JRay public server

A community manifest exchange for JRay. Jellyfin servers running the JRay plugin pull actor-timeline manifests ("Jmanifests") for titles they own instead of running the CV pipeline locally, and optionally contribute the manifests they generate back.

See SPEC.md for the design. Section references throughout the code point at it.

The community instance is https://jray.tourolle.paris. The JRay plugin ships with it pre-configured but disabled — §9 requires that no traffic leave an installation until an admin opts in, so the default entry exists to save the admin from typing a URL, not to enable sharing on their behalf. Set JRAY_SERVER_ID=jray.tourolle.paris when deploying that instance: it becomes the origin stamped on manifests it first accepts (§9a) and the salt for report IP hashes.

Status

First implementation pass: the core vertical slice, reconciled against the system spec.

Per-requirement status is in docs/requirements.md — 32 requirements (UR-001..018, DR-001..014), each tracing up to an SR-nnn or PR-nnn. UR-015..018 are the pending SR-003 schema bump and are marked Planned rather than omitted.

Implemented:

• §2 Jmanifest format and series bundles
• §3 cut matching — exact / runtime / loose tiers
• §4 the API surface, less POST /manifests/search
• §5 rate limiting, in-process fixed-window counters
• §5a trust model — anonymous bearer tokens, closed-vocabulary storage, automatic revocation
• §6 upload validation, all four stages
• §7 relational storage, no JSON blobs on the write path
• §8 Rust + Axum + SQLite, single serialized writer, in-process job queue
• §9a content addressing (content_id), computed on upload

Reconciled with the system spec (see docs/requirements.md for the detail):

• anneal_sec removed. Withdrawn upstream by AR-012/AR-013 — presence now follows track extent, so a track survives its own gaps and there is nothing to anneal. Its successor extinction_sec and the new gallery_scope are accepted, stored, and (for scope) used in §7 ranking. A manifest still carrying anneal_sec is now a hard 400, not silently ignored: it was produced by a pipeline whose window semantics differ from what this server assumes.
• Audio signature: the 120 s rule now matches both producers. An earlier draft of §3 allowed a shortened window for items under 150 s; that conflicted with scene-actor-extraction IR-007 and was the weaker rule, since a caller-varying length is the property SR-004 forbids. Items under 120 s now send no signature at all.

Deferred:

• §3 audio signatures — the field is accepted, validated and stored, and content_id already excludes it, but audio-tier matching and POST /manifests/search are not wired up. This follows §3's own recommended sequencing: ship the plugin-side computation first, let signatures accumulate, then enable matching once coverage is useful.
• §9a federation endpoints (/federation/*) and the pull worker. The schema columns (content_id, origin, ingested_from, peers) are in place, and ingest::persist is already the shared path a pull would reuse.

Running

cargo run

Configuration is entirely environment variables:

Variable	Default	Purpose
JRAY_BIND	127.0.0.1:8080	Listen address. Terminate TLS at the operator's proxy (§8)
JRAY_DB	jray.db	SQLite path. WAL mode, created on first run
JRAY_TMDB_API_KEY	—	Hard dependency for UR-3. Without it, uploads stay pending and are never listed
JRAY_TMDB_BASE_URL	https://api.themoviedb.org/3	Override for testing
JRAY_TRUSTED_PROXIES	—	Comma-separated proxy IPs whose X-Forwarded-For is honoured. Not default-on: §5 rate limiting and report attribution key on client IP, so a spoofable header defeats both
JRAY_SERVER_ID	localhost	This server's identity, used as manifest origin and as the report IP-hash salt
JRAY_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SEC	30	Request timeout so a slow bundle query fails fast
JRAY_JOB_BATCH	8	Cast-check jobs leased per worker tick
JRAY_JOB_POLL_SEC	5	Worker poll interval
JRAY_LOG	info	tracing filter

Contributing requires a token (§5a) — an anonymous bearer capability, not an account. Self-issue one:

curl -sX POST -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{}' \
  http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/v1/tokens

Deployment

§8's deployment notes are requirements, not suggestions:

• Enforce the body cap at both the proxy and the app. client_max_body_size (nginx) / request_body max_size (Caddy) should match §6 stage 1, so oversized uploads are dropped at the edge and never occupy an application worker. The app must also be safe when run without a proxy, which it is.
• Set JRAY_TRUSTED_PROXIES to the proxy's address, or X-Forwarded-For is ignored and every client behind it shares one rate-limit bucket.
• Back up the SQLite file with VACUUM INTO or the backup API — never a plain file copy of a live WAL database. Manifests represent real CV compute.

Tests

cargo test          # 178 tests
cargo deny check    # advisories, licences, bans, sources

Unit tests per module, plus two integration suites:

• tests/api.rs — end-to-end through the real router: status codes, headers, and the properties that only hold if the layers compose correctly (per-route body caps, rate-limit surfaces, the strict schema actually reaching uploads).
• tests/injection.rs — that hostile input cannot escape its layer: SQL payloads in query parameters, path segments, JSON bodies, bearer tokens and report notes; JSON structure abuse; CRLF header injection; path traversal; and Unicode tricks against the §5a character class.

Security-relevant properties are asserted rather than assumed — movie/jellyfin_id rejection, the §5a character class defeating base64/hex smuggling, per-route body caps, a lying Content-Length not bypassing the cap, and a forged X-Forwarded-For not resetting a rate-limit budget.

On injection specifically. Two independent defences apply, and they fail differently, so both are tested:

1. Parameterised queries. Every value reaches SQLite through params![]. The only format!-built SQL interpolates two compile-time constants (a column list and a status literal) — no runtime input ever becomes SQL syntax. This is what actually prevents injection.
2. Closed-vocabulary validation. Identifiers are regex-constrained and free text is limited to a closed character class, so most payloads never reach the query layer at all.

The injection suite would still pass on defence 1 alone, which is deliberate: if validation were ever loosened, the tests should not silently start depending on it.

Writing that suite found two real gaps, both since fixed:

• Compatibility homoglyphs (𝐒𝐭𝐞𝐯𝐞, Ａｃｔｏｒ) passed the §5a class. They are letters by Unicode category and NFC does not fold them — only NFKC would. Beyond name spoofing, a fullwidth-digit alphabet would have reopened the encoding channel the "no digits" rule exists to close.
• A one-frame audio_signature was accepted on a feature-length manifest, making the field the variable-length container §3 explicitly forbids. The length floor is now derived from the declared runtime, keeping §3's genuine short-item exception without trusting the client's length.

Two tests worth knowing about:

• content_id::tests::golden_vector_hash_is_stable locks the §9a canonical form. The JRay plugin must reproduce it byte-identically; §8 notes the extraction side is Python, so this can no longer be one shared implementation and must be cross-tested instead. GOLDEN_VECTORS is that fixture, and its hash was verified against an independent Python implementation.
• The integration tests use an on-disk temporary database, not :memory:, because §8's topology is one writer connection plus a read pool — in-memory SQLite is per-connection, so the readers would see an empty database.

CI and container image

.gitea/workflows/ci.yml runs on Gitea Actions (and unmodified on GitHub Actions), gated fastest-first: fmt → clippy → test → cargo deny → static musl build. The dependency audit also runs weekly, since advisories appear without any code changing.

The Dockerfile is the optional convenience, not the intended deployment path — §8 is explicit that neither Docker nor Compose should be required. It builds against musl and runs from scratch as uid 65534: 8.7 MB, no libc, no shell, no package manager. rusqlite bundles SQLite and reqwest uses rustls, so there is nothing left to link.

docker build -t jray-server .
docker run --rm -p 8080:8080 -v jray-data:/data -e JRAY_TMDB_API_KEY=... jray-server

Two things that are easy to get wrong, so they are handled explicitly:

• Static linkage is asserted with file, not ldd. The musl target produces a static-PIE, and ldd prints the musl loader for one — an ldd-based check reports a perfectly static binary as dynamic.
• /data is staged with the runtime uid's ownership. Docker seeds a named volume from the image directory, ownership included, so a non-root server can create the database on first run. A bind mount is not seeded this way — the host directory keeps its own ownership, so chown 65534:65534 it first or the server exits with "unable to open database file".

Two tests are worth knowing about:

• content_id::tests::golden_vector_hash_is_stable locks the §9a canonical form. The JRay plugin must reproduce it byte-identically; §8 notes the extraction side is Python, so this can no longer be one shared implementation and must be cross-tested instead. GOLDEN_VECTORS is that fixture, and its hash was verified against an independent Python implementation.
• The integration tests use an on-disk temporary database, not :memory:, because §8's topology is one writer connection plus a read pool — in-memory SQLite is per-connection, so the readers would see an empty database.

Known gaps

• The §6 stage-3 thresholds are still §10's guesses. §10 (5) is explicit that running the check over the 331 real corpus files would give the true distribution of honest-upload match ratios, and is "the single cheapest way to de-risk UR-3 and UR-5". The scoring logic is deliberately pure functions in castcheck.rs so that retuning is a test-data exercise, not a code change.
• POST /manifests/{id}/report records reports but nothing consumes them yet. §5a's divergence detection and the operator kill switch are not implemented; delisting is currently a manual UPDATE, which §5a does note is the intended shape ("one UPDATE", not a moderation queue).
• No admin surface. Revocation is automatic (§5a), but an operator has no endpoint for the deliberate kill-switch case.