f3fa45f742c086a662a319be29a1c5bd537a72c8
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 dtourolle
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f3fa45f742 |
feat(diagnostics): persistent redacted logging and an exportable bundle
🏗️ Build and Test JellyTau / Run Tests (pull_request) Successful in 22m12s
🏗️ Build and Test JellyTau / Supply Chain (pull_request) Successful in 37s
Traceability Validation / Check Requirement Traces (pull_request) Successful in 11s
🏗️ Build and Test JellyTau / Android Compile Check (pull_request) Successful in 4m10s
The app forgot everything it did the moment it exited. The Rust half
logged through env_logger to stdout only -- invisible to anyone who
launched from a desktop icon, and on Android worse than that: stdout is
not logcat, so the backend produced no visible output at all on the
platform carrying this project's hardest bugs. The autoplay deadlock,
the truncated-stream restart and the background-audio stall were all
diagnosed by talking a user through `adb logcat`, because there was no
other way to see anything. A panic left nothing behind at all.
Logs now go to a size-capped rotating file, to logcat on Android, and to
the webview console in dev. A panic is recorded with its backtrace before
the process dies. The frontend's messages are forwarded into the same
file, so one timeline holds both halves of the app in order -- which is
what makes a race between them legible after the fact, and races between
them are the expensive bug class here.
Redaction runs in the log FORMATTER, not at export time. A credential
sitting in a file on the device is already a disclosure; stripping it on
the way out would be too late. The exporter redacts a second time to
cover files written by builds that predate this. api_key, X-Emby-Token,
Authorization, "AccessToken" and Token="..." all reduce to [REDACTED],
while host, item ids and filenames are deliberately kept -- a log scrubbed
of those is one nobody can debug anything from. Server URLs keep scheme
and host and drop any embedded user:pass@.
Two things the tests caught that review would not have:
- redact_headers recursed on its own output. The replacement keeps the
header NAME, so the next call matched the same header forever; the
test died with a stack overflow. It is a forward scan now.
- The frontend forwarder used `void plugin.error(...)`. `void` discards
a promise's value but not its rejection, so in any webview without
IPC -- a unit test, SSR, a browser preview -- every log line became an
unhandled rejection. 20 of them showed up the first time coverage
ran. Each call now attaches a catch.
Only info and above cross the IPC boundary: debug is per-tick player
state and forwarding it would be thousands of calls a minute for output
nobody reads. A failing forwarder never propagates and never prevents the
console write.
Nothing is transmitted anywhere. The export writes a zip and reports its
path; the user attaches it themselves, which is also what keeps this from
becoming telemetry. An Android share intent is explicitly out of scope --
it is Kotlin work that belongs with the other native code.
The panic hook chains to the previous hook rather than replacing it,
because utils/lock.rs installs a silencing hook around tests that provoke
poisoned locks on purpose.
Spec in docs/specs/diagnostics-and-logging.md; UR-078 / DR-218 / UT-209.
Verified: 1079 frontend tests and the coverage gate, 759 Rust tests,
clippy -D warnings, svelte-check 0 errors, and cargo check for
aarch64-linux-android.
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dtourolle
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3211c96ecf |
feat(updater): in-app update on desktop, releases link on Android
Anyone who installed an AppImage or ran the Windows installer was frozen
on that version forever. Nothing in the app ever mentioned a new release
existed, and the release notes were the only announcement.
Desktop now checks a signed manifest, shows the version and its notes in
Settings, and installs and relaunches on request. The signature check is
the whole point: it is what stops a substituted download from being
installed by the app itself. Windows binaries stay unsigned for
SmartScreen purposes -- that is a code-signing certificate, a separate
problem -- but the update payload is verified against our own key.
Android is deliberately not wired to the updater. An app may not replace
its own APK; that is the package installer's job, and the plugin has no
Android implementation. It gets a link to the releases page instead of a
button that would throw.
The plugins are gated with a target-triple cfg rather than
cfg(desktop). Cargo only evaluates target cfgs in a [target.'cfg(..)']
table, so cfg(desktop) matches nothing, silently drops the dependency,
and fails much later with "Permission updater:default not found" -- which
is exactly what the first attempt here did.
Where the manifest lives took some finding. This Gitea serves
/releases/download/<tag>/<asset> but 404s on
/releases/latest/download/<asset> (verified against a real asset), so
there is no stable latest-release URL. The gitea-pages branch is
force-pushed wholesale by publish-docs.yml, so it cannot host the file
either. latest.json therefore gets its own orphan branch, read over the
raw-file URL, and is published from a scratch repo in RUNNER_TEMP rather
than by switching branches in the checkout -- doing that would have left
the following steps standing on a one-commit history, and the next step
but one runs release:notes against the real commit range.
Also fixed, all of it release-integrity:
- "appimage" is in bundle.targets. The release notes have advertised an
AppImage for months; tauri.conf.json never built one, the artifact
step globbed for *.AppImage, found nothing, and said nothing. The
step now fails instead.
- The .AppImage.tar.gz/.sig pair and the NSIS .sig are collected. A
manifest referencing a signature that was never uploaded fails only
on the user's machine, so the manifest step also refuses to write an
entry with an empty signature.
- Release notes are generated by release:notes from the traceability
graph, which is what CLAUDE.md has asked for all along, instead of a
fixed heredoc that said "see CHANGELOG.md for detailed changes" and
linked "GitHub Issues" on a Gitea-hosted project.
- The notes tell users how to verify a download with SHA256SUMS.
Requirements UR-077 / DR-217, tests UT-208 (12 cases over the version
comparison and the platform decision, including that a pre-release does
not offer itself as an upgrade to the matching release).
Verified: 1070 frontend tests, cargo check for both the host and
aarch64-linux-android (confirming the plugins are absent there), clippy
-D warnings, svelte-check 0 errors.
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dtourolle
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cfddc1edea | First working POC |