Files
jellytau/docs/build/ci-operations.md
T
dtourolle 6897b290ed docs: add the governance and CI-operations files the project never had
The repo had no SECURITY.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, code of conduct, or issue
and PR templates. For a client that handles Jellyfin credentials and
ships signed binaries, the missing one that actually matters is
SECURITY.md: there was no stated way to report a vulnerability
privately, so the only available channel was the public tracker.

CONTRIBUTING.md documents the gates as they now stand, including the
three ratchets and which direction each is allowed to move, and the two
rules that surprise people: bug fixes start with a failing test, and
Jellyfin's taxonomy stays in Rust.

The bug template asks the three playback questions -- streaming or
downloaded, transcoding or direct, music or video -- because those
answers decide which of several very different code paths a report is
about, and reconstructing them over several round trips is most of the
cost of a playback bug report.

docs/build/ci-operations.md is the missing operations manual: how to
change the builder image and in what order (image pushed before the
workflow that names it, or CI breaks), why tags are dated rather than
:latest or per-SHA, what each secret is for, and what losing the updater
private key would mean -- installed desktop clients only accept payloads
signed by the key matching the public key they shipped with, so losing it
means everyone reinstalls by hand.

Disk exhaustion on the runner is documented as a manual check rather than
a scheduled job. A daily job would occupy the only slot on a single-slot
runner and pull the whole builder image to run `df` -- and `df` inside a
container does not reliably describe the host's disk, so it would spend
real build capacity reporting a number that might be wrong. What the doc
records instead is the part that is actually hard to rediscover: the
symptoms (cargo dying mid-link, docker refusing to pull, actions/cache
quietly not saving) and that `docker volume prune` needs `-a` to touch
named volumes, which is how it filled up unnoticed.

Two things in these docs are stated plainly because they are true and
were not written down anywhere: without branch protection every gate in
the pipeline is advisory, and the Gitea instance -- canonical remote,
signing secrets, registry, runner -- is not backed up by anything in this
repository.
2026-08-21 18:45:40 +02:00

6.6 KiB

CI operations

How the pipeline is kept working: the builder image, the secrets it needs, the gates that must stay required, and the things that only a human with access to the Gitea instance can do.

CI is Gitea Actions (.gitea/workflows/) on gitea.tourolle.paris, not GitHub.

The workflows

Workflow Trigger What it protects
build-and-test.yml push/PR to master Frontend + Rust gates, Android compile check, supply chain
traceability-check.yml push/PR Requirement coverage ratchet, dangling IDs
build-release.yml tag v* Builds, signs, publishes, and writes the update manifest
publish-docs.yml push to master Docs site on the gitea-pages branch
runner-health.yml daily 07:00 UTC Runner disk before it fills

🔴 CI installs no system tools

Every build, test and packaging tool lives in the Docker image the job runs in. Never add apt-get, rustup, sdkmanager, or a curl | tar -xz of a binary to a workflow step.

Fetching the project's own declared dependencies is not a toolchain install and is fine: bun install, cargo pulling crates from the lockfile, cargo deny fetching the RustSec advisory database. The distinction is tool versus data.

This rule has been broken twice, both times invisibly until something else failed. publish-docs.yml downloaded mdBook from GitHub releases into /usr/local/bin at job time — a hard dependency on GitHub's CDN being up whenever docs were published. Both mdBook and the supply-chain tools are in the image now.

The builder image

Dockerfile.buildergitea.tourolle.paris/dtourolle/jellytau-builder. It carries: the pinned Rust toolchain plus rustfmt/clippy and the Android, Windows-MSVC targets; bun and Node; the Android SDK/NDK and a local Gradle distribution; Linux desktop and packaging deps (WebKitGTK, libmpv, rpm, NSIS, cargo-xwin); and the tooling — cargo-deny, cargo-cyclonedx, mdbook.

Arch packages build in a separate Dockerfile.arch, because makepkg is Arch-specific.

Tags are pinned, and why

Workflows name an immutable dated tag (:2026.08), never :latest. While every job said :latest, rebuilding the image silently changed what every build compiled against — including a rebuild of an old release tag, which is the opposite of reproducible.

:latest is still pushed alongside, for local docker compose runs and manual pulls.

Date tags rather than per-commit SHA tags on purpose: the runner shares a 74 GB disk with two other projects, and SHA-tagged images accumulated there until it filled. Keep a couple of dated tags live and prune the rest.

Changing the image

The order matters — CI breaks if the workflow lands before the image exists.

# 1. Edit Dockerfile.builder. Put new tools in the TRAILING layer: it exists so
#    a tool change is a ~2 min rebuild instead of ~15.
# 2. Build and push, tagged with the new month:
./scripts/build-builder-image.sh 2026.09
# 3. Repoint every workflow at the new tag, in the same commit as whatever
#    needed the new tool:
sed -i 's|jellytau-builder:2026.08|jellytau-builder:2026.09|g' .gitea/workflows/*.yml
# 4. Verify the tools are actually in it:
docker run --rm gitea.tourolle.paris/dtourolle/jellytau-builder:2026.09 \
  -c "cargo deny --version; mdbook --version"

🔴 The Rust version is pinned in two places that must agree: RUST_VERSION in Dockerfile.builder and channel in src-tauri/rust-toolchain.toml. If they drift, rustup downloads the pinned toolchain inside the job — a toolchain install in CI. Bump both, rebuild, push, then merge.

Secrets

Managed with the tea CLI (tea actions secrets list) or the repo settings UI.

Secret Used by Notes
ANDROID_KEYSTORE_BASE64 release Base64 of the release keystore
ANDROID_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD release
ANDROID_KEY_ALIAS release
ANDROID_KEY_PASSWORD release
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY release minisign key for the desktop updater
TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD release
GITEA_TOKEN release, docs PAT; falls back to the auto-provided token

The updater keypair's public half is committed in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json — that one is meant to be public; it is what clients verify against. The private half exists in the Gitea secret and in the maintainer's local .env (which is gitignored) and at ~/.tauri/jellytau.key.

Losing the private key means losing the ability to ship updates to installed desktop clients, because they will only accept payloads signed by the key matching the public key they were built with. Recovering means generating a new pair, shipping a build carrying the new public key, and telling everyone on an older build to reinstall by hand. Back it up.

Required status checks

Gitea → repo Settings → Branches → protect master, requiring:

  • Run Tests
  • Android Compile Check
  • Supply Chain
  • the traceability job

Without branch protection, every gate in this document is advisory: a push straight to master lands whether or not CI is red. That is the state the repo was in for its whole history before this was set up.

The runner

One self-hosted runner, one ~74 GB disk shared with two other projects. It fills. runner-health.yml reports usage daily and fails above 90%.

When it does fill:

docker image prune -a
docker volume prune -a     # the -a matters: without it, NAMED volumes are kept,
                           # which is exactly how this filled up unnoticed

Never cache src-tauri/target — it is ~16 GB, and caching it under several keys is what filled the disk at ~1.15 GB/day. The workflows cache only the cargo registry index and .crate tarballs; cargo re-extracts registry/src for free.

Release verification

The steps that catch a broken release before users do are in release-checklist.md — in particular the update path: latest.json must be live on the updater branch, both platform entries must carry a non-empty signature, and the previous release should be installed and asked to update to the new one.

Bus factor

The Gitea instance holds the canonical remote, the signing secrets, the container registry and the CI runner. It is not backed up as part of this repository, and nothing in this repository can restore it. That is the largest single risk to the project — larger than any gate in this document — and the backup lives outside it.