and it means the 90% coverage figure is computed over a codebase that excludes the Android tree | S |
 | 3 | **Delete the asset protocol outright** | It is not narrowly used, it is **unused**. `getCachedImageUrl` has no production callers (only its own test file), so `convertFileSrc` never executes; images arrive as base64 `data:` URIs from `image_get_url`. Confirmed on device: zero `asset.localhost` requests across a full browsing session. Dropping `protocol-asset` and the `assetProtocol` block retires the surface instead of shrinking it, and `imageCache.ts` goes with it | S |
 | 4 | **Tighten `img-src`** | The v0.8.0 CSP grants `img-src … http: https:` on the premise that thumbnails are fetched direct-from-server by the webview. They are not (see #3). With no webview-side server image loads anywhere in `src/`, `'self' data: blob:` should suffice. Needs its own device pass — a wrong `img-src` blanks every image, silently | S |
-| 5 | **Three `Runtime::new().unwrap()` in playback-critical threads** (audit D3) | `session_poller/mod.rs:102`, `player/mpv_backend.rs:424`, `player/android/mod.rs:761`. A panic strands the app offline with nothing surfaced, freezes the scrubber mid-playback, or kills progress reporting across a JNI boundary. One shared helper returning `Option<Runtime>` and logging on failure retires all three. (The wider "820 unwraps" figure was a measurement error — the real count is 19, and none are in command handlers) | S |
-| 6 | **Confirm the playback service rejects unknown callers** (audit B7, second half) | `JellyTauPlaybackService` is `exported="true"` with a `MediaSessionService` intent filter — conventional for Media3, but it means any app on the device can attempt to bind and drive playback. The session's `onConnect` should reject unknown packages. (The predictive-back half of B7 was verified working on device and needs nothing) | S |
-| 7 | **Media3 is several minor versions behind** (audit B6) | Pinned at 1.5.0 across exoplayer/hls/session/common. Much of this app's hard-won behaviour lives in ExoPlayer edge cases — truncated progressive streams, background-audio handoff, HLS resume — so its bug-fix releases have unusually high value here. Schedule with a device pass over the playback regression list | M |
-| 8 | **Shipped desktop bundles have no update path** (audit C3) | deb/rpm/nsis are built but `tauri-plugin-updater` is absent, so every desktop user upgrades by manually fetching a package — in practice a long tail of installs pinned to whatever they first downloaded. Add the updater with a signed manifest, or document the manual path so the omission is deliberate | M |
+| 5 | **Three `Runtime::new().unwrap()` in playback-critical threads** | `session_poller/mod.rs:102`, `player/mpv_backend.rs:424`, `player/android/mod.rs:761`. A panic strands the app offline with nothing surfaced, freezes the scrubber mid-playback, or kills progress reporting across a JNI boundary. One shared helper returning `Option<Runtime>` and logging on failure retires all three. (The wider "820 unwraps" figure was a measurement error — the real count is 19, and none are in command handlers) | S |
+| 6 | **Confirm the playback service rejects unknown callers** | `JellyTauPlaybackService` is `exported="true"` with a `MediaSessionService` intent filter — conventional for Media3, but it means any app on the device can attempt to bind and drive playback. The session's `onConnect` should reject unknown packages. (Predictive back, raised alongside this, was verified working on device and needs nothing) | S |
+| 7 | **Media3 is several minor versions behind** | Pinned at 1.5.0 across exoplayer/hls/session/common. Much of this app's hard-won behaviour lives in ExoPlayer edge cases — truncated progressive streams, background-audio handoff, HLS resume — so its bug-fix releases have unusually high value here. Schedule with a device pass over the playback regression list | M |
+| 8 | **Shipped desktop bundles have no update path** | deb/rpm/nsis are built but `tauri-plugin-updater` is absent, so every desktop user upgrades by manually fetching a package — in practice a long tail of installs pinned to whatever they first downloaded. Add the updater with a signed manifest, or document the manual path so the omission is deliberate | M |
 | 9 | **`DR-042` overstates what ships** | It promises "poster cards, year, **and rating badges**", but `MediaCard.svelte` renders only `productionYear`; `CommunityRating`/`OfficialRating` appear solely as sort keys, never as a badge. Either build the badge or correct the requirement text — a requirement that describes unbuilt behaviour is worse than an untraced one | S |
 | 10 | **Stray duplicate `JellyTauPlayer.kt`** | A copy exists at `src-tauri/android/app/src/main/java/.../player/JellyTauPlayer.kt`, outside the canonical `src-tauri/android/src` tree that `sync-android-sources.sh` reads. Two files with one name in a tree with a strict canonical-source rule is a trap for the next edit | S |
-| 11 | **Five files carry a disproportionate share of complexity** (audit D4) | `player/mod.rs` (4.7k lines), `repository/offline.rs` (4.7k), `repository/online.rs` (3.7k), `commands/player/mod.rs` (3.3k), `commands/download/mod.rs` (3.2k), plus `VideoPlayer.svelte` (2.8k). The same files the changelog keeps returning to for deadlocks and playback regressions. Not worth a speculative refactor — but the next time one needs substantial work, splitting it is likely cheaper than growing it | L |
+| 11 | **Six modules carry a disproportionate share of the complexity** | `src-tauri/src/player/mod.rs` (4,732 lines), `src-tauri/src/repository/offline.rs` (4,705), `src-tauri/src/repository/online.rs` (3,760), `src-tauri/src/commands/player/mod.rs` (3,327), `src-tauri/src/commands/download/mod.rs` (3,238) and `src/lib/components/player/VideoPlayer.svelte` (2,786) — all still growing. The cost is not the line count itself, it is that **these are the same modules `CLAUDE.md`'s Gotchas section keeps having to warn about**: the deadlock rule about locking in event callbacks, the `AutoplayDecision` scrutinee, the "no lifecycle calls after an `await` in `onMount`" rule, the HLS `master.m3u8` rule, the download concurrency cap. A file that needs a standing warning in the project's onboarding document is a file whose invariants are no longer local to it, and every such warning is a rule a newcomer has to be *told* rather than one the structure enforces. **Recorded, not scheduled** — a speculative refactor of six files this size buys nothing on its own. The trigger is the next time one of them needs substantial work: splitting it then is likely cheaper than growing it, and each rule that moves from Gotchas into a module boundary is one fewer thing to remember | L |
 
 
 ### Linux Keyring Integration Workaround
@@ -843,7 +870,7 @@ deprecated in current Media3.)
 **Affected Files**:
 - [src/lib/components/player/AudioPlayer.svelte](../src/lib/components/player/AudioPlayer.svelte) - Duplicate handlers
 - [src/lib/components/player/MiniPlayer.svelte](../src/lib/components/player/MiniPlayer.svelte) - Duplicate handlers
-- [src/lib/services/playbackControl.ts](../src/lib/services/playbackControl.ts) - Position conversion
+- [src/lib/utils/playbackUnits.ts](../src/lib/utils/playbackUnits.ts) - Position conversion (the shared helper the "Future Fix" below called for; `playbackControl.ts`, previously listed here, has since been removed)
 - [src/lib/stores/playbackMode.ts](../src/lib/stores/playbackMode.ts) - Position conversion
 - [src/lib/services/playbackReporting.ts](../src/lib/services/playbackReporting.ts) - Position conversion