4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
dtourolle	88e15e3e12	merge: Android runtime security (B1, B3) ... Correct the POST_NOTIFICATIONS mechanism: the lockscreen notification is exempt because of the MediaSession token, not because it belongs to a foreground service — FGS notifications are explicitly NOT exempt. So no permission prompt and no checkSelfPermission gate; instead both notification builders bind the token once and log loudly if it is ever null, turning a silent failure into a logcat line. Stop the webview undoing the network security config: mixedContentMode COMPATIBILITY, allowFileAccess/allowContentAccess false. Conflict resolution: this branch's DR-198 collided with the Tauri branch's, so it was renumbered DR-200 (3 TRACES in JellyTauPlaybackService.kt and the UR-006 matrix row updated). DR-199 was uncontested. Pinned counts summed to DR 191 / total 334; UR-071 takes both DR-198 and DR-199.	2026-08-16 23:03:29 +02:00
dtourolle	2d21f092d5	fix(android): stop the webview undoing the network security config ... MainActivity set mixedContentMode = MIXED_CONTENT_ALWAYS_ALLOW together with allowFileAccess/allowContentAccess = true, which is a blanket cleartext opt-in reached by hand — the exact thing network_security_config.xml exists to prevent and its own comment warns against. Nothing needed any of the three: - file:// is never loaded. Cached thumbnails go through convertFileSrc, which on Android resolves to http://asset.localhost/... and is answered by wry's request interceptor rather than the filesystem; downloaded media goes over the loopback HTTP server (DR-137), which exists precisely because the asset/file route cannot stream a large file. - content:// is never loaded. The manifest's FileProvider is for outbound share intents, not webview navigation. - Mixed content never arises. Tauri serves the UI from http://tauri.localhost (use_https_scheme defaults false and is not set), and both 127.0.0.1 and asset.localhost are loopback/.localhost origins Chromium treats as potentially trustworthy. A plain-HTTP remote server would be mixed content, but the network security config already rejects it first — so ALWAYS_ALLOW bought nothing. COMPATIBILITY_MODE rather than NEVER_ALLOW is a deliberate hedge: the platform default at targetSdk 21+ is NEVER_ALLOW, so this is still one step looser, and it keeps passive content working if the analysis missed a path. The two files now cross-reference each other so the pair cannot drift apart again. Also records why POST_NOTIFICATIONS is declared but never requested. An audit read the missing runtime request as a threat to the lockscreen controls; it is not. A foreground-service notification is explicitly NOT exempt, but a media-session one is, and the platform predicate (Notification.isMediaNotification) requires MediaStyle AND a non-null session token. Confirmed on device: appops POST_NOTIFICATION: ignore with the transport notification live. So no permission prompt is added and startForeground stays ungated — a guard there would trade a cosmetic problem for the "did not then call Service.startForeground()" kill. What is added is the guard matching the real precondition: both builders bind the token once and log an error if it is ever null, since SystemUI's media carousel is gated on the same predicate and a token-less notification loses the lockscreen controls entirely, silently. TRACES: UR-006, UR-071 | DR-198, DR-199	2026-08-16 22:59:47 +02:00
dtourolle	38dd1129e5	feat(security): set a restrictive CSP and scope the asset protocol to thumbnails ... `app.security.csp` was `null`, so the webview ran with no Content-Security-Policy at all: any script that reached the web layer would have inherited the whole IPC surface. There is no known injection path today (one app-owned `{@html}`, no `innerHTML`/`eval`), so this is defence in depth rather than a fix for an open hole. `script-src 'self'` is the restrictive half — Tauri nonces SvelteKit's inline bootstrap script at build time, so no `'unsafe-inline'` is needed — together with `object-src`/`frame-src 'none'` and `base-uri 'self'`. `img-src`/`media-src`/ `connect-src` cannot be restrictive: the Jellyfin origin is typed in by the user at run time and is routinely plain http on a LAN, so they allow `http:`/`https:`. That is a wide grant for data, but it still bars `file:`/`filesystem:` and does not touch script execution. A run-time policy naming the server exactly was rejected: Tauri derives the header from immutable config when it serves the HTML, so it would mean rebuilding config and reloading the webview on every server change. `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because Svelte compiles `style="…"` attributes into markup; `worker-src`/`media-src` keep `blob:` for hls.js's demuxer worker and its MSE object URL; `ipc:`/`http://ipc.localhost` keeps `invoke` working. `devCsp` mirrors it with the eval/inline/websocket allowances Vite's dev server needs. The asset-protocol scope narrows from `$APPDATA/**` — the storage root holding the SQLite database and the encrypted-token fallback file — to `$APPDATA/thumbnails/**`. Since DR-137 moved downloaded media to the loopback media server, `imageCache` is the only `convertFileSrc` caller left. Needs manual verification on both platforms: thumbnails, online HLS video and offline downloaded video cannot be exercised headlessly.	2026-08-16 22:58:53 +02:00
dtourolle	09780103a7	Split software arch desc for easier manintenance. Many fixes related to next video playing and remote playback	2026-03-01 19:47:46 +01:00