dtourolle 38dd1129e5 feat(security): set a restrictive CSP and scope the asset protocol to thumbnails
`app.security.csp` was `null`, so the webview ran with no Content-Security-Policy
at all: any script that reached the web layer would have inherited the whole IPC
surface. There is no known injection path today (one app-owned `{@html}`, no
`innerHTML`/`eval`), so this is defence in depth rather than a fix for an open
hole.

`script-src 'self'` is the restrictive half — Tauri nonces SvelteKit's inline
bootstrap script at build time, so no `'unsafe-inline'` is needed — together with
`object-src`/`frame-src 'none'` and `base-uri 'self'`. `img-src`/`media-src`/
`connect-src` cannot be restrictive: the Jellyfin origin is typed in by the user
at run time and is routinely plain http on a LAN, so they allow `http:`/`https:`.
That is a wide grant for data, but it still bars `file:`/`filesystem:` and does
not touch script execution. A run-time policy naming the server exactly was
rejected: Tauri derives the header from immutable config when it serves the HTML,
so it would mean rebuilding config and reloading the webview on every server
change. `style-src` keeps `'unsafe-inline'` because Svelte compiles `style="…"`
attributes into markup; `worker-src`/`media-src` keep `blob:` for hls.js's
demuxer worker and its MSE object URL; `ipc:`/`http://ipc.localhost` keeps
`invoke` working. `devCsp` mirrors it with the eval/inline/websocket allowances
Vite's dev server needs.

The asset-protocol scope narrows from `$APPDATA/**` — the storage root holding
the SQLite database and the encrypted-token fallback file — to
`$APPDATA/thumbnails/**`. Since DR-137 moved downloaded media to the loopback
media server, `imageCache` is the only `convertFileSrc` caller left.

Needs manual verification on both platforms: thumbnails, online HLS video and
offline downloaded video cannot be exercised headlessly.
2026-08-16 22:58:53 +02:00
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JellyTau logo
JellyTau

A cross-platform Jellyfin client built with Tauri, SvelteKit, and TypeScript.

Business logic lives in a Rust backend; a UI-rich Svelte frontend handles presentation and talks to it over Tauri's IPC. Targets Linux (libmpv) and Android (ExoPlayer).

Getting Started

This project uses bun as its package manager.

# Activate the Rust environment (fish shell)
source "$HOME/.cargo/env.fish"

# Install dependencies
bun install

# Run in development
bun run tauri dev

# Type-check the frontend
bun run check

# Build for Linux
bun run tauri build

# Build for Android
bun run tauri android build

For the full set of build, test, and Android helper scripts, see scripts/README.md.

Documentation

Topic Location
Architecture overview & subsystem docs docs/architecture/
Requirements, traceability & technical debt docs/requirements.md
Build & release process docs/build-release.md
Docker builds docs/build/docker.md
Traceability tooling & CI docs/traceability.md, docs/traceability-ci.md
Release checklist docs/release-checklist.md
UX flows docs/ux-flows.md

VS Code + Svelte + Tauri + rust-analyzer.

License

MIT

S
Description
A jellyfin client with Tauri
Readme MIT
79 MiB
2026-08-22 08:10:12 +00:00
Languages
Rust 49.1%
TypeScript 26.6%
Svelte 17.1%
Kotlin 4.9%
Shell 1.7%
Other 0.5%