diff --git a/docs/requirements.md b/docs/requirements.md index 560759f7..8183ef07 100644 --- a/docs/requirements.md +++ b/docs/requirements.md @@ -446,6 +446,9 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic. | DR-250 | Stopping means nothing is playing, from any renderer — not "whatever we believe owns playback has been asked to stop". A background-audio handoff swaps which renderer that is, and the swap is bookkeeping that can be mid-flight: `exit_background_audio` marks the webview element the player again the moment it is called, while the element has not reloaded. The teardown's stop was gated on flags describing what the component started, so after a handoff it described a player that was no longer making sound and the stop was skipped — the audio stream kept running and the mini player adopted it, which is why a movie reappeared as an audio track. The stop is now unconditional (it is idempotent) and clears the handoff base and flag, so a later position read cannot be interpreted against a handoff that no longer exists | Player | UR-040, UR-005 | Done | | DR-251 | A duration of zero is treated as "the engine does not know yet", and falls back to the runtime the item already carries. ExoPlayer reports `C.TIME_UNSET` until it resolves one and `JellyTauPlayer.getDuration()` maps that to `0.0`, so the engine answered `Some(0.0)` rather than `None` — which satisfied every "unknown duration" fallback and left the seek bar with no scale. It presented as scrubbing being broken rather than as a duration that never arrived, and the catalog had the runtime the whole time | Player | UR-005, UR-040 | Done | | DR-252 | Seconds reported by an engine are converted to a `Duration` only when finite and positive. `Duration::from_secs_f64` panics on a negative or non-finite value and no engine promises otherwise: ExoPlayer reports `C.TIME_UNSET` (`Long::MIN_VALUE`, about -9.2e15) for a stream whose length it does not know, which is every background-audio handoff — `/Audio/{id}/universal` is a chunked, length-less transcode. Held as a float that junk was harmless; converted to a `Duration` by the `MediaPlayer` adapter it became a panic that killed the backend mid-handoff and left a black screen with no controls. One guard on the contract, used by every engine crossing into it | Player | UR-005 | Done | +| DR-253 | A deferred seek is discarded when the file it was issued against stops being the one loading. `seek` holds a position while MPV has nothing loaded and the `FileLoaded` handler applies it (DR-241), but neither `load` nor `stop` cleared it — so scrubbing near the end of a transcoded item, which re-opens the stream, and then skipping to the next item before the reload completed applied the old position to the new item. It started wherever the previous one had been scrubbed to, silently | Player | UR-040, UR-005 | Done | +| DR-254 | Advancing to the next episode drops a per-playback quality override. The override is process-wide and describes one playback: a viewer who drops to 720p for a struggling episode has said nothing about the next. Every advance the frontend drives clears it via `player_play_item`; the background audio-only advance loads the next episode in Rust and skipped all three clearing sites, so every later episode stayed capped with nothing in the UI saying why | Repository | UR-074 | Done | +| DR-255 | One helper answers "what URL should an engine open". `playback_url` was gated to Android because only ExoPlayer needed it, and that gate is why a byte-identical copy was later added for the cross-platform open path — the original is invisible in a Linux build, so nothing warned. Two matches over `MediaSource` meant a new variant could be handled in one and forgotten in the other | Player | UR-081 | Done | | DR-198 | The webview runs under a real Content-Security-Policy, and the asset protocol is scoped to the one directory it still serves. `csp` was `null`, which disables CSP entirely: any script that reached the web layer — through a future `{@html}`, a dependency, or a devtools paste — would have inherited the whole IPC surface, and with it the user's session. `script-src 'self'` (Tauri injects a nonce for SvelteKit's inline bootstrap script at build time, so no `'unsafe-inline'` is needed) plus `object-src`/`frame-src 'none'` and `base-uri 'self'` is the part that is genuinely restrictive. `img-src`/`media-src`/`connect-src` cannot be: the Jellyfin origin is typed in by the user at run time and is commonly plain `http` on a LAN, so they allow `http:`/`https:` — a wide grant for *data*, but one that still bars `file:`, `filesystem:` and scripting schemes, and leaves `script-src` untouched. `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because Svelte compiles `style="…"` attributes (including `app.html`'s `display: contents` wrapper) into markup; this is safe only while no `