feat(security): set a restrictive CSP and scope the asset protocol to thumbnails
`app.security.csp` was `null`, so the webview ran with no Content-Security-Policy
at all: any script that reached the web layer would have inherited the whole IPC
surface. There is no known injection path today (one app-owned `{@html}`, no
`innerHTML`/`eval`), so this is defence in depth rather than a fix for an open
hole.
`script-src 'self'` is the restrictive half — Tauri nonces SvelteKit's inline
bootstrap script at build time, so no `'unsafe-inline'` is needed — together with
`object-src`/`frame-src 'none'` and `base-uri 'self'`. `img-src`/`media-src`/
`connect-src` cannot be restrictive: the Jellyfin origin is typed in by the user
at run time and is routinely plain http on a LAN, so they allow `http:`/`https:`.
That is a wide grant for data, but it still bars `file:`/`filesystem:` and does
not touch script execution. A run-time policy naming the server exactly was
rejected: Tauri derives the header from immutable config when it serves the HTML,
so it would mean rebuilding config and reloading the webview on every server
change. `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because Svelte compiles `style="…"`
attributes into markup; `worker-src`/`media-src` keep `blob:` for hls.js's
demuxer worker and its MSE object URL; `ipc:`/`http://ipc.localhost` keeps
`invoke` working. `devCsp` mirrors it with the eval/inline/websocket allowances
Vite's dev server needs.
The asset-protocol scope narrows from `$APPDATA/**` — the storage root holding
the SQLite database and the encrypted-token fallback file — to
`$APPDATA/thumbnails/**`. Since DR-137 moved downloaded media to the loopback
media server, `imageCache` is the only `convertFileSrc` caller left.
Needs manual verification on both platforms: thumbnails, online HLS video and
offline downloaded video cannot be exercised headlessly.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -51,6 +51,66 @@ pub struct EncryptedFileStorage; // AES-256-GCM fallback
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| Token Transmission | Bearer token in `Authorization` header only |
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| Token Refresh | Handled by Jellyfin server (long-lived tokens) |
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## Webview Content Security Policy
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`app.security.csp` in `tauri.conf.json` (TRACES: UR-012, UR-071 | DR-198). It was
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`null` — CSP disabled — which meant any script that reached the web layer
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inherited the full IPC surface. Tauri computes the header from this value when it
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serves the embedded HTML, injecting a nonce for SvelteKit's inline bootstrap
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script, so `script-src` needs no `'unsafe-inline'`.
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```
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default-src 'self';
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script-src 'self';
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style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
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font-src 'self' data:;
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img-src 'self' data: blob: asset: http://asset.localhost http: https:;
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media-src 'self' blob: asset: http://asset.localhost http://127.0.0.1:* http: https:;
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connect-src 'self' ipc: http://ipc.localhost http: https:;
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worker-src 'self' blob:;
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object-src 'none'; frame-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'
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```
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| Directive | Why |
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|-----------|-----|
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| `default-src 'self'` | Everything not named below is same-origin only. |
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| `script-src 'self'` | The genuinely restrictive half. Bundled JS only; Tauri's build-time nonce covers the one inline `<script>` in `index.html`. Adding `'unsafe-inline'` here would silently do nothing anyway — a nonce in a directive voids it. |
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| `style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` | Svelte compiles `style="…"` attributes into markup, including `app.html`'s `display: contents` wrapper, and CSP treats a style *attribute* as inline. Safe only while no `<style>` **element** survives into `index.html`: Tauri would nonce it, and the nonce would then void `'unsafe-inline'`. The production build extracts all CSS to files, so it currently has none. |
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| `img-src` | Thumbnails come from two places: the asset protocol (`asset://localhost/…` on Linux/macOS, `http://asset.localhost/…` on Windows/Android — the same protocol, named differently by `convertFileSrc`) and, on a cache miss, straight from the Jellyfin server. `data:`/`blob:` cover inline and generated images. |
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| `media-src` | `<video>`/`<audio>` sources: HLS transcodes and progressive streams from the server, the token-guarded loopback media server on `http://127.0.0.1:<random port>` (DR-137), and `blob:` for the MSE object URL hls.js attaches. |
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| `connect-src` | `ipc:` / `http://ipc.localhost` is Tauri's `invoke` transport (custom scheme on Linux/macOS, `http` host on Windows/Android) — without it every command is blocked. `http:`/`https:` is hls.js fetching manifests and segments; ordinary API traffic goes through Rust and is not subject to CSP. |
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| `worker-src 'self' blob:` | hls.js runs its demuxer in a worker built from a blob (`enableWorker: true`). Without `blob:` it falls back to main-thread demuxing — playback survives but costs more CPU. |
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| `object-src`, `frame-src` = `'none'` | No plugins, no iframes; both are classic injection sinks. |
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| `base-uri 'self'`, `form-action 'self'`, `frame-ancestors 'none'` | Block `<base>` hijacking, form exfiltration and framing. `frame-ancestors` is only honoured when the policy is delivered as a header, which is platform-dependent; it is harmless where it is not. |
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**`img-src`/`media-src`/`connect-src` are deliberately permissive.** The Jellyfin
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origin is typed in by the user at run time and is routinely plain `http` on a
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LAN, so it cannot be enumerated at build time. `http: https:` is a wide grant for
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*data* — but it still bars `file:`, `filesystem:` and scripting schemes, and it
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does not touch `script-src`, which is where an injected origin would actually
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hurt. A run-time policy naming the server exactly was considered and rejected:
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Tauri derives the header from immutable config at the moment it serves the HTML,
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so it would mean rebuilding the config and reloading the webview whenever the
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user adds or switches a server, to constrain a destination the user chooses
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anyway.
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`devCsp` mirrors the policy with `'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'` on `script-src`
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and `ws:`/`wss:` on `connect-src`, because the Vite dev server injects styles and
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code and drives HMR over a websocket. It applies only to `tauri dev`.
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### Asset protocol scope
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`app.security.assetProtocol.scope` is `$APPDATA/thumbnails/**` — not the storage
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root. `imageCache.ts` is the only `convertFileSrc` caller left in the frontend:
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downloaded media moved to the loopback media server in DR-137, and downloaded
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audio is opened by MPV/ExoPlayer directly from its path. The old `$APPDATA/**`
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grant let the webview read the SQLite database and the encrypted-token fallback
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file alongside the thumbnails it actually needs.
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If a new feature hands the webview a local file, widen this scope to that
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subdirectory specifically; a path outside it resolves to nothing and the webview
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reports `NETWORK_NO_SOURCE` (which is exactly how DR-134's failure presented).
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## Local Data Protection
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| Data Type | Protection |
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@@ -67,3 +127,4 @@ pub struct EncryptedFileStorage; // AES-256-GCM fallback
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3. **Logout Cleanup**: Token deletion from secure storage on logout
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4. **No Token Logging**: Tokens are never written to logs or debug output
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5. **IPC Security**: Tauri's IPC uses structured commands, not arbitrary code execution
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6. **Webview Containment**: A restrictive `script-src` keeps injected script off the IPC surface; the asset protocol is scoped to the thumbnail cache only (see above)
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@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
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| DR-131 | The offline mutation queue is drained. `sync_queue` had producers and no consumer: `PlaybackReporter::queue_for_sync` writes a row for every start/stop/mark-played that cannot reach the server, `sync_mark_processing`/`_completed`/`_failed` were registered commands with no callers, and no Rust task processed the table — so queued watch positions never reached Jellyfin and the offline banner's count only ever grew. A drain hangs off the same `connectivity:reconnected` transition as DR-120 (in Rust, because a drain started by a component dies with it) and replays rows oldest-first, so a stale start cannot move the server's resume position backwards after a later stop. `update_progress` replays as *stopped at N* rather than as progress — replaying a mid-playback report hours later would claim the item is still playing — and payloads are read in both dialects that exist in users' databases (`position_ticks` from Rust, camelCase `positionMs` from the frontend helper). A failed row stays queued for the next reconnect; after `MAX_SYNC_ATTEMPTS` it is `abandoned` and stops counting, because a row nothing can ever push is what turns the queue into a counter that only grows. An *unreachable* server is not counted as an attempt at all — the row goes back to `pending` untouched — so opening the app offline a few times cannot abandon good rows; only a server that answers and refuses spends the budget. The drain also runs once at startup, because a queue built in a previous session would otherwise sit untouched for a whole run whenever the server was reachable the entire time and no offline→online transition ever fired. Requires `MediaRepository::mark_played` (JA-035) — the previous stand-in reported a stop at `i64::MAX` | Backend | UR-025, UR-002 | Done |
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| DR-132 | The pending-sync count is answerable. The offline banner's badge read "N pending sync(s)" and led nowhere, so it was taken for pending *transfers* and looked for on the Downloads page — which lists the `downloads` table and structurally cannot show `sync_queue` rows. The badge becomes a button opening the queue it counts: each row's operation, the item's title (resolved by a `LEFT JOIN items` in `sync_get_pending`, not a per-row frontend fetch), when it was queued, and the error of anything failing, plus a "Sync now" that runs the DR-131 drain on demand. The same list is a Settings section, because a row that keeps failing is still queued when the server is reachable and no banner is on screen. The drain emits `sync-queue-changed` so the badge updates on reconnect instead of lagging by up to one 10s poll | UI | UR-025 | Done |
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| DR-133 | A downloaded file has exactly one on-disk path, and the row that names it is authoritative. `downloads.file_path` starts relative to the storage root, but the worker rewrites it to the absolute path it actually wrote when the transfer completes — so a *completed* row is already rooted. The video player's offline branch rooted it a second time, handing the asset protocol `/data/user/0/app//data/user/0/app/videos/x.mp4`; the webview reported `MEDIA_ERR_SRC_NOT_SUPPORTED` with `NETWORK_NO_SOURCE`, so every downloaded video failed to play while audio — which resolves the same column through Rust's `resolve_local_media_path`, without re-rooting — played fine. The join is absolute-aware (POSIX, Windows drive letters and UNC) so rows written before completion still resolve | Playback | UR-071 | Done |
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| DR-134 | The webview can actually fetch the local files it is handed. `convertFileSrc` rewrites a path to `http://asset.localhost/…` unconditionally, but Tauri only answers that origin when the `protocol-asset` cargo feature is compiled in *and* `app.security.assetProtocol.enable` is set — neither was, so every such URL reached a protocol with no handler and the webview reported `NETWORK_NO_SOURCE`. This silently defeated both offline video (`<video src>`) and the cached-thumbnail path in `imageCache`, which fails soft to the server copy and so hid the breakage whenever the server was reachable. The scope is `$APPDATA/**` — the storage root under which the database, `downloads/` and the thumbnail cache all live — rather than an unrestricted grant, so the webview can read the app's own media and nothing else | Security | UR-071 | Done |
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| DR-134 | The webview can actually fetch the local files it is handed. `convertFileSrc` rewrites a path to `http://asset.localhost/…` unconditionally, but Tauri only answers that origin when the `protocol-asset` cargo feature is compiled in *and* `app.security.assetProtocol.enable` is set — neither was, so every such URL reached a protocol with no handler and the webview reported `NETWORK_NO_SOURCE`. This silently defeated both offline video (`<video src>`) and the cached-thumbnail path in `imageCache`, which fails soft to the server copy and so hid the breakage whenever the server was reachable. The scope was `$APPDATA/**` — the storage root under which the database, `downloads/` and the thumbnail cache all live — rather than an unrestricted grant; DR-198 narrows it further to `$APPDATA/thumbnails/**`, since DR-137 moved downloaded media off this protocol and thumbnails are all it still serves | Security | UR-071 | Done |
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| DR-140 | An audio track is pinned only when the user picked one. Jellyfin's `MediaStream.Index` is global across every stream in a media source, so index 0 is the *video* stream on virtually all files — yet `AudioStreamIndex=0` was sent as "the first audio track" on the HLS transcode URL, the background audio-only handoff URL, the direct-play fallback URL, and the `PlaybackInfo` negotiation body. A server that honours the request literally then transcodes the video stream into the audio slot and the result plays as a picture with no sound; only servers that silently correct the index hid the bug, which is why it presented as "some videos have no audio". The parameter is now omitted whenever no track has been chosen, so the server resolves the source's `DefaultAudioStreamIndex`; an explicit selection from `player_switch_audio_track` is still carried through unchanged. On the `static=true` direct-play URL it is dropped outright — the original file is served untouched, so the parameter could only mislead | Playback | UR-004, UR-040 | Done |
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| DR-147 | One search input per screen, and the URL is the search's single source of truth. The header bar rendered only under `/library/**` and merely *navigated* to `/search` (DR-063), so a desktop search handed the user to a screen whose input was a different element — the header box cleared itself and vanished, and the page's own box took over mid-word. That page then re-derived its input from `?q=` against `library.searchQuery` on every store write, so the next keystroke re-ran the effect and snapped the text back to the query the header had sent (and a scope chip back to the URL's scope); entering from the bottom-nav Search tab skipped it only because the effect early-returned on an empty query. The bar now renders on `/search` too (`showHeaderSearch`) and is the sole md+ input — the page's own input is `md:hidden` — and on that route it republishes the query into the URL with `replaceState`, so a whole session of typing costs one history entry. The page *consumes* that URL once per distinct value (`seedFromSearchUrl` against a non-reactive `applied` marker) instead of continuously reconciling it, and the scope chips publish through the same URL so the bar and the chips cannot disagree. Landing on `/search` with a seeded query focuses the bar and puts the caret at the end, because the box the user was typing in belonged to the unmounted route | UI | UR-049, UR-054 | Done |
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| DR-142 | An episode has exactly **one** surface, and it is complete. Two divergent renderings existed: `EpisodeFocusView` (reached from Continue Watching, the series episode list, the TV landing page and Downloads — i.e. every real entry point) offered only Play and Favourite, while the bare `/library/<episodeId>` page nobody routed to carried the download button, the series/season breadcrumbs and the cast section. Opening an episode the normal way therefore silently lost the ability to download it. The Focus View is now the single surface and carries the full §5B.2 composition — hero action row `Play / Download / Favourite`, series name and `SxEy` badge as links back to the series and to that season's anchor, then genres → cast → similar shows *below* the episode strip, never above it (DR-062). `/library/<episodeId>` redirects into it (`episodeRedirectTarget`, the same rule seasons follow under DR-103), and an episode with no `seriesId` renders the same component series-less rather than falling back to a second, lesser page. The focused episode is fetched in full rather than reused from the season fan-out, because that is a *list* query and carries neither cast nor genres — the sections would have rendered empty. The strip hides itself when the episode has no siblings, a card that only shows the episode you are already on being noise | UI | UR-048, UR-058 | Done |
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@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
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| DR-137 | Local media is served to the player over a loopback HTTP server, not the asset protocol. Tauri's `asset` protocol answers a request carrying no `Range` header by reading the whole file into memory, and only advertises `Accept-Ranges: bytes` from *inside* its range branch — so the first request never learns ranges exist and a multi-gigabyte body is attempted instead. Chromium abandoned it with `PIPELINE_ERROR_READ` after ~31s, which reached the user as "downloaded video does not play offline". Real HTTP on `127.0.0.1` is chosen over a custom URI scheme deliberately: range support becomes a property of the transport rather than depending on whether a platform's webview forwards `Range` to a custom scheme. No response ever exceeds a 4 MiB chunk and bodies stream from the file handle, so memory is bounded regardless of file size. Because **loopback is shared between apps on Android**, the server binds `127.0.0.1` only and every URL carries a random per-session token; paths are additionally confined to the app data directory, so a leaked URL cannot read outside it. This is stage 1 of making the server the single media origin — remote passthrough and download-while-watching are deliberately out of scope here | Playback | UR-071 | Done |
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| DR-138 | Loopback is exempted from Android's cleartext ban, and nothing else is. Release builds set `usesCleartextTraffic="false"`, so the webview's request to the local media server (DR-137) was rejected by network security policy before any I/O — `<video>` failed in the same millisecond as `loadstart`, with `NETWORK_NO_SOURCE` and no server-side log at all, which is why it looked identical to a missing file. A `network-security-config` resource permits cleartext for `127.0.0.1` only and keeps `base-config cleartextTrafficPermitted="false"`, so a remote server must still be HTTPS; this is deliberately not a blanket opt-in. The manifest attribute is ignored once the config is present, so the config is the single authority. `sync-android-sources.sh` also had to learn to copy `res/xml`, which it skipped — the manifest references the resource, so a missed copy fails the resource link rather than degrading quietly | Security | UR-071 | Done |
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| DR-093 | Traceability coverage gate derives its requirement denominators from `requirements.md` at run time rather than hardcoded literals: `countDefinedRequirements` counts an ID only where it leads a markdown table row (ignoring the "Traces To" column and prose) and deduplicates IDs listed both in the definition tables and in the §3 traceability matrix; `computeCoverage` reports the *intersection* of traced and defined IDs so an ID traced in code but absent from `requirements.md` is surfaced as `orphaned` instead of inflating the ratio past 100%. UT/IT test identifiers are excluded as a separate taxonomy. CI and `bun run traces:coverage` share this computation and fail on both a sub-threshold and an impossible >100% result | Tooling | - | Done |
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| DR-198 | The webview runs under a real Content-Security-Policy, and the asset protocol is scoped to the one directory it still serves. `csp` was `null`, which disables CSP entirely: any script that reached the web layer — through a future `{@html}`, a dependency, or a devtools paste — would have inherited the whole IPC surface, and with it the user's session. `script-src 'self'` (Tauri injects a nonce for SvelteKit's inline bootstrap script at build time, so no `'unsafe-inline'` is needed) plus `object-src`/`frame-src 'none'` and `base-uri 'self'` is the part that is genuinely restrictive. `img-src`/`media-src`/`connect-src` cannot be: the Jellyfin origin is typed in by the user at run time and is commonly plain `http` on a LAN, so they allow `http:`/`https:` — a wide grant for *data*, but one that still bars `file:`, `filesystem:` and scripting schemes, and leaves `script-src` untouched. `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because Svelte compiles `style="…"` attributes (including `app.html`'s `display: contents` wrapper) into markup; this is safe only while no `<style>` element survives into `index.html`, since a nonce there would make Tauri's injection outrank — and therefore void — `'unsafe-inline'`. `worker-src blob:` and `media-src blob:` are hls.js: it demuxes in a worker built from a blob and attaches MSE through `URL.createObjectURL`. `asset:` and `http://asset.localhost` are the same protocol under the two naming schemes `convertFileSrc` emits (custom scheme on Linux/macOS, `http` host on Windows/Android); `ipc:`/`http://ipc.localhost` is the invoke transport, which would otherwise be blocked by `connect-src`. A run-time CSP naming the server origin exactly was rejected: Tauri computes the header from immutable config when it serves the HTML, so it would mean rebuilding config and reloading the webview on every server change, for a policy the user can already point anywhere. The asset-protocol scope narrows from `$APPDATA/**` to `$APPDATA/thumbnails/**` — since DR-137 moved downloaded media to the loopback server, `imageCache` is the only `convertFileSrc` caller left, so the database and the encrypted-token fallback file no longer sit inside the grant | Security | UR-012, UR-071 | Done |
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---
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@@ -386,7 +387,7 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
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| UR-009 | IR-009, IR-010, IR-011 | - |
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| UR-010 | IR-012, IR-021 | DR-037, DR-059 |
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| UR-011 | IR-013 | DR-003, DR-015, DR-018 |
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| UR-012 | IR-009, IR-014 | - |
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| UR-012 | IR-009, IR-014 | DR-198 |
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| UR-013 | IR-013 | DR-017 |
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| UR-014 | IR-010 | DR-014, DR-019 |
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| UR-015 | - | DR-005, DR-020 |
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@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
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| UR-068 | - | DR-119 |
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| UR-069 | - | DR-113, DR-114, DR-120 |
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| UR-070 | - | DR-121, DR-122 |
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| UR-071 | IR-032 | DR-123, DR-124, DR-125, DR-126, DR-127, DR-128, DR-133, DR-134, DR-135, DR-136, DR-137, DR-138, DR-170, DR-171, DR-180 |
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| UR-071 | IR-032 | DR-123, DR-124, DR-125, DR-126, DR-127, DR-128, DR-133, DR-134, DR-135, DR-136, DR-137, DR-138, DR-170, DR-171, DR-180, DR-198 |
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| UR-072 | - | DR-156 |
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| UR-073 | - | DR-158 |
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| UR-074 | - | DR-162, DR-177, DR-181 |
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@@ -643,6 +644,7 @@ Internal architecture, components, and application logic.
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| UT-190 | `build_next_up_endpoint` sends `EnableResumable=false` with the user and limit, and no `SeriesId` filter when none was requested | DR-197, JA-036 | Done |
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| UT-191 | A per-series next-up query keeps `SeriesId` and the resumable exclusion, and defaults the limit | DR-197 | Done |
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| UT-192 | `filterInProgressNextUpItems` drops an episode present in the resume list, keeps the genuinely unstarted next episode, leaves the rest of the row intact, and is a no-op when nothing is in progress | DR-197 | Done |
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| UT-193 | The shipped Tauri security config stays restrictive: `csp` is set, `script-src` carries no `'unsafe-inline'`/`'unsafe-eval'`/wildcard, `object-src`/`frame-src` are `'none'`, the directives playback needs (asset scheme, loopback, `blob:`, `ipc:`) are present, and the asset-protocol scope covers only the thumbnail cache — never the storage root that holds the database | DR-198 | Done |
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### Integration Tests
|
||||
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+4200
-4160
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ describe("live requirements.md", () => {
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expect(defined.UR).toBe(75);
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expect(defined.IR).toBe(32);
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expect(defined.DR).toBe(187);
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expect(defined.DR).toBe(188);
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expect(defined.JA).toBe(36);
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expect(defined.total).toBe(330);
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expect(defined.total).toBe(331);
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});
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||||
});
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@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
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/**
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* Guards the shipped webview security configuration.
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*
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* `csp` was `null` and the asset protocol was scoped to the whole storage root,
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* which is the directory holding the SQLite database and the encrypted-token
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* fallback file. Both are one-character regressions away and neither is visible
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* in any behavioural test, so they are asserted here instead: the restrictive
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* half of the policy must stay restrictive, and the permissive half must keep
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||||
* the schemes playback actually needs.
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*
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* TRACES: UR-012, UR-071 | DR-198 | UT-193
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||||
*/
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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import { readFileSync } from "fs";
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import { resolve } from "path";
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|
||||
const config = JSON.parse(
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readFileSync(resolve(__dirname, "../src-tauri/tauri.conf.json"), "utf-8")
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);
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const security = config.app.security;
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/** Split a CSP string into `directive -> sources`. */
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function directives(csp: string): Record<string, string[]> {
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const map: Record<string, string[]> = {};
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||||
for (const part of csp.split(";")) {
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const [name, ...sources] = part.trim().split(/\s+/);
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if (name) map[name] = sources;
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}
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return map;
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}
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describe("tauri.conf.json CSP", () => {
|
||||
it("is set at all — a null CSP hands any injected script the full IPC surface", () => {
|
||||
expect(typeof security.csp).toBe("string");
|
||||
expect(security.csp.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const csp = directives(security.csp as string);
|
||||
|
||||
it("locks down script execution", () => {
|
||||
// Tauri injects a nonce for SvelteKit's inline bootstrap script at build
|
||||
// time, so 'self' alone is enough and inline/eval must never be re-added.
|
||||
expect(csp["script-src"]).toEqual(["'self'"]);
|
||||
expect(csp["object-src"]).toEqual(["'none'"]);
|
||||
expect(csp["frame-src"]).toEqual(["'none'"]);
|
||||
expect(csp["base-uri"]).toEqual(["'self'"]);
|
||||
expect(csp["default-src"]).toEqual(["'self'"]);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("keeps the schemes playback and thumbnails depend on", () => {
|
||||
// The asset protocol under both names convertFileSrc emits.
|
||||
expect(csp["img-src"]).toContain("asset:");
|
||||
expect(csp["img-src"]).toContain("http://asset.localhost");
|
||||
expect(csp["media-src"]).toContain("asset:");
|
||||
// hls.js: MSE object URLs, and its demuxer worker built from a blob.
|
||||
expect(csp["media-src"]).toContain("blob:");
|
||||
expect(csp["worker-src"]).toContain("blob:");
|
||||
// The token-guarded loopback media server (DR-137).
|
||||
expect(csp["media-src"]).toContain("http://127.0.0.1:*");
|
||||
// Tauri's invoke transport.
|
||||
expect(csp["connect-src"]).toContain("ipc:");
|
||||
expect(csp["connect-src"]).toContain("http://ipc.localhost");
|
||||
// The user's Jellyfin server: an arbitrary run-time origin, http on a LAN.
|
||||
for (const directive of ["img-src", "media-src", "connect-src"]) {
|
||||
expect(csp[directive]).toContain("http:");
|
||||
expect(csp[directive]).toContain("https:");
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("never widens a data directive into script execution", () => {
|
||||
for (const [name, sources] of Object.entries(csp)) {
|
||||
if (name === "script-src" || name === "worker-src") {
|
||||
expect(sources).not.toContain("'unsafe-eval'");
|
||||
expect(sources).not.toContain("'unsafe-inline'");
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A bare `*` would re-admit every scheme, including file:.
|
||||
expect(sources).not.toContain("*");
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("tauri.conf.json asset protocol scope", () => {
|
||||
const scope: string[] = security.assetProtocol.scope;
|
||||
|
||||
it("covers only the thumbnail cache, not the storage root", () => {
|
||||
expect(scope).toEqual(["$APPDATA/thumbnails/**"]);
|
||||
// The database and the encrypted-token fallback live directly in $APPDATA.
|
||||
expect(scope).not.toContain("$APPDATA/**");
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -23,11 +23,15 @@ debug = "line-tables-only"
|
||||
tauri-build = { version = "2", features = [] }
|
||||
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
# protocol-asset serves downloaded media and cached thumbnails to the webview
|
||||
# over http://asset.localhost; without it convertFileSrc yields a URL nothing
|
||||
# answers. Paired with app.security.assetProtocol in tauri.conf.json, which
|
||||
# scopes it to $APPDATA/**.
|
||||
# TRACES: UR-071 | DR-134
|
||||
# protocol-asset serves cached thumbnails to the webview (asset://localhost on
|
||||
# Linux/macOS, http://asset.localhost on Windows/Android); without it
|
||||
# convertFileSrc yields a URL nothing answers. Paired with
|
||||
# app.security.assetProtocol in tauri.conf.json, which scopes it to
|
||||
# $APPDATA/thumbnails/** — the one directory still read through this protocol.
|
||||
# Downloaded media went the same way until DR-137 moved it to the loopback media
|
||||
# server, so the database, the encrypted-token fallback file and downloads/ are
|
||||
# all outside the grant now.
|
||||
# TRACES: UR-012, UR-071 | DR-134, DR-137, DR-198
|
||||
tauri = { version = "2", features = ["protocol-asset"] }
|
||||
tauri-plugin-opener = "2"
|
||||
tauri-plugin-os = "2"
|
||||
|
||||
+15
-8
@@ -1029,16 +1029,23 @@ fn set_env_if_unset(key: &str, value: &str) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Downloaded media and cached thumbnails are handed to the webview as
|
||||
/// `http://asset.localhost/…` URLs by `convertFileSrc`. Tauri only answers that
|
||||
/// Cached thumbnails are handed to the webview as asset-protocol URLs by
|
||||
/// `convertFileSrc` (`asset://localhost/…` on Linux/macOS,
|
||||
/// `http://asset.localhost/…` on Windows/Android). Tauri only answers that
|
||||
/// origin when the `protocol-asset` cargo feature is compiled in *and*
|
||||
/// `app.security.assetProtocol.enable` is set in `tauri.conf.json`, which also
|
||||
/// scopes it to `$APPDATA/**` — the storage root holding the database,
|
||||
/// `downloads/` and the thumbnail cache. Both are required together: with either
|
||||
/// missing the URL resolves to nothing and the webview reports
|
||||
/// `NETWORK_NO_SOURCE`, which is how offline video came to fail silently.
|
||||
/// `app.security.assetProtocol.enable` is set in `tauri.conf.json`. Both are
|
||||
/// required together: with either missing the URL resolves to nothing and the
|
||||
/// webview reports `NETWORK_NO_SOURCE`, which is how offline video came to fail
|
||||
/// silently.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// TRACES: UR-071 | DR-134
|
||||
/// The scope is `$APPDATA/thumbnails/**`, not the storage root: downloaded media
|
||||
/// moved to the loopback media server in DR-137, so `imageCache` is the only
|
||||
/// remaining `convertFileSrc` caller and the database and the encrypted-token
|
||||
/// fallback file — which share that root — never need to be readable by the
|
||||
/// webview. Widen it only if something other than thumbnails starts resolving
|
||||
/// through `convertFileSrc` again.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// TRACES: UR-012, UR-071 | DR-134, DR-137, DR-198
|
||||
#[cfg_attr(mobile, tauri::mobile_entry_point)]
|
||||
pub fn run() {
|
||||
// Initialize logger
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,10 +18,11 @@
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security": {
|
||||
"csp": null,
|
||||
"csp": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src 'self' data: blob: asset: http://asset.localhost http: https:; media-src 'self' blob: asset: http://asset.localhost http://127.0.0.1:* http: https:; connect-src 'self' ipc: http://ipc.localhost http: https:; worker-src 'self' blob:; object-src 'none'; frame-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'",
|
||||
"devCsp": "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self' data:; img-src 'self' data: blob: asset: http://asset.localhost http: https:; media-src 'self' blob: asset: http://asset.localhost http://127.0.0.1:* http: https:; connect-src 'self' ipc: http://ipc.localhost http: https: ws: wss:; worker-src 'self' blob:; object-src 'none'; frame-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'",
|
||||
"assetProtocol": {
|
||||
"enable": true,
|
||||
"scope": ["$APPDATA/**"]
|
||||
"scope": ["$APPDATA/thumbnails/**"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,10 @@ export async function getCachedImageUrl(
|
||||
const cachedPath = await commands.thumbnailGetCached(itemId, imageType, tag);
|
||||
|
||||
if (cachedPath) {
|
||||
// Convert file path to asset URL for Tauri
|
||||
// Convert file path to asset URL for Tauri. This is the only remaining
|
||||
// convertFileSrc caller, which is why the asset-protocol scope is narrowed
|
||||
// to $APPDATA/thumbnails/** — a path outside it resolves to nothing.
|
||||
// TRACES: UR-012 | DR-134, DR-198
|
||||
return convertFileSrc(cachedPath);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user